Lecturer, Below the Bar, Economics (Natural Resource Economics and Policy)

The J.E. Cairnes School of Business and Economics at NUI Galway wishes to appoint a person to the post of Lecturer Below the Bar, Economics (Natural Resource Economics and Policy), Contract Type B. The position will commence on 1 September 2016. Candidates should normally hold a PhD in economics or equivalent and demonstrate a record of publishing in peer reviewed journals, the capacity to secure research funding, and the ability to teach and supervise at undergraduate and postgraduate levels. Whilst not limited to these areas, we particularly encourage applications from those with interests in agriculture and agri-food, environmental economics, marine economics, and sustainable energy and development.

The J.E. Cairnes School is home to the Whitaker Institute. The successful candidate will contribute to already successful research clusters within the Whitaker Institute, notably the Socioeconomic Marine Research Unit (SEMRU) and the Centre for Environment, Sustainability and Development (CEDS). Through these clusters, the School already has strong links with Teagasc, the Marine Institute, and the Department of Agriculture, Food and the Marine. The successful candidate will be expected to strengthen these relationships and enhance the School’s existing comparative advantage in the area of economic evaluation. The School is already a leader in the economics of evaluation in both the natural resource/environment and health/ageing areas.

Closing date for receipt of applications is 17:00 (GMT) on Thursday, 21st January 2016.  It will not be possible to consider applications received after the closing date.

For more information and Application Form please see website:  http://www.nuigalway.ie/about-us/jobs/ Applications should be submitted online.

Latest edition of Economic and Social Review now available online

Here is the list of contents of the latest edition of the Economic and Social Review:

Vol 46, No 4, Winter (2015)

Table of Contents

Articles

The Demand for League of Ireland Football
Barry Reilly 485–509

The Relative Age Effect and Under-21 Irish Association Football: A
Natural Experiment and Policy Recommendations, David Butler, Robert
Butler  511–519

Housing Bubbles and Monetary Policy: A Reassessment
Graeme O’Meara 521–565

To Weight or Not To Weight? A Statistical Analysis of How Weights
Affect the Reliability of the Quarterly National Household Survey for
Immigration Research in Ireland
Nancy Duong Nguyen, Patrick Murphy 567–603

Book Review

EOIN O’LEARY, Irish Economic Development: High-Performing EU State or
Serial Underachiever. London: Routledge; 232 pages; March 2015
Frank Barry  605-611.

All papers can be accessed at www.esr.ie

Critical Quarterly columns

I’m writing an economics column in Critical Quarterly, a humanities journal, which is a bit of fun. They are supposedly free to view for 12 months after publication. I already posted a link to the first, on the European democratic deficit, but neglected to link to the second, on migration. The third, on secular stagnation, is available here.

Redistribution in the Age of Austerity

Readers of this blog might be interested in this working paper we’ve just put up on the Levy working paper series. The abstract is below.

We examine the relationship between changes in a country’s public sector fiscal position and inequality at the top and bottom of the income distribution during the age of austerity (2006–13). We use a parametric Lorenz curve model and Gini-like indices of inequality as our measures to assess distributional changes. Based on the EU’s Statistics on Income and Living Conditions SLIC and International Monetary Fund data for 12 European countries, we find that more severe adjustments to the cyclically adjusted primary balance (i.e., more austerity) are associated with a more unequal distribution of income driven by rising inequality at the top. The data also weakly suggest a decrease in inequality at the bottom. The distributional impact of austerity measures reflects the reliance on regressive policies, and likely produces increased incentives for rent seeking while reducing incentives for workers to increase productivity.

Emigrants, tax rates, and debt

Paul Krugman has an interesting piece here, and I can’t resist posting a link to something similar I wrote back in 2010.

PK’s piece also gives me an excuse to post a link to this piece by Oxford Economic & Social History graduate Christopher Kissane on incentivising emigrants to come home, which makes several good points IMO.

