link here

These briefing papers are provided to MEPs on the committee prior to a meeting they will have with ECB President Trichet on March 22nd at which these and other issues will be discussed.

Summary: Asset booms and sectoral changes can distort traditional estimates of structural fiscal revenue, and could lead to serious fiscal policy errors. This paper extends the estimation of structural revenues to take account of asset prices and sectoral changes, and applies this to the case of Ireland, where a property bust has revealed a large hole in the public finances. It is shown that excluding these factors led to a substantial bias in the estimation of structural revenues, and the structural balance prior to the crisis was much larger than earlier estimated.

The first relates to the discount rate used to value cash flows when coming up with long-term economic value.  These had provided for an adjustment of 0.8 percent above the relevant government bond rate. This adjustment is now 1.7 percent.  This change will lower the value of the assets.

Government bond rates are, of course, lower now than they were last September. This is probably what the Minister was referring to when he said “There will, however, be a reduction in the interest rates used for loan discounting purposes” a comment widely (and now it seems incorrectly) reported as being related to the Commission’s recommendations. We see now that the Commission’s recommendations, taken on their own, will imply lower prices paid.

The other change I can spot relates to the (to me) mysterious “Standard Discount Rate”. The regulations for this used to be as follows.

The standard discount rate that NAMA shall apply in the calculation of the long-term economic value of all bank assets shall be 2.75 per cent to provide for enforcement costs, and 0.25 per cent to provide for due diligence costs.

The 2.75 percent is now 5.25 percent. From previous discussions, the prize for best answer as to what the standard discount rate was went to Frank Galton: NAMA LTEV = LTEV*(1-Standard Discount Rate). Assuming that’s correct, then this latest change would also imply lower prices. Anyone who understands the standard discount rate (or can see any other interesting changes) feel free to explain it to us.

One aspect of this story that I’m having some trouble understanding is why the IMF cannot be used to assist an EU member. The Irish Times Cantillon column explains the argument as follows. Current circumstances imply that:

The only possible lender of last resort is thus the International Monetary Fund, but an IMF intervention in a euro-zone economy would be a mortal blow to the credibility of the euro.

Ok, here’s a question. What does “mortal blow to the credibility of the euro” actually mean? And if it means something concrete (and bad) why does an IMF intervention produce this bad outcome while an EMF intervention does not? Answers on an electronic postcard …

To recall: the red lines show what happen when governments respond to a worldwide economic crisis with monetary and fiscal stimulus. The blue lines show what happens when governments stick to monetary and fiscal orthodoxy. All very purgative and morally satisying no doubt, except that it led directly to the election of Adolf Hitler (something that I have been meaning to blog about for a while, but now I have to prepare for class..)

For an individual country, ‘internal devaluation’ is the optimal strategy in our situation. (Optimal given our constraints that is — it is an incredibly lousy option relative to nominal devaluation, or being able to run a counter-cyclical fiscal policy.) But if everyone is doing the same thing, then it becomes collectively self-defeating.

This is a European problem, and requires European solutions designed to support demand and prevent continent-wide deflation.

Paul Krugman is alarmed here.

It is hard for anyone to disagree with many of the policy recommendations in the letter. An important point is  that many of these policies could be pursued simultaneously with the current strategy of stabilising the fiscal situation and  contributing to the process of real devaluation as a mechanism to improve competitiveness. As has been repeatedly pointed out on this blog, labour demand can be boosted both through outward shifts in the labour demand curve (through productivity improvements) and through reductions in wage costs (movement along the labour demand curve) and there is no direct conflict between these two strategies.

The letter assigns at least part of the responsibility for the depth and severity of the recession to current government policies.  Policy failures during the pre-crisis period (inadequate financial regulation and pro-cyclical fiscal policies) have certainly contributed to the severe contraction and it would have been much better if Ireland had accumulated sufficiently large surpluses during the boom years to provide the fiscal space required to engage in counter-cyclical fiscal interventions.  In addition, it is possible to debate the appropriate mix between current and capital spending within the current aggregate envelope and the optimal sequence for the required increases in the overall tax burden.

However, given the massive shock to the economy and the public finances, the over-riding imperative in setting fiscal policy has been to demonstrate a commitment to fiscal sustainability. If the government had not undertaken a sizeable fiscal adjustment, the spread on sovereign debt would surely be much higher than the current elevated level and the upward movement in interest rates (influencing the funding costs for the banking system as well as for the government) would have had an even more contractionary impact on the economy.

