@ Tomaltach
I disagree. This ship will drift from treaty port to treaty port, long past the point where an EU constitution would have served as a safe harbour.
1787 had a congress with records, and a pro and anti record with the Federalist and Anti Federalist papers.

What we have had so far was a what????

One thing about the 1st attempt was its valorisation of our historical ‘forms’ of power, as if history had a soverignty.

We need the discipline and openess of a founding, but with a freshness and spark of creativity.
I fear the weight of history will defeat the whole project!

Al

Thanking you for the clarity.

So, in the interests of kick starting the economy…
Would anyone like to buy a vote???

Only joking!????

Al

.. “The impact wouldn’t be measurable but for a country so-dependent on FDI, a rejection would hardly serve the interests of Ireland.”

I’m intrigued that you have formed a view that

- there will be any FDI available anywhere in the mid term, as, globally, debts exceeds money supply, or thereabouts.

- that an unelected and unaccountable EU commission, newly granted emperor-like powers, including regulation of FDI, will know or care where ireland is and what happens there

- that areas of greater political importance to the Commission will somehow not get FDI that passes under the Commissions’ nose

.. And that we would not, as a nation, be better off selling our ‘yes’ vote for something more interesting than the right to indebt ourselves up to the oxters for seven generations.

“That said, I think the economic consequences of the Lisbon referendum are minimal, regardless which way the vote goes, so we should not be debating this on Irish Economy.”

The impact wouldn’t be measurable but for a country so-dependent on FDI, a rejection would hardly serve the interests of Ireland.

Perception and reputation does count and the impact of the crash is already evident there.

Graham has already clarified the point about the increased role of the European Parliamnet and national parliaments. Many thanks Graham for that. The extended co-decision means that the European Parliament will have a greater involvement in the legislative process. The European Parliament and the Council will have to agree on the text of the proposed law before it can become law. National parliaments will have the power to have a say on proposed legislation before this is considered in detail by the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers.

Part Two: National Parliaments

As you likely know, most EU laws require transposition into National Law in order for them to take effect. Lisbon formally recognises this by giving national parliaments a consultative role in the drafting of directives before the final Directive hits the OJ.

This just makes sense. It’s like best practice for European public policy.

For instance, the number of areas for which the codecision procedure are applied will be increased under Lisbon. This adds weight to the institution, even in the areas in which it already operates.

In recent years, there is an increased awareness of the contribution the EP makes to the production of robust EU level laws.

This is owning not only to fact that the institution is fundamentally democratic, but also because by its nature and modus operandi it is open and transparent in a way the other two institutions were never designed to be.

For instance, in the area of financial reform, the EP has made a number of insightful and utterly approperiate amendments and improvements to a raft of directives in the wake of the de Larosiere report. The debates which surround these changes stimulate active engagement on the part of stakeholders (lobbyists) and the wider citizenry in these issues.

That could never happen if EU law just went straight from the Commission to the Council.

Admittedly, it is still in its infancy, and it is certainly not sexy, but maybe getting 27 countries to work together just isn’t ever going to be as interesting as a Lynx ad.

As robust as a sheet in the wind, apparently.

The Ray Kinsella character, played by Kevin Costner in the 1989 movie Field of Dreams, hears a voice whisper, “if you build it, he will come,” as he walks through his cornfield.

I would suggest that the real Ray Kinsella needs to get out of his ivory tower more often for some air at ground level.

Even at a human level, where Ireland has had to tender the tin ponny for rescue from its self-inflicted wounds, how could he conclude a rejection of the LT would be good for Ireland?

A small country with a governance system totally unfit for purpose and most of the members of its Parliament unable to address crucial issues such as the banking crisis, in a coherent manner, dictating to the rest of Europe, is beyond a joke.

“It will also strengthen the role of both the European Parliament and national parliaments in the decision-making process.”

Could you define this further?
Is this a legislative role?

Al

Can’t see that Lisbon is going to affect these to much of a degree.

You can make a “slippery slope” argument, but that is something else entirely and really doesn’t sustain Pramit’s claims.

Widgren (2009), CESifo Economic Studies

See also Napel and Widgren (unpubl): http://www.soc.utu.fi/sivustot/pcrc/files/Widgren.pdf

The Lisbon Treaty will bring more clarity on who does what and there will be less confusion and uncertainty in the future about the distribution of powers between the Union and Member States. It will also strengthen the role of both the European Parliament and national parliaments in the decision-making process.

I think a muddled compromise is the only possible way the Eu could have and ever can evolve. This is not Philedelphia 1787. The Eu constitution has been built up over five decades and reflects various agreements between well established, sovereign states.

