ESM Details

Details of the proposed structure of the new European Stabilisation Mechanism can be found in various parts of the World Wide Web thingy, e.g. here and here.

Two things jump out to me. First, the agreed margin on a 7.5 year fixed rate loan from the EFM would be 260 basis points, about 60 points lower than the current rates on offer from the EFSF. Perhaps someone will insert a clause making the margin dependent on a country’s corporate tax rate but somehow I doubt it.

Second, despite a lot of previous focus on the idea that only bonds issued after 2013 would be eligible for restructuring, the proposal does not contain such a commitment. As expected, there is a commitment that government bonds with a maturity greater than one year issued after the introduction of the ESM will have to have collective action clauses facilitating restructuring. But rather than adopt a position that existing bonds cannot be haircut, the proposal seems to essentially take the opposite strategy. A country that fails a “sustainability analysis”

will be required to to engage in active negotiations in good faith with its creditors to secure their direct involvement in restoring debt sustainability. The granting of the financial assistance will be contingent on the Member State having a credible plan and demonstrating sufficient commitment to ensure adequate and proportionate private sector involvement.

I’m all in favour of this, having argued at various times (e.g. here and here) that a proposal to only haircut bonds issued after the introduction of ESM was unworkable. However, this does help to explain the market jitters of the past few days. The Irish two-year bond yield was up another 40 points or so today and stands at 10.25% as I write, having reached as high as 10.7% earlier today.

IIEA Blog Post: No Deal Is Better than the Wrong Deal

Over at the IIEA blog, I have written a new post arguing that it would be better for Ireland and for Europe to have no deal on the interest rates on the EU loans to Ireland than to have a deal that linked an interest rate change to adjusting Ireland’s corporate tax rate.

Frank Daly on Residential House Prices

The complications caused by the absence of a properly representative national house price index have been illustrated again via a speech given by NAMA’s Chairman Frank Daly (see NAMAWinelake here). Frank discusses NAMA’s assessment of the residential sector as follows:

On the residential sector the Central Bank is forecasting falls of 60% from peak (end 2006) to end 2012 under its adverse scenario or 55% under its baseline scenario – based we understand on the PTSB\ESRI index. At NAMA we are not surprised by this and it is not as alarming as one would first think. We do not believe that the PTSB\ESRI index currently showing close to 40% fall from peak is realistic and reflective of where the market is. NAMA’s base valuation date was November 2009 and at this date we were already taking account of on average 50% falls in residential property values from the peak.

So while the residential market may have some little more to fall and no one can be certain that an average fall of 60% from peak may not occur in residential house prices, we would believe that the bulk of this has happened already.

Based on my own anecdotal sample, I’m inclined to agree with Daly that residential prices have fallen more than shown by the PTSB\ESRI index. However, the implications for the Central Bank stress testing exercise strike me as a little more serious than Daly suggests. Daly indicates that most of the peak-to-trough decline envisaged in the Central Bank stress scenarios has already happened.

But this raises the question as to whether the stress scenarios should be based on a peak-to-trough calculations or should they be based on an assumption about a current level of prices and an additional assumption about further declines. It’s not clear why the scenarios should be based on a peak-to-trough assumption. And if, for example, the valuation of residential mortgage portfolios is based on an inaccurate assessment of current levels of house prices, then this may undermine the credibility of the calculations. I would hope that the report accompanying the stress test results would discuss this issue.

Inversion: Two-Year Bond Rate Moves Above Ten-Year

As I write, the two-year Irish bond yield has risen from 9.3% to above 10% and is now higher than the ten-year bond yield. I suspect this may be a reaction to yesterday’s meeting of Euro area finance ministers and the prospect that Ireland will not get a reduction in its interest rate. But I’d be interested in hearing if people can point to other reasons.

Behaving Like Teenagers?

A development that I have noticed lately in the comments section of this blog is the tendency to argue that the Irish people deserve little sympathy from our European partners because we are somehow unwilling to implement obvious solutions to our problems.

Every story about public sector inflexibilities (such as the silly business about the privilege days) is taken as evidence of mendacious insiders and nasty trade unionists defending their ill-deserved high salaries while the nation heads towards sovereign default. Similarly, stories about cuts in pay for politicians or academics are merely greeted with outrage that the cuts are not big enough.

Discussions of welfare rates provoke the question of how dare we ask for improved bailout while we pay higher benefit rates than elsewhere. Similar moral outrage is applied to the corporate tax rate discussion and, less often but occasionally, to the fact that (even after recent increases) Irish rates of income taxation for low and middle-earners are still low by international standards. A call for immediately cutting the deficit to zero so that we would not need a bailout was greeted very positively by many of our commenters, who clearly take the view that this can be done easily if only we had the will.