Conditional on the environment facing the country, the path of fiscal adjustment is more certain of returning growth to the economy than an aspirational alternative that seems to rely on investment-led growth to jointly solve the fiscal crisis and the economic crisis without having to resort to cuts in the level of public expenditure (beyond any savings from efficiency gains).  The international economic consensus highlights that  the optimal fiscal response to the crisis varies substantially across countries, with fiscal adjustment required for those countries that face a difficult funding situation. As such, it is perfectly consistent to advocate more expansionary fiscal policies for some countries while also supporting fiscal adjustment in Ireland.

Finally, the letter makes a number of recommendations for re-shaping longer-term economic policies. The debate about post-crisis policies is important and the coherent vision provided by this letter is a valuable contribution - but the first order of business is to safely emerge from the current crisis.

The wide-ranging guarantee of bank liabilities announced at the end of September 2008 runs out in little more than six months. Assuming that the banks have been recapitalised by then, the government can minimise subsequent risk of exchequer cost through getting out of the guarantee business as quickly as possible.

Bank resolution legislation – clarifying the power of the authorities to ensure that all providers of risk capital share quickly and appropriately the losses incurred by failed banks – is an important component in the state’s exit strategy from the banking collapse.

I believe the more pressing issue is to have a resolution regime in place for the period after the current guarantee expires and before existing subordinated bonds mature.  If the banks are insolvent, or at least incapable of reaching minimum capital adequacy requirements on their own, there should be a willingness to impose these losses on creditors, most likely as part of the debt-equity swap long advocated by Karl Whelan. 

While it may just be semantics, I think it is better if this is not viewed as temporary nationalisation, which raises the spectre of a (possibly long) period of political control.  There is a dangerous appetite for political control of lending.   Thus we get this in an otherwise sensible analysis by Alan Ruddock in the Sunday Independent:

If the Government’s new policy is to have any teeth it must be able to force the banks to do what they have not done for a long time, if ever: support the Irish economy. That will have to involve very close monitoring of margins and lending quantities, but without the political system becoming too involved in the day-to-day operations of the banks. In other words, effective regulation.

The real sin of NAMA may end up being one of omission rather than commission: it has distracted from putting in place the needed resolution regime.  I fear that a banking commission, though ultimately essential, might be another expensive distraction for the coming months.  The focus now should be on the joint tasks of ensuring losses are fairly borne by the providers of risk capital, recapitalising through debt-equity swaps and ensuring control of lending is kept as far as possible from politicians. 

The Irish sex ratio at birth was 1.058 in 2008. This is exactly the median for western European countries. Moreover, there has been virtually no change in the Irish ratio over the past fifty years – it was 1.0523 in 1960 and 1.0589 in 2000. This suggests that changes such as the increased availability of pre-natal scans and the rise in pregnancy terminations by Irish women since 1960 have not had any differential gender impact.

As The Economist points out, the sex ratio is an important indicator of the place and status of women in society and the economy. The normality and stability of the Irish ratio is therefore not without its significance.

There are three ways to inject new equity capital into the two surviving[1] banks: 1) the government directly purchases more equity shares from the banks, 2) the banks try to raise the equity from existing shareholders using a rights offering, or 3) the banks accept a big block acquisition of equity capital from a large foreign institution probably a foreign bank. The Central Bank and Department of Finance should be pushing hard on the banks to use method 3, since this method is in the best interest of the Irish taxpayer and Irish economy.

It is standard best practice to rescue ailing banks via arranged takeovers by strong banks. For example, in the USA the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and Federal Reserve have very well-honed procedures and can arrange these forced-marriages quickly and smoothly. In the current Irish situation there are several big advantages over the other two methods:

1. It brings harsh market discipline to the banks. If using method 1 instead, the banks become majority state-owned, and the political biases in government policy might infect bank strategies even more strongly than at present. This is a serious concern. For example, recent government banking policies (liability guarantee, Anglo Irish non-closure, NAMA business plan, property price information suppression) have been very generous toward Irish property developers, at great expense to Irish taxpayers and the Irish economy. A foreign bank would not have these political biases – perhaps it could even strong-arm the government into releasing a property price register and also force the government to stop working through NAMA to prevent property prices from dropping to a market-clearing equilibrium. Method 2, an attempted rights offering, would leave the banks very weak and essentially wards of the state, and hence many of the same concerns apply.

2. A foreign block acquisition would provide market validation of the equity price for the Irish banks. By opening up its books to a foreign acquirer, and then accepting a fair offer for some or all of the shares of the bank, the bank provides a true picture of the state of the bank, and by extension a valuation guide for other Irish banks and building societies.