A future Eu can ammend its policies if current priorities are changed. Yes, I accept that there is an element of inflexibility and inertia - but that is a feature of the current EU, not created by Lisbon. In fact, Lisbon makes an attempt to make this process more flexible (policy changes without full conventions) though understandably there was resistance to any mechanism that allowed radical changes (such as the transfer of new competence).

Lisbon is a constitutional treaty. Things should be decided on principle. It may be uncontroversial to transfer competence over tourism policy, and innocent at that, but it is wrong nonetheless. A consitution should be based on clarity of thought. Not muddled compromise.

Similarly, Lisbon elevates certain aspects of environmental protection at the expense of others. This reflects current priorities, but sets them in stone. A future EU will be obliged to protect the climate (whatever that may mean) even if it is no longer threatened.

And so on.

That said, I think the economic consequences of the Lisbon referendum are minimal, regardless which way the vote goes, so we should not be debating this on Irish Economy.

No material reaction on bond markets after the last No.
I wouldn’t expect any significant impact after another No either. At least not at first.
(asset swap spreads over Greece might rise a few basis points, but in the wider scheme of things, that’s peanuts).

That said, Ireland has already paid a tribute in voting No last year.
I would not able to quantify it. But it was real.

I don’t think many investors would have dumped Irish government bonds on account of the No vote alone.
The cost of borrowing did not of course jump dramatically on 13 June 2008.

The far bigger tribute was paid some months later, coming on top of a number of other significant negatives. The banks crisis (and its mishandling), along with the prospects of persistently wide budget deficits over the coming years, was of course the major culprit for the severe cheapening of Irish bonds.

However the spectre of the earlier No hung over investment decisions. I’m sure at the margin the No vote did play a role in helping cheapen Irish debt at that point.

Some Irish debt today is still trading cheaper than that of single A Greece. That is a concrete tribute, if needed, to the dim view such investors have of the present government’s treatment of taxpayer interests.
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*** What would happen this time on the day ? ***

The world, nor the economic outlook, will not fall apart the day after yet another No. I wouldn’t see any repeat of Denmark 1992 (it did feel as the bottom fell out of Europe 2 June 1992)

So the issues for investors are very much long term in nature. e.g. will Ireland begin to live within its means… ? Can the Irish state afford the luxury of rescuing and protecting its local banks ? And will the Irish public be able to play within the rules of monetary union?

Lisbon has no immediate or direct bearing on these long term questions. So a No on the day would not have any material impact.
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*** What could happen longer term? ***

I’d be afraid however that a No vote could still be interpreted – at some stage - as an indication that Ireland is not ready for the sizable belt tightening that is still needed for eurozone membership.

In the immediate instance, a No vote might be seen as a sign of government weakness. Investors appreciate competent and effective leadership from a government, with results. It does no help to go on collecting faux pas, one after another.

Now the people who make decisions over such investments have - on the whole - a fairly sophisticated understanding of the circumstances of such a vote, I think. Another No vote would be water under the bridge ex post. This would be just one factor entering into the continuous reassessment that investors make on the potential for future Irish governments to stabilise the economy and finances in the years to come.

The real risk is rather if we were to see another funding crisis. A second No vote – some months or years previously - would again (and at the margin) make investors less likely to entertain risk on Irish securities.

Another NO would be seen as confirming Ireland as one of the more eurosceptic members of the eurozone. Investors will want to know what commitment there is by the public to eurozone membership. Not just commitment to the ideal…but to the necessary belt tightening.

I don’t believe the double majority can lead to enhanced gridlock. First, the bulk of decisions in the council are taken without recourse to voting. But second, the double majority in practise is similar to what went before. It is really only a minor adjustment. Under Nice 255 votes are required out of 345 where Germany has 29 and Ireland 7. So 73% of votes are required. If you look at the list of voting weights entirely this means you need, starting at Germany at the top, all votes down to Hungary, which means you need states with 411 million or 83% or the union population. So in essence you are moving from 73% / 83% down to 65% / 55%. There is no question but the bar is being lowered not raised in Lisbon.

You said some people are saying Yes is better some are saying No. But in terms of MEPs, Commission, Member state governments, Business groups and most major unions, (along with representatives of American investment groups) the odds stack heavily in favour of yes. It is not merely that opinion is divided down the middle. You are dismissing too readily the extent of support for the treaty among very influential groups.

