Colm McCarthy: Fours years on yet not even a parking ticket issued

Colm writes in today’s Sindo on the outstanding problem of obtaining satisfaction from those responsible for the banking crisis within the banks. As usual there is a lot to think about and digest, but one piece stood out for me:

In Ireland, almost four years after the balloon went up, not so much as a parking ticket has been issued. Inquiries are under way by the Director of Public Prosecutions, An Garda Siochana, the Criminal Assets Bureau and the Office of the Director for Corporate Enforcement but none has yielded fruit. The Irish banking bust has been described by Central Bank governor Patrick Honohan as one of the largest, relative to the size of the country, which has ever occurred anywhere.

The snail-race by the investigating bodies is an embarrassment, has fed public cynicism and the belief that those responsible for the disaster will never be brought to account.

The socially corrosive effect this delay is having cannot be estimated. There has been at least one file prepared and sent to the DPP, but that’s it as far as we go. Colm has a gloomy outlook on the possibility of any redress coming via the Oireachtas:

It does not matter which Oireachtas committee undertakes the next incomplete inquiry.

The importance of the current account

The current account is the sum of the balance of trade, factor income and cash transfers. It is one half of the balance of payments, together with the capital account. The current account matters in every country for a host of reasons, but it is especially important for small open economies like ours. Here’s the latest data on Ireland’s current account, here’s that data in chart form.

CSO.ie

We see the imbalance within the current account throughout the crisis. Much of this imbalance came through the ‘services’ and ‘income’ channels, as we can see in this figure that simply decomposes the components of the current account over time.

Components of the current account.

There is a new working paper from the ECB by Ca’Zorzi et al which shows that, accounting for a host of other factors, the current account imbalance story is really the only one that matters. Once the current account become decoupled from what the authors call ‘fundamentals’, the wheels come off the bus. This paper should be food for thought for our policy makers.

Successful Bill Auction

The remarkable thing about this morning’s 3 month t-bill auction is how unremarkable it was. The whole thing seems to have gone off without a hitch. Happy days. We’re not back in the bond markets just yet, but it is a good first step towards a return to business as usual.

Journalists! Bonds are not Bills! Bills are not Bonds!

Today the NTMA announced Ireland will resume treasury bill auctions, the first since September 2010. This is a really good thing.

But this does not mean Ireland is “back in the bond market”, with all the baggage that phrase has for Irish people these days. We’re back in the Bill market. Journalists in particular should understand the difference between bonds and bills.

While both bonds and bills are debt obligations, in other words when you buy either a bond or a bill you are lending your money to the Irish government, and both are auctioned, bills are used as short term liquidity instruments, typically repaying the bill buyer in 3 months or 6 months or something like that, while bonds carry much longer maturities, usually 2 years, 5 years, 10 years, even 30 years, and are typically used to pay down other maturing bonds or to finance state expenditure. See these lecture notes, slide 218 in particular, for more details. Update: these ones are way better.

Thus Bills differ in their form and their usage, it doesn’t make sense to confuse them. While today’s announcement is a good sign, we shouldn’t get too excited over their issuance. Portugal has been issuing T-Bills throughout its time as a programme country, and even Greece got some away in May.

For these reasons we shouldn’t read too much into the yield and bid to cover ratios of these bills. It’s still a positive first step, but it’s not Ireland dipping its toes in the water of the markets, more like us taking off our socks near the pool.

Krugman and Layard on a manifesto for economic sense

Paul Krugman and Richard Layard put forward a case for a coherent and evidence based approach to the crisis. Essentially they argue that a strategy of focusing on the reduction of public debt levels exclusively in order to regain market confidence makes no sense, and has been falsified empirically. They also argue that structural imbalances shouldn’t prevent the use of discretionary fiscal policy for stabilization purposes when it is available.

This chart of the drop in domestic demand from the recent Nevin Institute quarterly report (page 4) is particularly striking as a motivating factor in discussing Krugman and Layard’s piece.

Final Domestic Demand

Krugman and Layard have a manifesto you can sign up to (I did).

There are lots of things in this piece I agree with, but two big ones are:

1. Placing the blame for the crisis at governments’ feet makes no sense. The crisis didn’t start in the public finances, it began in the private sector(s).
2. The confidence argument and its attendant strategy is completely wrong headed at this juncture, Ireland in particular shouldn’t be held up by anyone as the role model for austerity, either in the 1980s or today.

There are also aspects I don’t see as pertinent to the Irish case.

Krugman and Layard write:

A second argument against expanding demand is that output is in fact constrained on the supply side – by structural imbalances. If this theory were right, however, at least some parts of our economies ought to be at full stretch, and so should some occupations.

But in Ireland, in the IT sector for example, and especially in really high end tech jobs like online video gaming and such, they can’t get people. (Obviously in other sectors like services and construction their argument holds.) There are other examples but I think in a small open economy like Ireland this argument isn’t that important.

The key question from an Irish point of view is: to what extent is the Krugman-Layard prescription possible in a country with so little fiscal room for maneuver? Translating the argument down a bit, if Ireland is somewhere between Greece and Spain in terms of it’s problems, even if Enda Kenny et al bought the Krugman/Layard prescription lock stock and two smoking barrels, given where we are right now, are our options severely limited in any event? I’d welcome your thoughts on this.