3. The implicit cost of the government liability guarantee, for any bank in foreign ownership, would fall to near-zero. The liability guarantee would be buffered by the big foreign bank’s large asset base.

The drawback to a foreign takeover is that domestic shareholders (?) would lose control of either or both of the two main banks. I think that this is a price that the Irish public should accept. The banks gambled recklessly with their legacy and lost the bet. Domestic ownership of the banks matters very little in a very open economy like Ireland’s.

Paul Gorecki sums it up nicely: There was only one valid criticism of the report and it did not change the substance of the report or its conclusions.

Here’s the abstract:

The report sets out an economic approach to municipal waste management policy in Ireland and then applies that framework to two recent policy developments. First, the proposed Section 60 policy direction to cap incineration and other matters, and second, the international review of waste management policy. These complementary policy developments sponsored by the Department of the Environment, Heritage and Local Government are designed to provide a roadmap for a new municipal waste management policy. The report questions whether these developments provide a coherent and feasible basis on which to develop waste policy. Indeed, apart from some unexceptional lessons which are consistent with current waste management policy, implementation of these proposals and recommendations is likely to lower societal welfare and increase the chances that Ireland will miss important Landfill Directive targets with consequent EU fines. The report puts forward a number of suggestions consistent with raising societal welfare while at the same time meeting the Landfill Directive targets.

The report was previously discussed here.

Update: The IWMA still does not accept the ESRI waste projections (even though EPA and DEHLG do).

Update2: Dr Dominic Hogg of Eunomia continues to think that the ESRI is wrong.

Update3: Minister Gormley argues that the international review is flawless.

(from today’s Volkskrant)

If replicated over the year, that would imply a shortfall for the year of €310 million which isn’t such a big deal. That said—and I don’t claim to be an expert on the month-to-month stuff and I know lots of this stuff is really noisy—income tax receipts being down 6% relative to target seem like bad news, More generally, I’m starting to get worried at how we keep falling short of targets.

The GDP and unemployment statistics from last year showed the really steep declines in activity ended in the second quarter. I’m looking for an unwinding of the huge year-over-year declines by April or so. If that doesn’t happen, we could end up pretty far off target.

Details are surprisingly sparse in places for a document so long in the making.   But the proposed reforms are generally sensible.   It is also good to see recent behavioural economics research having an impact on policy.   Some highlights:

·         The retirement age is to rise in stages, reaching 68 by 2028.   While this is unlikely to be the end of the increases, it provides a good start in terms of reducing long-term fiscal imbalances.   Getting better control over long-term finances will also help boost near-term creditworthiness, especially as the NTMA attempts to issue 30-year bonds

·         The new auto-enrolment scheme (to be launched in 2014) is well informed by work in behavioural economics.   The design details generally make sense: automatic enrolment (with automatic re-enrolment after two years for those who opt out); matching government and employer contributions; low administrative costs through utilising the PRSI system, and low-cost investment defaults

·         Tax relief standardised at 33 percent rather than at the marginal rate.   This is high enough to provide an incentive for pension provision, while getting rid of a regressive feature of the old system

As an aside, for those who can’t get enough of the Iceland!ic banking crisis, here are two reports co-authored by eminent economists written prior to the crisis endorsing Iceland’s fabulous banks. Here’s one from 2006 co-authored by Columbia University’s Rick Mishkin, a former Fed Governor (Best section - “Could Bank Refinancing Be a Problem?”). And here’s one from 2007 co-authored by Richard Portes of the London Business School. (Best section - “The banks:successful and resilient”.)

As another aside, I note that some people were poking fun at the slides. However, it is very unusual for a politician to usual visual aids like this to illustrate their arguments and, based on my observation of his talk at the McGill Summer School, Minister Lenihan uses this material very effectively. So politicians using slides is a good thing: Don’t encourage those who’d recommend the minister keep his head down and deliver a monologue without charts and tables!

Best of luck to them. Let’s hope their current investigations spring a surprise.

In relation to stories about AIB shrinking credit, I heard references on the radio this morning to the bank shrinking its loans to customers from €129.5 billion in 2008 to €103 billion in 2009. This is only correct if one accepts the accounting treatment of the €19 billion the banks expect to receive from NAMA as “financial assets held for sale to NAMA” rather than “dodgy property-related loans that have been written down a bit.” I’m sure the bank is restricting lending but it’s not as easy to get loan books down as fast as the “loans to customers” line suggests.

Yesterday, Postbank, jointly owned by An Post and BNP Paribas, stopped taking new business. It will close by the end of the year. Its name would suggest that Postbank is actually a bank, but this must be an illusion.

