Tag: Anglo Irish Bank

Moving Deposits

I am trying to get my head around the Anglo/Irish Nationwide “deposit sales”.   The collective wisdom of this blog might help set things straight.   (Useful reporting by Simon Carswell and Mary Carolan here and here.)

A few initial comments/questions:

First, I think term deposit sale (or selling the deposit book) creates a lot of confusion.   I think it is better to think of what is happening as asset sales, but where part of the price is taking on existing liabilities to depositors.   From the purchaser point of view, another perspective is that it is a purchase of assets that comes with a certain amount of pre-arranged funding (i.e. the deposits). 

Second, there seems to be a view that it is a good thing to retain the deposits in the Irish banking system.  But then there is also a view that Ireland needs to deleverage – essentially sell assets to reduce outstanding liabilities.   The ECB wants this to happen because it is afraid it will be further called on as lender of last resort if those deposits later flee.   What are your thoughts on selling the assets to (and retaining the deposits with) other Irish banks? 

Third, in terms of the total being exchanged for the deposits (mainly NAMA bonds and cash), what is the inference about how the bonds are being valued?   I’m sure someone has done these calculations.    Are the implied valuations related to the fact that the asset sales have been made to other Irish banks — one 92.8 percent State owned, the other privately owned?  

Anglo Trading Update & Orders on Deposits

A busy day for our grossly insolvent banks. Anglo has issued a trading update. In addition, the Minister for Finance has obtained direction orders from the High Court for Anglo and INBS to allow for deposits to be transferred and to enable other aspects of the restructuring plans. Nearly identical statements from Department of Finance and NTMA (with an FAQ here.)

Anglo’s January 31st Bond

There have been some comments on this blog this morning on the popular subject of bank bonds.

Let me point out some facts and then some questions for debate.

The facts:  On Monday, January 31st, Anglo Irish Bank are going to pay out on a maturing bond worth €750 million. (For reference, the total cut in this year’s welfare budget will be €873 million.) The investors who purchased this bond invested their money with Anglo on the 17th of January 2006. The bond is senior unsecured debt and is not covered by a state guarantee.

The questions: Should the government have passed legislation this month to allow the Minister for Finance to intervene so that the bank did not pay this bond back? And if so, should the next government pass such a bill in relation to the remaining €4 billion or so in outstanding unguaranteed bonds owed by Anglo and INBS?

In answering the question, it’s worth noting that the logic of the section of the recent Credit Institutions (Stabilisation) Bill relating to subordinated debt suggests that a government can change the terms and conditions of bonds to apply haircuts if the bank owes its continued existence to significant amounts of public money being injected.

It is unclear whether this power can simply be extended to senior bonds but it seems to me that it can. Another issue is whether such changes in terms and conditions can legally work to allow a bank to distinguish between different types of unsecured creditors that start out with equal claims, by haircutting bond holders but not deposits. Mechanically, of course, one could achieve the same outcome by haircutting both senior bonds and depositors and then compensating depositors via a separate piece of legislation, but this would be more complicated.

The other issue is the implications of a default on a senior bond for the Irish and European banking sectors. My belief is that how this plays depends on what investors believe is the precedent being set. If the precedent is that investors can lose out if they place their money with banks with flawed business models, who engaged in shady business practices and then become grossly insolvent—then surely this is a precedent that must form part of new proposals for dealing with failed institutions?

On the other hand, one could argue that at such a sensitive time for the Irish banking sector, defaults of this type would send the wrong message and worsen an already extremely serious liquidity problem. This is the argument put forward by our new best friend, Mr. Bini-Smaghi.

I’m open to considering all sides of this argument. On balance, however, I’m inclined to the position that it is in the interests of both Irish citizens and those in the wider EU to set a precedent with the Anglo and INBS bonds that there need to be limits on how much support European taxpayers will provide to insolvent banks.

Anglo SubDebt Buyback Offer Announced

Anglo Irish Bank have announced buyback offers for their subordinated bonds. The holders of the €1.5 billion in dated subordinated notes have been offered 20c on the euro, so this will cost the bank €300 million. The holders of the undated perpetual preferred securities (about €700 million outstanding according to page 56 of Anglo’s interim report) are being offered 5c on the euro, at a cost of about €35 million.

It appears that those signing up for the offers also have to vote to give the bank “the right to redeem all, but not some only, of the Existing Notes of each Series at an amount equal to €0.01 per €1,000.” In other words, if a majority of the bondholders acccept the deals on offer, then those who don’t accept will get essentially nothing.

It is disappointing that there has been no statement explaining this decision on the Department of Finance website. With €335 million of taxpayer funds being offered, the public should get a full explanation of why this is money well spent.

Brian Lucey on the Bondholder Bailout

Brian Lucey writes on the bondholder bailout and other matters in today’s Irish Times: article here.