Monetary Dialogue Briefing Papers: June 2011

The latest collection of briefing papers for the European Parliament’s Monetary Dialogue with the ECB are available here (click on 30.6.2011). One set of papers (including one by me) discusses the prospects for monetary policy in light of the wide variations in the economic cycle across different Euro area economies. The other set of papers discuss issues related to restructuring Greek debt.

I’ll repeat my final couple of paragraphs here. These were written prior to the comments discussed here

The relationship between the ECB and the peripheral economies has become extremely complex. However, it is clear that ECB officials have regularly used the implicit threat that they can withdraw their support for peripheral banking systems, or else continue to provide funds to “persistent bidders” at interest rates that are perhaps considerably higher than are charged to other countries, as a way to obtain actions they deem necessary.

In relation to Greece, ECB officials have been using the threat of the withdrawal of the eligibility of Greek sovereign debt as collateral for open market operations to put forward their argument against any debt restructuring. In the case of Ireland, it is known that Irish government officials have requested that assurances be provided that the ECB will continue to provide sufficient liquidity to Irish banks over the next few years, perhaps via a special medium-term facility. However, no such assurances have been provided. And without greater clarity on the timeframe for repaying their loans to the ECB, it will remain impossible for even recapitalised Irish banks to obtain market funding.

The ECB’s strategy of threatening peripheral banking systems (and the regular coverage this receives in the media) has become one of the destabilising factors that have contributed to worsening the current crisis. It is time for this poorly-thought-out strategy to cease. The ECB’s obligations under the European Treaty mean that it cannot help peripheral countries via keeping interest rates low for the next few years. But it can continue to act as a lender of last resort to the banks in these countries in a way that reassures (rather than worries) financial markets.

To my mind, the latest “anonymous ECB official” comments represent a new lowpoint for that particular institution.

Lorenzo Bini Smaghi

LBS’s many fans on this Blog will want to read about the controversy surrounding his continued membership of the ECB’s Executive Board. If he does not step down Nicolas Sarkozy is threatening to block Mario Draghi’s accession to the Presidency. The Financial Times account is here.

Silvio Berlusconi has called on him to step down, although no definite decision has been taken to offer him the post as head of Banca d’Italia in succession to Draghi.

According to the Corriere della Sera LBS had ‘no comment’ about the issue on leaving the palazzo Chigi. However, La Repubblica quotes him (on leaving a conference in the Vatican) to the effect that he cannot be removed before the end of his eight-year term. He underlined that ‘personal independence is one of the doctrines on which the independence of the Bank rests.’

He hasn’t gone away you know…..

Hans-Werner Sinn replies to his critics in relation to Target 2 balances here.  Readers of this blog will undoubtedly draw their own conclusions.  At the heart of his fallacy is the conceptual  absurdity of separate regional credit policies in  a monetary union with perfect capital mobility.

The political economy of eurozone membership

Richard Pine makes a point about Greece that I have found myself wondering about in the context of Ireland:

The public service, which will lose 150,000 workers by 2015, and faces another round of pay cuts as part of new austerity measures, clearly does not relish a return to a new, devalued, drachma. Those in the private sector who need a stimulus to manufacturing, agriculture and tourism would welcome the boost in exports and the end of recession.

I think the political economy of eurozone membership is more complicated than this. Anyone in secure employment, be it in the public or the private sector, is presumably happy to be paid in a nice hard currency, while in the Irish case the multinational sector may not have the same interests as Irish-owned SMEs. But the general point that the more secure elements in society (and the wealthy) have a stake in eurozone membership, while those in precarious employment, and the unemployed, may have quite different interests, seems like a potentially valid one.

What do people think?

Quote of the day

“When we were faced with a similar situation after coming into government, we agreed with the ECB and we held back from burden sharing with senior bond holders and we didn’t proceed down that road.”

Michael Noonan, reported here.

It wouldn’t be altogether surprising, I suppose, if the most conservative party in the State agreed with the ECB when it came to the distribution of bank losses as between ordinary taxpayers and financial institutions. But this isn’t the story we have been told to date.

So: does Fine Gael — and Labour — agree with the ECB regarding burden sharing with bondholders?

Update: Michael Noonan has said that Anglo and Irish Nationwide senior bondholders should face losses.