To say that we can throw out Lisbon and come back in 10 years and rewrite the union’s architecture misses a couple of other important points. First, there is no appetite to re-open this whole debate - not among member governments, not among Eu officials. It has taken painstakingly long to get here. Inching this far took over a decade. And that was with the participation of a UK government that (at the time) was very much pro-European (early Blair). The next 10 years is likely to see a lot of conservative rule in the UK who will want, not to construct a new eu institutional architecture, but to merely dismantle much of what has been in place.

Finally the Eu has evolved its balance between intergovernmentalism and supranationalism very delicately, with, at times, the big countries diverging over the strength of the commission or the centrality of the council. We are where we are after painful compromise on these issues. Throwing a ‘fresh’ framework on the table has practically zero chance of ever getting past the first meeting of council officials, not to mention getting onto the Leaders’ desks.

Among other reasons, apart from the lack-lustre campaigning efforts of all the main political parties, Lisbon 1 was lost because whole swathes of the electorate - farmers, women voters and the moderate left - ‘deserted’ the ‘yes’ side in droves and voted against.

This time it appears the farmers may be back on board, e.g. opinion polls in the Farmers’ Journal etc. The opinions of women voters are more difficult to judge. As was the case with the Nice Treaty, their voting intentions are more influenced by propaganda-induced fears about EU militarisation/ conscription of sons into an EU army or social issues like abortion and euthanasia. As for the moderate left, 54% of Labour supporters voted ‘no’ to Lisbon 1. Prof. Michael Marsh’s team analysis of the result of Lisbon 2 should tell a tale about what happens with their votes this time. Moreover, when Lisbon 1 took place, the full extent of our economic crash to come was not appreciated and most people still believed in the ’soft landing’ theory. Circumstances have changed in the meantime.

No matter how much ‘No’ campaigners try to distract from it, the economy will be the issue uppermost in people’s minds when they go to vote next week. As shown by the reasons people subsequently gave to pollsters as to why they voted ‘no’ the last time, the actual contents of the Lisbon Treaty had little to do with it. An appreciation of the finer details of the Lisbon Treaty will probably be just as important this time out, which is not at all. But this time, arguably,what nobody wants to do is risk a ‘no’ vote if it would lead to any further deterioration in our economy. It’s not a fear thing; it’s the application of common sense.

The big ‘unknown’ is how important a factor hatred of the government will prove to be in influencing people’s voting choice. Neither the ‘yes’ nor ‘no’ campaigns have been particularly impressive this time around and the political class remain largely absent from the stage. Right now, I would expect it’s running about 60 - 40 in favour of a ‘yes’ result. If the simple and pragmatic economic arguments for voting ‘yes’, as set out in some of the comments on this thread, are more widely publicised in the final days of the campaign, that margin may widen even more.

If instead we imagine that each individuals decision includes some uncertainty(u) (e.g. Y*=XB+u) and the person votes yes if Y*>0, then in a once off referendum, the aggregate of all the indivuals u’s may push the number of yes voters over the 50% mark. (or could go the other way). The important point is there’s an equal chance of both (if u is symmetric). However if you only re-run in the advent of a ‘no’ then you are biasing the whole process in favour of a yes.

Also, to suggest that a re-run is fine since it allows people to answer yes if they “accept that your concerns have been adequately addressed?”, ignores the counter argument that it prevents people who have altered their view of the consequence negatively to change to a ‘no’.

[If we really cared about whether the decision reflects the views of the citizens a more democratic solution is to have a representative survey every x years and if the majority say 'no' after an original 'yes' or vice versa then have a re-run. [I'm not proposing this by the way - just saying that this is more deomcratic! Obvious problems are if the decision is irreversible and the cost, also instability etc.... ]]

I think Ireland should vote no, by the way, as that will create the opportunity (in a decade or so) to write a proper constitutional treaty. The priority then should be to end the tricameral parliament and separate the powers of the Commission.

“the financial/economic considerations persuade me that it is firmly in Ireland’s interest to vote YES”

I suspect you’re right.

It’s the longer term political/social consequences that bother me.

This is about the bureaucrats’ grip on EU power and their intolerance of any meaningful dissent. The consequences, here and abroad, of the disregard of popular feeling (as expressed in our No vote and the French and Dutch rejection of the earlier form of the Treaty) are unknowable.

One possible consequence, and the possibility increases with each smothering of dissent, is the tearing apart of the entire EU project, which would be a real tragedy.

It’s dangerous to discount the longterm effect of loading so much fear, threat and bluff into what is allegedly a democratic choice. You get the result you want - and it might or might not be the best result - but at a price.

Of course, in this country, we wouldn’t know anything about creating longterm pain as a price for a shortterm party.

Also, the Monty Python quote is: What *have* the Romans ever done for us?

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ExWfh6sGyso

Not enough coffee this morning?

