Fit For Purpose Bailouts

One of the disappointing things about the bailout and associated adjustment programme is that it has done little to lower the perceived probability of an eventual Irish default. I know that many readers believe Ireland is fundamentally insolvent, and so are not overly surprised. At this stage, however, there is growing recognition that the structure of the European bailouts also makes it difficult for countries to regain market access. Key European policy makers have indicated a willingness to revisit the arrangements, though this will have to go beyond the relatively straightforward option of increasing the size of the support funds.

I grapple with the reasons why the current structure of the bailouts is itself an impediment to regaining creditworthiness in a piece for the business section of todays Irish Times (article here).

Buiter Vs. Krugman on European Rigidities

This is really just a sub-thread on Greg’s Krugman post and Kevin’s earlier Buiter post.   

A significant part of Paul Krugman’s case against the Euro relates to the resulting loss of macro flexibility.   As he explains, nominal exchange rate devaluations/depreciations are effective in lowering the real exchange in an economy with substantial nominal rigidities.   However, Willem Buiter and co-authors argue that European countries tend to display real rigidity rather than nominal rigidity, making changes in the nominal exchange less effective in producing improvements in cost competitiveness.   Interestingly, however, Buiter holds out Ireland as a possible exception to the European pattern.    

“Can Europe Be Saved?” by Paul Krugman

Paul Krugman has a thoughtful survey of the Euro crisis in this week’s New York Times Magazine (forthcoming on Sunday but available on-line now).  This is not stockbroker-economist-type research, which tends to be long on buzzwords and hyperbole.  It is a well-reasoned feature-length review with some policy suggestions.  It has a central focus on Ireland and the other troubled peripheral states.

Divide and conquer

A friend of mine has just sent me this link, in which Sarkozy is saying that it is unreasonable for us to maintain our low corporate tax rates while seeking financial aid from Europe:

“I deeply respect the independence of our Irish friends and we have done everything to help them. But they cannot continue to ask us to come and help them while keeping a tax on company profits that is half (what other countries have),” he said.

For a more inflammatory version of the same argument, by an influential French economist, click here. And I was struck on my last trip to France by how ordinary people there are making the link between the Irish bailout and our ‘dumping fiscal’.

There are lots of obvious counters to all this, but I think the more important point is that such responses are inevitable, given the European response to the crisis to date. As two recent articles point out (here and here), the real cleavage in Europe is between European taxpayers and bank creditors (with the ECB being a third interested party, as another body which could help to fill the holes which have emerged in the European banking system). But since the powers that be are ruling out bondholder haircuts and quantitative easing, the only cleavage we are left with in practice is the one between core and periphery taxpayers.

Of course ordinary French and German taxpayers are going to be angry at lending their money to an insolvent state with lower tax rates than their own. Why wouldn’t they be? Of course ordinary Irish taxpayers are going to be angry at having to pay for high interest loans designed to bail out foreign banks. Why wouldn’t they be?

And while ordinary Europeans get angry with each other, with unpredictable political consequences, capital walks away scot free.

Olli Rehn in the FT

Olli Rehn has an interesting piece in the FT this morning.   One noteworthy part is the admission that the current and proposed financial support measures are not up to the task.

In parallel, we must ensure that the financial support mechanisms put in place last May are fit for purpose. The effective lending capacity of the current European financial stability facility should be reinforced and the scope of its activity widened. Here we need to review all options for the size and scope of our financial backstops – not only for the current ones, but also for the permanent European stability mechanism too.