If it were a bank, Postbank would not be allowed to fail. And Brian Lenihan’s reaction to its closure was merely to say that he is “disappointed [his favourite word] but not surprised”.Why does the closure of Postbank get a c’est la vie shrug of the shoulders while the closure of Anglo is so unthinkable that at least €30 billion of public money is being used to keep it, if not actually alive, then apparently undead?

The answer Brian Lenihan would give is that Anglo is of “systemic importance” to the Irish economy, while Postbank is not.

O’Toole then correctly points out that Postbank has lots of branches and customers.

The problem with this argument is that it is based on a confusion of the meaning of the words “close” and “fail” in the context of the banking sector. Postbank is a subsidiary of BNP Paribas Fortis and that bank is not going out of business. Every one of Postbank’s depositors will get their money back and BNP’s withdrawal from Ireland has no implications for its bondholders.

In contrast, when we discuss letting Anglo fail, we aren’t talking about shutting down its nonexistent branch network. What we mean is acknowledging that the bank is insolvent (and Fintan is correct that claims in January 2009 that Anglo was solvent were indeed ludicrous) and then having it declare bankruptcy. Normally, such a decision would lead to Anglo’s creditors not getting all their money back. However, if we did that now, we would face the problem that the Irish government has guaranteed essentially all of Anglo’s liabilities, so no money would be saved for the taxpayer.

My point here isn’t to defend the scale of the September 2008 guarantee or its extension to Anglo but merely to acknowledge that the issues related to Anglo are completely different to those related to Postbank.

Elaine Byrne’s column today also focuses on Anglo with reference to Iceland! She discusses whether, if the Iceland!ic referendum passes, we should follow suit and not pay off Anglo debts. There will be more discussion of this question in the coming months.

There are major decisions still to be taken in relation to reducing the costs to the taxpayer of resolving Anglo and other banks that appear to be only NAMA over-payment away from insolvency. We could decide to just remove the guarantee and let all the banks declare bankruptcy. But this would have, let’s say, some short- to medium-term implications for the functioning the Irish banking sector.

With the September 2008 guarantee set to expire later this year, there is the opportunity in the coming months to arrive at an orderly resolution process in which insolvency is recognised, bad property assets are cleared off the bank balance sheets, providers of risk capital lose money in a way the reduces cost for the taxpayer, and the banks are placed back on a sound footing.

These are very important decisions and the sooner our more influential journalists recognise what the real issues are, the better the public debate will be.

(i) There is an acknowledged problem in some sector or policy area;

(ii) the Government could  do something to ameliorate this problem;

(iii) QED the Government should do something, not always specified.

The result of this line of attack is policies like the Car Scrappage Scheme, of which more anon.

Examples in this morning’s media concern the excess supply of hotels, and the threat of global warming. The Government is being urged to take measures

- to reduce the hotel stock, and

- to support the hydro storage/windpower project called Spirit of Ireland.

Hotel Stock: Hotels are a pure private good. Due to policy-induced capacity expansion, there are now too many. Some are bust, and face receivership/liquidation/NAMA.  Room prices are falling. This is the natural market response. Where is the market failure?

It is true that some long-established hotels have seen their business undermined by State-subsidised competition, but this is a routine business risk in an interventionist political culture. Many of these long-established hotels enjoyed State grants for conference/leisure centres when the going was good. The industry is lobbying for some State-run scheme to take out capacity. Doing nothing will cost less and the industry will adjust. Intervening, yet again, will distort adjustment.

Spirit of Ireland: The externality of carbon emissions is addressed by putting a price on carbon, at which point the State can safely adopt a position of technology neutrality. Power generation, once externalities are dealt with, is a pure private good too. Whether these schemes make sense is a matter for the capital market, not for the Government.

Car Scrappage: Car sales have collapsed and some car dealers have gone out of business. The same has happened with €1,000 handbags, and some handbag retailers are struggling. Ireland manufactures neither cars nor handbags. The Car Scrappage Scheme will spend taxpayer money to sustain, temporarily, the retail distribution network for an imported consumer durable. Why not a Handbag Scrappage Scheme? This scheme is plain daft for Ireland. It is not even clear that it makes any sense for car-producing countries - the German scheme appears to have sucked in imports of smaller cars, which Germany does not produce. 

These ‘Something Must be Done’ schemes provide harmless entertainment for economists, fodder for the 24-hour news cycle and a playpen for lobbyists. But they contribute nothing to sustainable employment, cost the Exchequer money and hinder the necessary post-Bubble adjustment.  

In contrast, the Economics of Doing Nothing is that this is often the best policy, and the cheapest.