Is our banking inquiry nobbled before it starts?

Independent TD Stephen Donnelly has resigned from the committee of TDs and Senators charged with investigating the banking crisis. This follows a week where the government lost a vote, then rammed home changes to the composition of the inquiry committee to ensure it had a majority.

The reasons why the government lost the vote aren’t really that important. Remember both Houses held full debates on the establishment of the banking inquiry and the Government then unilaterally amended the motion that established the inquiry when it was clear it wouldn’t have a majority. It could have simply said ‘yeah we messed up, but you, know, custom and practice, lads’, and moved on, or allowed the inquiry to proceed unmolested, but then the Taoiseach defended the action to impose a majority, claiming the government wouldn’t have enough control over the inquiry:

you [presumably the government] need to able to approve terms of reference, a work schedule, and you need to able to approve a report at the end of it.

It all kicked off, and Donnelly resigned. There were some tense exchanges between Deputy Donnelly and Minister Leo Varadkar on radio on Sunday morning. Since then the polls tend to show support for Donnelly’s decision.

There have been several direct and indirect investigations into the circumstances surrounding the banking crisis. The Honohan report, for example, looked at regulation but obviously delved deeply into banking matters as well. None of these investigations have taken place in public, and none dealing with the ‘run up’ to the banking crisis, from the late 1990s to 2013 when we exited the bailout, or from 2002 to 2013. Colm McCarthy has a good post on why the terms of references should extend that far back.

The credibility of any findings from the new banking inquiry have clearly been called into question. Colm gives an explanation for the clear need for another inquiry:

The inquiry should explore whether any warnings were voiced within the banks, and whether the banks paid any attention to the warnings available from other sources. It should also explore the failure of international monitoring by bodies such as the European Commission, the IMF and the OECD, all of which produced excessively complacent assessments in the years leading up to the crisis.

Colm finishes with the sentiment I think we’d all hope the inquiry leads us to:

The inquiry is about accountability, not about dishing out retribution.

And yet, following last week’s events, commentators can’t help asking every government and opposition talking head what the ‘real’ reason behind the banking inquiry is.

As usual, Miriam Lord put it best, this might well simply turn out to be the Oireachtas Committee on Embarrassing Fianna Fáil over the Banking Crisis.

Accepting that there will be no rowing back of the appointment of the two Senators, in the interests of increasing the credibility of the final report, there are two remedies I can see. The first is that one of the newly appointed Senators resigns and is replaced by Stephen Donnelly, without any admission of guilt on the government’s behalf. This partially restores the credibility of the committee while co-opting Donnelly back onto the committee, which really could use his advice and expertise.

The second is for the non-governmental committee members to resign en masse once they’ve seen the terms of reference, especially if they don’t like what they see, particularly in terms of the time frame the inquiry will cover, the role of the banks, regulators, and the media in the run up to the crisis, and processes to ensure accountability trumping retribution.

Update (Wednesday 18th): Well, that’s that then.

Social Consequences of Austerity Livestream

Is here, questions on this blog, or at the hashtag #ausconf, may come up in the conference as well.

The possibility of renegotiating Ireland’s approach to fiscal policy in the short term

The country is all a-buzz with speculation that, having listened to the voters for the last few weeks, and having applied Sudocrem to all affected areas from the experience of the election itself, the political class will suddenly be able to reverse the process of austerity begun under the previous government.  (The process obviously continued, in lock step, by the current one).

The Taoiseach’s call for a review of European policies around bank debt, combined with talk of renewal by Labour following the start of their leadership race, is fuelling this speculation.

The latest ESRI quarterly commentary makes the point that the government’s finances are improving at a slightly faster than expected pace, meaning we may hit the Troika-mandated 3% deficit target without serious adjustments required in the forthcoming budget simply by relying on existing forward momentum and the action of automatic stabilisers. Of course they hedge their bets a bit, but given the importance of the issue I thought I’d quote a bit of the commentary:

The public finances are improving more rapidly than envisaged in the government’s plan. If the forecast in this Commentary proves to be correct, government borrowing in 2015 is likely to come in below the target (3 per cent of GDP) once again, even without the substantial further cuts envisaged for the 2015 Budget. However, in formulating fiscal policy it is best to err on the side of caution to ensure that budgetary targets are met in 2015. Nonetheless, these developments suggest that, after a long period of attrition, we are approaching the end of the very painful period of fiscal adjustment. However, there still remains the possibility of new shocks to the economy.