“If you don’t agree with a view, then *stating reasons why* would be a great help, thanks.”

Click the link below that, you’ll get the reasons. Or go here: http://www.stephenkinsella.net/2009/09/17/a-reply-to-senator-donohoe/

You’re welcome.

When the chips are down as in the EMU crisis in the 90s, countries like Ireland fared poorly and will continue to do so. We represent a tiny proportion of the EU and membership means more to us than it does to the EU.

It may in fact be that ECB credit lines are being extended to assist with a yes vote. What is clear is that Ireland wont be allowed to spend at the insane levels at which it is currently burning EU cash. Someone will intervene to stop this behaviour - either the EU in withdrawing credit or IMF intervening to stabilise an out-of-control economy. All outcomes will be painful and prolonged.

The Lisbon Treaty represents a large and further dilution of our influence in Europe and is a significant change in the nature of the EU. Our decision on October 2 is whether we ease the path of that change and avoid the wrath of the larger states or vote no in our own long-term interests and seek aliiances within the other smaller states to help shape a Europe that values all its members.

The Senator’s essay, written as a direct reply to mine, focuses on rather more long term prospects: a potential (relative) increase or decrease of foreign direct investment into Ireland, and the central role of investor confidence in multinational investment decisions. My understanding of the Senator’s point is that Ireland’s attractiveness to these multinationals will be somehow lessened if we do not ratify the treaty. Thus, according to the Senator, a ‘yes’ vote is the best option for the country on the basis of a reduction in international investors’ uncertainty.

I am skeptical of this type of reasoning for several reasons.”

Kinsella’s arguments : http://www.stephenkinsella.net/2009/09/17/a-reply-to-senator-donohoe/#more-2656

Now don’t tell me that we have great education in this country and simultaneously decry an argument because you dislike a proponent of that argument. I don’t think you’d get very far with that approach in the field of informal logic.

If you don’t agree with a view, then *stating reasons why* would be a great help, thanks.

To my mind, there’s a link between NAMA and lisbon, insofar as the debt load incurred by irish private companies (banks), for which we’ve seen breakdowns of where it was lent in turn, was originally lent to these private companies by who exactly? - presumably at least somewhat by dutch and german pension funds.

Continental europe, with it’s rapidly ageing population (IIRC e.g. belgium will have >50% pop over 65 by 2025), whose life savings are all invested in funds etc, depend and rely heavily on the younger workers of europe (and emerging markets) to keep generating income for them in thier dotage.

Viz Iceland, recently forming a view that Iceland should not be forced to pay more than a certain percentage of GDP for the nationalised debts of it’s superstar bankers.
I would imagine that they view this as being in thier economic interest, not to be lumbered with crippling debt.

And would it be in irelands interest to be lumbered with crippling debt? Owed to who? These Euro pension funds?

But, you say, a super-dooper EU will be better able to meet future challanges and be better for the economy.

I’m afraid the reality is that there may not in fact be much in the way of FDI at all : USA debts now exceed 300% GDP, and the chinese (holding $2Trilion in reserves) want to shift away from the dollar as world reserve currency.

All ‘developed’ countries face a generation-long period of drawdown on invested funds to nurse wealthy pensioners (the non-wealthy pensioners can review the latest on privatised medicine’s ‘death boards’, euthanisation, etc).

And control over FDI will of course be centralised in brussels, where (I spent 7 years there) half the people have never even heard of ireland.

These new challenges the new super-dooper EU will face include, amongst others, the problem that changes to economic growth, historically, correlates pretty closely with changes to use of energy.
As we enter a world of ever-increasing energy use, and an actual plateau and possible decrease in available energy supply, it’s clear that one of the problems is that the possibility of permanent growth may be an illusion.

I think that the politics of the EU, when it comes to investing in small countries, will be focused on geopolitically important areas like the baltic, the balkans, the levant, the magreb, and central europe.

We might find a niche running nursing homes with nice views of hills and lakes, changing the nappies and dispensing meds.

As the rest of europe ‘opens’ to a neo-liberal economic footing, Ireland will not longer be the freewheeling exception that attracts the american money. There won’t be much US money, and the rest will go east.

So, to restate the question : What Will The Romans Ever Do For Us ??

I’ll sign of with this:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attacking_Faulty_Reasoning
The rebuttal criterion requires that one who presents an argument for or against a position should attempt to provide an effective rebuttal to all serious challenges to the argument or the position it supports and to the strongest arguments for viable alternative positions. Fallacies such as red herring, straw man, and poisoning the well fail to meet this criterion because they attack the arguer rather than the argument or use argumentative devices that divert attention away from the issue at stake.