Author: Karl Whelan

Rationale for the Greek Deal

I’ve been following the news stories on the proposed potential Greek bailout. However, reading articles like this, I’m struggling to find a good rationale for the agreement that’s been reached. The following questions come to mind:

  1. Greece needs to address its huge fiscal problems. To do this will require putting through highly unpopular measures. How does the EU’s offer of a potential bailout help get this achieved? How does the Greek government convince its people that harsh measures are required to reduce its deficit and keep open its access to sovereign debt markets when they now know that the EU tooth fairy is waiting by to help?
  2. Even if the senior figures in the leading EU countries have ultimately decided to intervene to prevent the disruptions associated with a Greek failure to roll over its debt, why not wait until that failure has happened?
  3. Why would the EU wish to be associated in the Greek public’s minds with the harsh expenditure cuts and tax increases that would still have to follow even after a bailout deal?
  4. Do those who advocate this policy really believe that the current Greek crisis is sui generis or are they planning to put in place a safety net for the whole Euro zone? If the latter, can such a policy really be credible?
  5. Is the long-run macroeconomic stability of the Euro area better served by avoiding the dislocations associated with one its constituent members going through a sovereign debt default or should we be more concerned about the problems created by the new bailout mechanism that lets governments know that the EU will intervene if they choose not to tackle their fiscal crises?

I feel that in asking these questions, I’ve clearly been missing something. Hopefully those who thrashed out this deal have thought these issues through. My concern is that in the somewhat fevered quasi-crisis atmosphere of this week, precedents may be getting set that we will live to regret.

Update: To be honest, I probably should have linked to this hand-wringing Times editorial as a better illustration of what I’m confused about. The editorial worries about “depressing the value of the euro” (which would in fact be a good thing for the Euro area economy) and discusses how this “raises major doubts about the future of the single currency” without explaining why this is the case.  The piece ends with the dramatic note of “The European Union remains on alert and on financial standby.”  It does make one wonder a little whether this issue is being hijacked somewhat by those who see “Europe” as the solution to most ills.

State In No Rush to Collect Dividend

You may remember that about this time last year, the state’s investment of €7 billion in preference shares of the two main banks was regularly touted as a great investment, with the 8% dividend playing a big role in helping to reduce our budget deficit. The story in relation to these dividends has now gotten a bit complicated and it now appears that instead of getting €560 million this year, we’re perhaps getting nothing.

As discussed here before (here and here) the EU Commission does not like the idea of taxpayer money going into the banks only to be paid out to subordinated bonds. For this reason, the Commission has prevented AIB and Bank of Ireland from paying coupon payments on certain bonds. This has triggered “dividend stopper” clauses which prevent the banks from paying cash dividends on the government’s preference shares, which are due on February 20 in the case of Bank of Ireland and May 13 in the case of AIB. This in turn would trigger the right of the National Pensions Reserve Fund Commission (NPRFC) to acquire ordinary shares equivalent to the amount of the dividend. And €560 million is a large amount of money relative to the current stock market capitalizations for these banks.

However, it turns out that NTMA are not keen on collecting these shares for the taxpayer. Via Bloomberg, the Irish Times reports:

Speaking at a Dáil committee in Dublin today, Mr Corrigan said failure to pay the coupon won’t automatically lead the government to take a bigger stake in the lenders. The NTMA chief executive said he would prefer the banks to pay the coupon in cash rather than shares. He said he is “in no rush” to collect the shares, and will await a European Union decision on the coupon before deciding how to proceed.

In relation to not being in a rush, it is true that the NTMA don’t have to take the shares. The original announcement stated:

Dividend: Fixed dividend of 8%, payable annually. Dividends payable in cash at the discretion of the bank. If cash dividend not paid, then ordinary shares are issued in lieu at a time no later than the date on which the bank subsequently pays a cash dividend on other Core Tier 1 capital.

Since the banks are not currently paying out dividends on ordinary shares, then it is clear that the shares don’t have to be issued, though it is less clear as to who makes the decision to get shares issued—the banks or the government.

It would be interesting to know the exact nature of this EU decision-making process that Mister Corrigan referred to. The Commission has already made its judgment on the payments to subdebt holders and it has adopted a consistent stance on this issue with other EU banks. There doesn’t seem to have been any conversion of the subdebt to some other form of claim that wouldn’t have a dividend stopper. So what exactly are we waiting for? A bit of clarity on this would be nice.

Iceland! Iceland! Collapse! Collapse!