So does that mean the government can run out and renegotiate, renew, de-re-up on their promises to the Troika? I think the ESRI are saying the promises can be met without additional austerity, with a fair wind.

This may not spell the end of the consolidation period, however.

(Updated, thanks to Rossa White for this clarification) The NTMA’s investor presentation has the best graph of what’s supposed to happen in 2015’s budget. In budget 2014 the government agreed about 0.9 billion in revenue cuts and 1.6 billion in expenditure cuts, but the composition of the 2015 adjustment of around 2 billion (as per the recent SPU) hasn’t been outlined yet.

So while it isn’t clear that this last bit of austerity can be avoided just yet, it is pretty clear that (however constituted) the government will try hard not to implement the last few billion of cuts, especially if the 2014 August and September returns are looking good.

I think the question is, given the need to respect the 3% constraint–and please let’s not give any credence to headbangers talking about renegotiating the MoUs, etc., at this stage–what exactly the government will try to do to signal to the public the austerity period is effectively over.

The answer will define the legacy of this government. As Kevin notes this morning, at the last general election, the public voted for change, they got none. They are asking for it again, and much more clearly this time.

Michael Noonan has signalled since the last budget that altering tax bands is on the cards, saying.

If I have the money that is where I will go. I would like to reduce the threshold at which people hit the higher rate.

Fair enough, and this widening of tax bands does make sense as long as funds allow, and perhaps a tweaking of the USC, but the question politicians are asking I’m sure is will this be enough to appease the public?

Austerity: Economic, Political, and Social Perspectives

Austerity is not simply an economic phenomenon—societies experience it in different ways, socially, politically, and geographically. The aim of this event is to bring leading thinkers to probe the complex effects of austerity on the European economies forced to experience it by the global economic crisis.

The event will be live-streamed through the INET and YSI network, shown at the Festival of Economics at the University of Trento, as well as various blogs and community sites like Irisheconomy.ie, and we encourage submissions to the panel, which can come in the form of email questions, tweets, and via facebook.

Austerity: Economic, Political, and Social Perspectives

Friday, May 30 Kemmy Business School, UL KBG-16 (map)

Livestream from YSI event in the Univeristy of Limerick, All times are CET

10.00 -10.30 Opening by Dean of the Kemmy Business School, Dr. Philip O’Regan

10.30-12.00 Panel 1: Beyond the theory: Austerity as an economic, and political, reality

Mary Regan, Political Editor of the Irish Examiner, Chair

Mark Blyth, Brown University

Johnathan Hopkin, London School of Economics

Niamh Hardiman, University College, Dublin

John McHale, NUI, Galway & Irish Fiscal Advisory Council

12.00-12.30 Break

12.30-2.00 Panel 2: The wider consequences of austerity on society

Stephen Kinsella, University of Limerick, Chair

Niamh Hourigan, University Collge, Cork

Carmel Hannon, University of Limerick

Seamus Coffey, University College, Cork

Julien Mercille, University College, Dublin

Profiling the indebtedness of Irish SMES

This is exactly the kind of responsive research the Irish Central Bank should be doing. The Central Bank’s Fergal McCann takes a look at Irish SME indebtedness in the wake, presumably, of Morgan’s latest Irish Times op-ed on the subject. Fergal solves the data problem the ICB has for SME indebtedness levels using Red-C data.

There’s no doubt, I think, that there is a serious debt problem within Irish SMEs. But 34% lot of them have no debt at all, with others with very little debt relative to turnover.

McCann’s work is not of the ‘it’s grand lads, nothing to look at here’ variety, either, and it does put a shape on the problem for us.

The seriously indebted medium-sized enterprises are in trouble, though, and we now have a good measure of the likely extent of how many of these firms there are.