Category: EMU

Complying with the Debt Reduction Rule

The issue of whether the Fiscal Compact will mean additional austerity in the post-2015 period has generated some heat in the referendum debate.  John has usefully provided some light to this issue in a previous post.  This post adds little to the conclusions there on the “1/20th” rule but relays a similar point in a slightly different way.  Based on IMF projections Ireland will satisfy the debt reduction rule in 2015.

The debt reduction benchmark is calculated as an average over a three-year period.  One of two averages can be used to satisfy the rule.  There is a backward-looking average covering the years t-1, t-2 and t-3 with a benchmark calculated for year t, and there is also a partially-forward-looking average for the years t-1, t and t+1 with a benchmark calculated for year t+2.

The formula for the benchmark is in the Code of Conduct for the Stability and Growth Pact and for the retrospective average it can be seen on page 8 to be:

where bb is the benchmark or target debt ratio and b is the debt-to-GDP ratio in other years.  Although there is a bit to the formula all that is needed is the debt ratios for three years in order to calculate the benchmark for the next year. 

If the debt ratio for the current year is expected to be below the benchmark level given by the formula then the conditions of the debt reduction rule are satisfied.

To simulate the impact of the rule on Ireland we can use the IMF’s forecasts of the general government gross debt from the recent update of the World Economic Outlook as these extend out to 2017.  We will use these to gauge Ireland’s performance to the rule beginning in 2012.

The debt ratio column are actual data up to 2010 and are the IMF’s projections from 2011 to 2017.  The benchmark column are the targets for each year and is calculated by putting the debt ratios for the preceding three years into the formula shown above.   Compliance is true if the debt ratio for any year is less than the benchmark calculated for that year.  Under current assumptions and IMF projections Ireland will satisfy the retrospective version of the debt reduction rule in 2017.

One of the assumptions the IMF makes is that we undertake the €8.6 billion of fiscal adjustment planned for 2013-15.  Projections after that are based on a “no policy change” scenario.  Under IMF projections we will satisfy the debt brake rule in 2017 with no additional fiscal effort above what has already been provided for up to 2015 with neutral budgets after that.

The debt reduction rule can be satisfied while running deficits and does not require any debt repayments.  The IMF project that there will be an overall budget deficit of 1.9% of GDP in 2017. 

The gross debt continues to rise and in the years from 2014 to 2017 (the years used in the 2017 comparison) the gross debt increases from €201.0 billion in 2014 to €213.5 billion in 2017. 

If the alternative forward-looking version of the rule was applied it would actually show that we would be in compliance with the rule from 2015, as the benchmark calculation is based on the debt ratios in the same three years, 2014, 2015 and 2016 and again compared to the ratio in 2017.  Using the forward looking version of the rule in 2015 will also give a benchmark of 109.6% of GDP for 2017 which is, of course, above the projected debt ratio for 2017.

Although this is only a simulation it does show that we would not need additional fiscal adjustment to satisfy the debt brake rule.  In fact, using IMF projections it can be shown that we will be able to satisfy the rule before we even leave the Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP).  The debt brake rule doesn’t actually become effective until three years after a country leaves the EDP.  We have until 2018 to become compliant with the debt reduction rule but we may actually be compliant by as early as 2015.

One reason for this is that the “1/20th” rule is actually relatively benign and according to Karl Whelan in section 2.1 of this paper the “rate of progress that is deemed satisfactory is still very slow.”  We have plenty to be worrying about but satisfying the conditions of the debt brake is not one of them.  In fact, it is likely that we will want to reduce the debt ratio at a rate faster than that required by the rule.

Growth in 2013

In the Irish Times, Michael Noonan is quoted as saying:

“On next year’s profiles we’re looking at 2.2 per cent of growth in GDP. The uncertainty caused by a No vote will cause that to come down and consequently that would make my job more difficult in planning the next budget. I don’t want to be put in a position where we have to increase the pace of the correction and, simply, the electorate are entitled to that information.”

I am curious. Am I the only one who thinks that plus 2.2 per cent is wildly over-optimistic, unless there is a radical change of direction in Eurozone macroeconomic policy?

Interests, ideas and EMU

When teaching economic history a question that frequently arises in the classroom is: do governments make policy based on interests, or do ideas also matter? Is it the case, as George Stigler once wrote about the UK’s move towards free trade in 1846, that

Economists exert a minor and scarcely detectable influence on the societies in which they live. . . . If Cobden had spoken only Yiddish, and with a stammer, and Peel had been a narrow, stupid man, England would have moved toward free trade in grain as its agricultural classes declined and its manufacturing and commercial classes grew

Or is Keynes’ famous line about ideas, written in the 1930s, and which is now such a cliché that I can’t bring myself to reproduce it here, more accurate?

This distinction between interests and ideas seems to me to be potentially quite important now, in the context of the EMU crisis.

You sometimes hear the argument made that in the final analysis, the Germans will give in on Eurobonds and the like, since the costs to them of allowing EMU to break down would be so enormous. This is an interest-based, rational choice prediction. But what if the Germans are advocating generalized austerity and internal devaluation in the periphery, not just because they don’t want to bail out other countries, or accept a higher rate of inflation in Germany, but because they genuinely believe that this is what is required in order to solve the crisis? What if they genuinely believe that there are no macroeconomic problems, only microeconomic problems? I think that there is plenty of evidence in favour of this view, and the German chapter in this book helps place it in its historical context. In this case, I don’t see any reason to be optimistic about where this crisis is heading: we can expect to see plenty more headlines about collapsing output, rising unemployment, and political radicalization in the months and years ahead, and eventually something will give.

Just because something is a cliché doesn’t mean it isn’t true.

Mrs Merkel gives Ireland the perfect reason to postpone the referendum

In this interview, Mrs Merkel gives the forthcoming Irish referendum as a reason why the treaty should not be renegotiated.

Almost no-one in Ireland thinks this treaty is a good one, and that includes the people who believe that we have no realistic option but to ratify it. Indeed, almost no-one outside Germany seems to want it, including the governments who signed it. It follows that if M Hollande were to lead a push to have it renegotiated, we should support that effort. If our May referendum is an obstacle in the way of achieving that goal, we should postpone it.

Spain

The news that Spanish unemployment is now at 24.4% deserves a thread. It is the latest reminder of the complete and utter failure of the Eurozone’s absurd strategy of generalized, undifferentiated austerity for all, simultaneously. What is so frustrating is that it was obvious in 2010 that this would be the result, which is why some of us objected at the time to what was happening: you didn’t have to be a genius to figure it out. I don’t see any way that the Eurozone will survive in its current form unless the macroeconomic policy mix changes, and I’m not sure it will change, even if M Hollande gets elected.