Not All About the Banks

The government has pushed the line in recent days that the flair up in the crisis is all about the banks.  There is little doubt that the trigger was ECB concern about their large and rising exposure to the Irish banking system.   But the idea that the banks are the problem and the state is fine – happily pre-funded as it is through the middle of next year – is nonsense.   As it stands, the Irish state is not creditworthy.   All else equal, it will become even less creditworthy as it burns through its valuable cash buffer.  The vanishing credibility of the ELG guarantee along with the creditworthiness of the state is the major cause of the banks’ increasing reliance on the ECB.  The intensified banking crisis is a (very significant) symptom of a deeper problem.

Of course, hopes are pinned that we can demonstrate political capacity to stabilise the debt to GDP ratio through a credible four-year plan and budget.  This will be a massive challenge.   Funding support on good terms – part of which could be used to “overcapitalise” the two main banks – would be a significant advantage in regaining market access; indeed, probably indispensible.   The last thing we need is another incorrect diagnosis of the problem. 

Supply side rabbits (or, the optimists need to decide on a party line)

How do you try to convince markets that an economy is going to grow even in the face of serious budget cuts, at a time of already high unemployment? You produce some supply side structural reforms from a hat, et voila! This is how the IMF envisages getting growth in Greece, for example, and it is now being suggested that structural reforms will be a means of getting growth in Ireland as well:

Together with the structural reforms that will be announced in the strategy, this budgetary adjustment should allow Ireland to return to a strong and sustainable growth path while safeguarding the economic and social position of its citizens.

I am a little confused by this. After all, it just a couple of months since Morgan Stanley provided a completely contrary reason for being bullish about Ireland:

Clearly, Ireland is facing major challenges in the quarters and years ahead.  But, if there is one economy in the euro area that could meet such challenges, it is probably the Irish economy, in our view. Mind you, these strong preconditions are not a guarantee that Ireland will be able to overcome the challenges that lie ahead easily.  But we believe that Ireland is fundamentally different from the other peripheral countries in that it is a fully deregulated, fully liberalised market economy.  Hence, it should be able to adjust to the new environment and work its way out of the current situation more quickly.

The reason for my confusion is that if we are indeed fully deregulated and fully liberalised, it is hard to see where the Irish supply side rabbits are going to come from.

So: are you optimistic because Ireland is a lean green market machine, which will adjust flexibly and push our (practically vertical) aggregate supply curve out to the right at a rate of knots? Or, on the contrary, are you optimistic because we are a eurosclerotic mess, whose rigidities imply a fruitful pro-growth structural reform agenda?

Ireland: The Texas of Europe?

Paul Krugman also points out the merits of deeper integration here.

Gavyn Davies on Ireland and EMU

Gavyn Davies has a good piece in the FT today. Some may respond that the deeper cooperation he calls for is politically impossible, but if that is the case then we have a real problem.

Solving the Irish Crisis: A Modest Proposal

Trevor Butterworth at Forbes has the solution