The conclusion often reached from these discussions is that the Irish people are a feckless and inflexible lot who are “behaving like teenagers” in looking for help from Europe.

I understand the moralistic instinct that underlies these comments as well as its implicit faith in simple solutions. With the country effectively in administration, this belief—that solutions are clearly sitting out there, but cannot be implemented because “other people” are feckless, inflexible and pampered—provides a lovely warm blanket of indignation in which to wrap oneself.

In my opinion, however, this kind of commentary is based on a gross misunderstanding of the challenges posed by the scale of the Irish fiscal adjustment. It is also extremely unfair to the Irish people and acts to undermine valid arguments for looking for additional help from the EU.

Let’s start with a hugely important fact that tends to receive little attention. The Irish adjustments thus far have been enormous by international standards. Prior to the December 2010 budget, the government implemented a combined €14.6 billion in adjustments from summer 2008 to December 2009. With Irish GDP estimated at €157 last year, these adjustments added up to over 9 percent of GDP, with the vast majority of the underlying impact distributed about equally between 2009 and 2010.

To get a sense of how big these adjustments are, consider the chart below. The numbers on the x-axis are the IMF’s estimates of actions taken to reduce fiscal deficits in 15 advanced economies during 1980–2009, while the y-axis shows the change in the cyclically adjusted budget deficit. The paper in the IMF’s World Economic Outlook argues strongly that its fiscal action measures are superior to simply measuring the change in the cyclically adjusted deficit when considering the stance of fiscal policy.

The IMF chart shows the Irish 2009 fiscal adjustment as the largest across the sample of advanced economies over the thirty-year period studied  (measured against GNP it would not have been a close race with Italy 1993). The paper was prepared before they could enter in the 2010 adjustment but by my calculations, it was about the same size. Then the government implemented an additional €6 billion in adjustments in the December 2010 budget.

Consider this for a second. In 2009 and 2010, the Irish public experienced the two biggest years of fiscal adjustment anywhere in the advanced economic world over the past thirty years. And this left Ireland with a budget deficit of nearly 12% of GDP. After another budget implementing adjustments similar in size to the previous two years, the public then elected a government consisting of parties who proposed a further €9 billion in cuts over the next three years in the case of Fine Gael or €7 billion in the case of Labour.

By the time the stabilisation programme is supposed to be finished, the cumulative fiscal adjustment will have been close to 20 percent of GDP. Previous academic studies of large adjustments reported cumalative adjustments of 10 percent of GDP as the outer limits of what had been achieved (see here and page 17 of this paper).

I’m my opinion, those who wish to characterise the Irish public as feckless teenagers have it exactly wrong. Fiscal adjustments are extremely difficult to implement. Every society in the world has powerful institutions and organisations designed to protect vested interests and various types of status quos. Many of these societies would respond to one year of fiscal adjustment on an Irish scale with mass public protests and strikes.

In Ireland, however, we have largely accepted three years of these adjustments without serious disruption and then voted in a government charged with implementing further large adjustments.

So pick on Irish public servants and trade unionists if you want but if you think that their equivalents elsewhere would have been open to larger pay cuts, you’re kidding yourself. Irish public sector workers have seen enormous reductions in take-home pay via cuts in gross pay, a pension levy and tax hikes and many are now struggling to meet their mortgage commitments. Yet there hasn’t been a single strike of notice because these workers and their union leaders understand the gravity of the fiscal situation.

And of course there are inefficiencies and waste in the public sector and people who are paid wage rates that are out of line with common sense. But show me the large organisation, public or private, that doesn’t have such inefficiencies. To be fair to our political processes, the current crisis has brutally exposed a wide range of public sector inefficiencies and the people elected two parties that have both committed to public sector reform.

And rail against welfare benefits being too high if you want. But these are the least well off in our society and they have put up with consecutive cuts in their modest incomes without serious protests.

And you can compare Irish income tax rates for low and middle-earners with other EU countries and reckon there’s room to raise more income there. However, the vast majority of these people have entered into commitments (mortgages, car loans, childcare payments) that cannot simply be reversed at the drop of a hat and many are already under enormous pressure. This is why fiscal adjustments are so small and gradual elsewhere.

No doubt many of our commenters will continue with their negative characterisations of the Irish people. However, I think the past few years have showed that we are a strong people who have displayed great courage in coping with immense adversity. Requesting a small amount of assistance from our European partners (particularly in relation to the repayment of loans made to insolvent banks by the ECB and European bondholders) to help Ireland avoid a sovereign default—this shouldn’t be too much to ask for if European solidarity is to be more than just a cheap slogan.