The German government announced a plan last week for dealing with problem assets on the books of its banks. This plan has been compared favourably to NAMA by a number of Irish commentators but I’m not really sure why.
The essence of the plan, as described by the Wall Street Journal, is as follows
banks will have the option of putting structured products, such as mortgage-backed securities, into special-purpose vehicles at 90% of their present book value, which is often far above the assets’ likely market value if sold today.
In return, the vehicle would give its parent bank a note promising to repay it an equivalent amount in up to 20 years’ time. The German state would guarantee the repayment in exchange for a fee from the bank, which would free up capital by swapping toxic assets for a risk-free note.
In addition, the bank would have to pay the vehicle the difference, spread out over as long as 20 years, between 90% of an asset’s book value and its estimated ultimate value when it matures. If an asset’s ultimate value turns out to be less than auditors’ estimates, the bank will have to pay dividends to the German state instead of to shareholders until the full loss is covered. If assets perform better than expected, the bank gets the upside.