Growth in 2013

In the Irish Times, Michael Noonan is quoted as saying:

“On next year’s profiles we’re looking at 2.2 per cent of growth in GDP. The uncertainty caused by a No vote will cause that to come down and consequently that would make my job more difficult in planning the next budget. I don’t want to be put in a position where we have to increase the pace of the correction and, simply, the electorate are entitled to that information.”

I am curious. Am I the only one who thinks that plus 2.2 per cent is wildly over-optimistic, unless there is a radical change of direction in Eurozone macroeconomic policy?

Some Budgetary Arithmetic for Fiscal Rules

The voting public must be getting frustrated with the wildly conflicting claims of politicians and economists on consequences of accepting/rejecting the Fiscal Treaty. As some of the consequences are genuinely uncertain – notably access to funding if the Treaty is rejected – conflicting assessments of consequences are not really surprising. But the public are also being subjected to some wild claims relating to the budgetary arithmetic of meeting the fiscal rules – rules already in place under the revised Stability and Growth Pact. It might be worthwhile to take a closer look at the numbers.

To get a sense of the likely additional fiscal effort required to meet the 1/20th and structural balance rules, a useful starting point is the most recent Government projections for the period to 2015 just published in the Stability Programme Update (SPU). Of course, as these are just projections; the actual situation in 2015 may be quite different. But examining what extra discretionary adjustment effort would be needed helps identify a rough order of magnitude, and hopefully weed out some wilder assertions. For reference, details of the implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact rules are available here.

The 1/20th Rule

The actual application of the rule uses both backward and forward looking averaging. To keep things as simple as possible, I will just look at the rate of debt reduction in the current year.

The change in the debt/GDP ratio is given by a simple formula:

Δd = [(i – g)/(1 + g)]d-1 – ps,

where d is the debt/GDP ratio (in percent of GDP), i is the average nominal interest rate on outstanding debt, g is the nominal growth rate, d-1 is the previous year’s debt/GDP ratio, and ps is the primary surplus (in percent of GDP).

We can use the projections in the just published SPU to get a sense of the projected underlying rate of debt ratio reduction in 2015. The lagged debt/GDP ratio (2014) is 119.5 percent of GDP, the nominal interest rate is 0.049, the nominal growth rate is 0.045, and the primary surplus is 2.8 percent of GDP. This yields a projected underlying fall in the debt/GDP ratio of 2.3 percentage points of GDP in 2015. (The actual fall projected in the SPU is 2.1 percentage points due to a stock-flow adjustment.) This suggests a further total improvement in the primary surplus equal to 0.7 percentage points of GDP would be sufficient to achieve the required 3 percentage-point reduction rate [(1/20)(119.5 – 60)]. Moreover, all else equal, the primary surplus as a share of GDP required to meet the rule declines as the debt/GDP ratio declines.

The Structural Balance Rule

The structural balance rule requires the structural deficit to be brought down to 0.5 percent of GDP. The Stability Programme Update projects a structural deficit of 3.5 percent of GDP in 2015. The implied nominal structural deficit is €6.3 billion. The nominal structural deficit consistent with the 0.5 limit (Ireland’s Medium-Term Budgetary Objective, which is the operational definition of structural balance) is €0.9 billion. The difference – €5.4 billion – might seem to suggest a large additional adjustment is required. But this ignores the impact of growth in nominal potential/actual GDP in subsequent years in bringing down the structural deficit in the absence of any discretionary adjustments.

Growth affects both the denominator and the numerator of the structural deficit as a share of GDP. (For simplicity I assume that actual and potential GDP grow at equal rates post 2015.) The denominator effect is straightforward. For the numerator, we could use the standard coefficient used by the European Commission for Ireland that assumes that the reduction in the deficit is 0.4 times the change in nominal GDP. (This coefficient is usually used for doing cyclical adjustments, but it should also be applicable for measuring the impact of changes in nominal potential GDP on structural balance in the absence of discretionary adjustments to tax and expenditure parameters.) However, to err on the conservative side, I assume a coefficient of just 0.2 for the calculations. The SPU projections imply a nominal growth rate for potential GDP of 3.16 percent in 2015. Assuming this growth rate remained constant for subsequent years (which again seems conservative), even with no further post-2015 discretionary adjustments the structural deficit as a share of GDP is projected to fall to 0.8 percent of GDP in 2019 and to 0.2 percent in 2020.

There’s many a slip twixt cup and lip – but hopefully these benchmark calculations can help identify some of the wilder budgetary arithmetic.

IMF and Sweden Host International Conference on Issues Surrounding Fiscal Consolidation and Medium-Term Budgetary Frameworks

IMF press release here.

Conference website here.

Referendums: Past and Present

Michael Marsh gave a talk at the Policy Institute last night on this topic –  slides are here.

Interests, ideas and EMU

When teaching economic history a question that frequently arises in the classroom is: do governments make policy based on interests, or do ideas also matter? Is it the case, as George Stigler once wrote about the UK’s move towards free trade in 1846, that

Economists exert a minor and scarcely detectable influence on the societies in which they live. . . . If Cobden had spoken only Yiddish, and with a stammer, and Peel had been a narrow, stupid man, England would have moved toward free trade in grain as its agricultural classes declined and its manufacturing and commercial classes grew

Or is Keynes’ famous line about ideas, written in the 1930s, and which is now such a cliché that I can’t bring myself to reproduce it here, more accurate?

This distinction between interests and ideas seems to me to be potentially quite important now, in the context of the EMU crisis.

You sometimes hear the argument made that in the final analysis, the Germans will give in on Eurobonds and the like, since the costs to them of allowing EMU to break down would be so enormous. This is an interest-based, rational choice prediction. But what if the Germans are advocating generalized austerity and internal devaluation in the periphery, not just because they don’t want to bail out other countries, or accept a higher rate of inflation in Germany, but because they genuinely believe that this is what is required in order to solve the crisis? What if they genuinely believe that there are no macroeconomic problems, only microeconomic problems? I think that there is plenty of evidence in favour of this view, and the German chapter in this book helps place it in its historical context. In this case, I don’t see any reason to be optimistic about where this crisis is heading: we can expect to see plenty more headlines about collapsing output, rising unemployment, and political radicalization in the months and years ahead, and eventually something will give.

Just because something is a cliché doesn’t mean it isn’t true.