Before the snow hit, I gave a pre-budget presentation (pretty similar to my UCD presentation from today, though with some additional material on the banks) at a Labour Party pre-budget event. That presentation and three others are available here. Marie Sherlock from SIPTU and John Martin from OECD gave interesting presentations on labour market and training issues and Michael Collins from TCD gave a presentation on tax breaks.
Year: 2010
I did a short pre-budget presentation today at UCD. Here are the slides. One point I emphasised is whether the level of front-loading of adjustment in the four-year plan agreed with the EU and IMF makes sense.
Up until the past few weeks, it was reasonable to argue that a significant front-loading was necessary (if not sufficient) to regain access to the sovereign bond market. However, now that our banking problems and the ECB have caught up with us and access to the sovereign bond market is not an issue for the next few years, I’m struggling to understand the logic for the extent of front-loading in the current plan (€6 bilion in adjustments in 2011, €3.6 billion in 2012, €3.1 billion in 2013 and 2014).
The economy is still in poor shape, so I’m not sure what the current argument is for further undermining it with such a front-loaded adjustment. As I speculated in the talk, perhaps the EU wanted to lock in as much adjustment as possible with the current government because comittments beyond the 2011 budget were most likely going to be open to negotiations with the next government.
One of the questions that has been raised time and again over the past few years is how exactly the government ended up taking the decision to provide an almost blanket guarantee to the banks. In an interview yesterday with Marian Finucane, Green Party leader, John Gormley, shed some new light on this decision. Here’s an excerpt (about twenty minutes in).
John Gormley: The arrangements had been made the previous Sunday, right, and we had gone into that in quite a bit of detail and said yes this was the expert advice, to go down the guarantee route.
Marian Finucane: When was that decision made?
John Gormley: That was on the day before. It was a Sunday. We had a Cabinet meeting. We’d gone through it in quite a bit of detail as I said.
Later there was this exchange:
Marian Finucane: Can I just ask you a question? I think the rest of us thought that the two Brians … that the decision was made that night.
John Gormley: Well, you couldn’t just make a decision on the spur of the moment. You’d have to discuss it for days in advance. Of course, not. No, you just can’t do it like that. Everybody had to be involved in what was the best thing to do in these circumstances.
Then when asked whether he understood at the time how momentous the guarantee decision was “nailing the sovereign to the banking difficulty” Gormley rolled out the following
You have to look at what Patrick Honohan has said. Again, as somehow who has been brought in, who has been quite an independent voice, the first outsider to be brought into that position. He did write a report. Again, it was a very thorough report. And he said very clearly in that report that while the bank guarantee may have been too broad, in that it included subordinated debt, that it was absolutely essential because of the systemic importance of some of these banks.
I’d make three points on this.
First, Minister Gormley tells us that the decision to give a blanket guarantee was made by the full Cabinet on the Sunday because this was the recommendation of expert advice. I think Minister Gormley should release this expert advice to the public and explain who it is that gave it. As of now, we know that the government’s very expensively recruited advisers Merrill Lynch (€7.33 million in fees) stated at a meeting on the previous Friday that they were against such a guarantee. Handwritten notes taken at a meeting involving the Minister for Finance and representatives from the Central Bank, Financial Regulator, Department of Finance contained the following:
On a blanket guarantee for all banks — ML felt could be a mistake and hit national rating and allow poorer banks to continue.
So what happened between the Friday and the Sunday?
Second, the continual rolling out of the talking point that “Honohan’s only objection was the inclusion of subdebt” does a disservice to all those who parrott it.
Here’s the most relevant section (8.39 in the report):
The scope of the Irish guarantee was exceptionally broad. Not only did it cover all deposits, including corporate and even interbank deposits, as well as certain asset backed bonds (covered bonds) and senior debt it also included, as noted already, certain subordinated debt. The inclusion of existing long-term bonds and some subordinated debt (which, as part of the capital structure of a bank is intended to act as a buffer against losses) was not necessary in order to protect the immediate liquidity position. These investments were in effect locked-in. Their inclusion complicated eventual loss allocation and resolution options. Arguments voiced in favour of this decision, namely, that many holders of these instruments were also holders of Irish bonds and that a guarantee in respect of them would help banks raise new bonds are open to question: after all, extending a Government guarantee to non-Government bonds has the effect of stressing the sovereign to the disadvantage of existing holders of Government bonds; besides, new bonds could have been guaranteed separately. The argument for simplicity also is weakened significantly by the fact that an actual dividing line between covered and non-covered liabilities was drawn at as least an equally arbitrary point; moreover, such instruments were held only by sophisticated investors.
The key point made here by Honohan is not, as Gormley and many other government politicians insist, that subordinated bonds were included (this decision is singled out in the short paragraph 8.40 that followed and later in 8.50 as “not easy to defend”). Rather the point was that the guarantee applied to existing bonds rather than new debt issues.
Most likely, Gormley (and the others who make this point) haven’t read the report or have read it and don’t understand it. They are, most probably, simply repeating a talking point supplied to them by their spinners. And I suspect the Governor isn’t willing to request government politicians to cease-and-desist from misrepresenting his report, particularly given that his critical opinions on blanket guarantees were well flagged elsewhere. However, it would be nice to see interviewers refusing to accept this nonsense anymore.
Finally, I’d note that it appears that Gormley is more worried about the image of him not being consulted about the guarantee than he is with being considered responsible for it. This seems like poor politics. He’d be better off to have placards in Dublin South-East saying “Guarantee: Not My Idea” than “Guarantee: I Wasn’t In Bed”. But he’s entitled to make his own decisions on which message to get across. And, as he noted in his interview, politicians are ultimately made accountable at the ballot box. The public can soon show what they thought of Mister Gormley’s period in government.
Writing in the Sunday Independent today, Colm McCarthy characterises the Irish government’s position in the EU-IMF negotiations as follows:
The analogy of a poker game has been invoked, with the Irish negotiators having held, according to economist Antoin Murphy, no more than a pair of twos. In reality they held no cards at all, and could not bluff either. An Irish rejection would have created unwelcome but manageable problems for the eurozone banking system but would have brought immediate financial meltdown in Ireland. The inevitability of the latter is the reason why the bailout providers were in Ireland in the first place.
I’m not sure that I agree with the asymmetry that Colm invokes here: That a meltdown of the Irish banking system would have been a disaster for us but merely an “unwelcome but manageable” problem for the rest of the Eurozone.
An Irish banking system meltdown, complete with senior debt defaults, could have had extremely serious consequences for the rest of the European banking system. If the cavalry had arrived in Ireland but failed to negotiate a deal because of their desire to make the terms too onerous, how could one feel secure about Spanish banks, for instance?
If, as it appears, the Europeans (rather than the IMF) were pushing for faster fiscal adjustment, more intense conditionality, no defaults on senior bonds and a high borrowing rate, rather than have no hand to play at all, the Irish side could still have adopted the Dirty Harry strategy: Go ahead punk, make my day.