I’ve noted on a number of occasions that both Brian Lenihan and Brian Cowen are very fond of misleading analogies in which any proposals to nationalise the two main Irish banks are linked to events in Iceland. For example, I noted recently that in an interview with Business and Finance, Minister Lenihan linked Iceland’s banking system collapse to a decision to nationalise. Some of the Minister’s bigger fans on this site argued that he was merely citing the sequence of events rather than indicating any actual causation.

Well, on this evening’s edition of The Last Word on Today FM, Minister Lenihan was at it again (podcast here — the interview is during the first hour of the show). In addition, as is usually the case when Lenihan and Cowen discuss this issue, the principal point of the discussion appeared to be to link the Labour Party’s position on the banking crisis to that of the Icelandic government. About 53 minutes in, the Minister said:

We didn’t go off, again like Iceland, and nationalise the system overnight because that lead to a banking collapse in Iceland. That’s what some of the Labour Party people wanted us to do in the last year.

(Cue philosophical debates in the comments about the meaning of the word “because” or perhaps “lead”).

Continue reading “Iceland! Iceland! Collapse! Collapse!”

Bonuses as Deferred Pay

This story is the best explanation we’ve got so far as to how the higher civil servant pay U-turn occurred and the justification used.

THE GOVERNMENT’S controversial U-turn on pay cuts for top public servants followed strong lobbying by their staff association that any cuts should take account of money lost as a result of the abolition of a bonus scheme which averaged 10 per cent of salary.

Official Department of Finance files show the Association of Assistant Secretaries and Higher Grades said it had legal opinion that the performance-related bonus scheme, which the Government initially suspended for 2008 and later scrapped permanently, formed an integral part of members’ remuneration packages.

The key argument put forward:

The association had earlier argued in correspondence with the Department of Finance that “while receipt of the performance-related element of pay is obviously not guaranteed to any individual, the scheme is part of our members’ basic remuneration package and amounts to an arrangement whereby part of that remuneration is simply deferred pending an independent assessment of performance”.

I’m not sure what this is supposed to mean. The fact that the bonuses did not count as pensionable pay and were not eligible for PRSI suggests that they were not part of basic pay. If the legal opinion was an implicit threat that the civil servants could have sued to reverse their pay cuts, I find it pretty hard to imagine such a case being successful.

In any case, it’s still not clear why the U-turn occurred. Minister Lenihan announced the ending of bonuses in February, so he was well aware of what he was doing when he announced the pay cuts in the budget concluding with “These are permanent reductions which will be reflected in future pension entitlements.”

It would be interesting to have heard the speech that Brian Lenihan gave on this issue at the Fianna Fail parliamentary party on Tuesday night for which he reportedly received a round of applause from the faithful.

In relation to this, I appeared on the radio on Tuesday night just after this meeting (link here) and heard Fianna Fail TD Michael Mulcahy suggest that the U-turn came from following the recommendations of the Review Body report and that the U-turn occurred because the report wasn’t released until after the budget. In truth, the U-turn runs counter to the report’s recommendations and the Minister had access to the report before the budget (he mentioned it in his speech.) These didn’t seem to be very satisfactory talking points on this issue from someone who had just received a full explanation from the Minister.

If the government thinks that misleading spin is the way to make this issue go away, I suspect they’re wrong. The fact that the usually-supportive Stephen Collins has taken up the issue also suggests that the government isn’t winning people over on this one.

Property Scheme Tax Incentives

One of the major issues that I think needs to be addressed this year is the role played by tax expenditures in our budgetary system. Reports such as this one by TASC have pointed to closing off tax expenditures as having an important role to play in closing the budget deficit. Chapter 8 of the Commission on Taxation report does a pretty good job of listing many of these tax reliefs and recommends shutting many of them off. There are serious discussions worth having in relation to many of these reliefs, such as those for pensions, but I don’t have the time to get into these issues now.

Interestingly, one particularly controversial type of relief that the Commission report does not examine is property incentive schemes; the report argued that since the decision had been taken to close off these schemes on their completion, they should not be examined. Information on the cost of these schemes was, however, reported to the Dail by Minister Lenihan last November in response to a parliamentary question from Joan Burton. The link to this answer is here but I know not to trust links to the Oireachtas website so I’ve also put up the answer as a Word document here.

The total amount of tax revenue lost from these schemes in 2007 was €435 million. I suspect this is smaller than some people might have expected, given the widespread nature of claims that the very richest in society are managing to pay almost no tax through their extensive use of these schemes.

Still, it is a decent amount of money. It would be interesting to know what these schemes are expected to cost this year and next and whether they can legally be closed. I suspect they can. Another interesting question is whether many of the individuals that availed of these schemes are now bankrupt and wouldn’t be able to pay any tax.