New research on households in long term arrears

Great work by Robert Kelly and Fergal McCann, pdf here, abstract below:

The resolution of the long-term mortgage arrears (those in arrears greater than one year; LTMA) crisis represents one of the key policy challenges in Ireland today. In this Letter we highlight the range of economic and demographic characteristics associated with the experience of LTMA in Ireland. Our analysis suggests that unemployment shocks, changes in mortgage affordability, the accumulation of non-mortgage debt, higher originating loan-to-value ratios and weak housing equity positions all have an important explanatory role. We also outline repayment patterns among households at differing levels of mortgage arrears. It is shown that in 2014, over three quarters of those in LTMA had continued increases in their arrears balances. This contrasts with those in the early stages of arrears, where less than half of all borrowers had arrears increases.

Slow train wreck

Why is anyone shocked at the political news from France this morning? Everyone is saying that the FN got a boost from the November 13 atrocities, and perhaps they did, but there are far longer run forces at play here.

One is the corruption and sleaze that characterises Parisian politics. But there are also economic factors that are having a predictable impact on attitudes (and if they are predictable, then economists don’t have the right to ignore them). Globalisation creates losers as well as winners, for example, and if no-one really cares about the losers, and we just pay lip service to the problem, then it is predictable that there will be a backlash. The Euro has not only locked in a set of distorted real exchange rates, but a macroeconomic policy mix with a pronounced deflationary bias. If times remain tough enough for long enough, and politicians hear your pain but don’t actually do anything about it, some people will eventually respond by voting for candidates who reject existing constraints on policy making. “Europe” is increasingly experienced as a set of constraints preventing governments from doing what their people want them to do, rather than as a means of empowering governments to collectively solve problems.

So why would anyone be surprised that Mme Le Pen has done so well; and is it not likely at this stage (though 2017 is a long way away) that absent major policy shifts she will come first in the first round of the Presidential election? And let there be no mistake: if she actually won the second round, either then or in 2022, this would mean the end of the EU as we currently know it.

What is so frustrating about all this is that it has been so predictable. Here are some links dating back to 2010, a year that risks being viewed by future historians as a fateful one:

Adam Posen

And me, with apologies for the self-indulgence, writing for Eurointelligence.

I am pretty sure Martin Wolf was saying similar things back then, and that many others were too.

The good news is that, as recent Irish experience shows, the populist vote stops rising when the economy recovers. (The decline in the independent vote share is quite striking, and SF have clearly stopped rising. And no, I’m not saying that anyone is like the French National Front, but support for these parties is the closest Irish equivalent to the French anti-establishment protest vote that is benefiting the FN so much.) And 2017, and even more so 2022, are a long way away. But Eurozone monetary and fiscal policy, and social policy too I would think, need to start taking into account the fact that the entire European project, the good bits as well as the harmful bits, is now facing an existential threat.

Update: Paul Krugman weighs in here.

Thoughts on Flat Taxes

Written for the RENUA flat taxes event today.

When all the little economists are in short pants, we learn the principles of public finance. Governments have to tax households and firms in order to provide services the market won’t, like libraries, street lighting, and national defense, as well as redistributing income from the rich to the poor as an aid to social solidarity. Taxes are a necessary evil. All taxes induce distortions to people’s behaviour. Some distortions, like the plastic bag tax, are clearly good. They make almost no one worse off and make lots of people better off. Recurrent taxes on property are in fact the least distortive to long run GDP per capita we have. While a site value tax would have been perfect, the LPT does a similar if suboptimal job.

Some taxes are highly distortionary, such as a very low corporation tax rate, or a very high income tax rate. These make lots of people better (and worse) off and damage important incentives. An efficient tax structure would deliver the funds to power public services with the minimum of distortions to individual and collective incentives. The theory of public finance has come around to the view that marginal taxes are not the most important thing to worry about, in information-opaque systems, the average tax rate should be relied on most heavily. The all-in tax rate for personal income tax & employee social security contributions is 52% here, relative to 46% on average across the OECD.

Perhaps more importantly, the ability to balance the average tax rate with a corruption-resistant tax structure through which taxes are collected and disbursed is a major asset of any public finance structure.  Important results have now been established showing the spread of corruption is quite badly affected by the ease with which the variables which determine the tax base can be manipulated by those in power. If we worry about the Noonan-end of the tax gathering element first, then, two principles which therefore make sense are simplicity and certainty with respect to the tax system.

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