Successful Completion of Tenth Review of Troika Programme

In a statement issued at the end of this Review yesterday, we were given the by-now familiar plaudits for achieving various benchmarks. Going forward, ‘strict implementation’ of this year’s budgetary targets is urged.

The gravity of the unemployment situation is acknowledged. ‘Swift action needed to deal with unemployment’ the newspaper headlines proclaimed. The onus for this is placed on the Irish government and a familiar list of policies proposed, including for example ‘the need for enhanced engagement with the unemployed and the opening up of competition in sheltered sectors like legal services’.

I wonder how much our readers think increased competition between lawyers will contribute to lowering our unemployment rate.

ECB Monthly Bulletin

The new bulletin is out, with the following special articles:

  • 09/05/2013 – Publication: Article, Monthly Bulletin, May 2013, pp 71-83, An assessment of Eurosystem staff macroeconomic projections, 423 kb, en
  • 09/05/2013 – Publication: Article, Monthly Bulletin, May 2013, pp 85-101, Country adjustment in the euro area: where do we stand?, 326 kb, en
  • 09/05/2013 – Publication: Article, Monthly Bulletin, May 2013, pp 103-114, Target balances and monetary policy operations, 631 kb, en

Today’s exam question

In honour of the fine examination weather we are having these days:

According to this morning’s Eurointelligence,

The Eurogroup will analyze to what extent past imbalances contribute to the current low growth, according to an unnamed Eurogroup official, and also whether Spain’s large current account deficit prior to the crisis can be attributed to the housing bubble, inappropriate banking supervision, or lax credit standards.

Does it make sense to attribute Spain’s current account deficit to Spanish policies alone? Be explicit about the theoretical and empirical assumptions you are making.

Blanchard and Leigh: Fiscal Consolidation: At What Speed?

Olivier Blanchard and Daniel Leigh provide a good account of the trade-off facing policy makers in identifying the optimal speed of fiscal adjustment.   See also Chapter 2 of the IMF’s recent Fiscal Monitor.   Reasons for slower adjustment include time-varying multipliers, the danger of “stall speed” where adverse feedback loops kick in at low or negative growth rates, and hysteresis effects from fiscal contractions that are worse when the economy is already in recession.   The main reason for faster adjustment is the danger of falling into a bad equilibrium with high interest rates and high expectations of default, especially where it is difficult to credibly commit to future adjustments.  

Simon Wren-Lewis gives a sceptical response here.  Paul Krugman responds here, here and here.  

The debate focuses mainly on the trade-off for a country such as the UK that retains its own independent monetary policy.   In contrast to the uncertainty that surrounds such empirical questions as the size of fiscal multipliers or the causal link from debt to growth, recent experience in Ireland and elsewhere shows that the risk of falling into a “bad equilibrium” is not hypothetical for a high-debt country within EMU.   For fragile EMU members, an additional factor is the existence of a conditional lender of last resort, where one of the conditions for support could be a forced restructuring of privately held debt (PSI).   (I make an initial stab at integrating a conditional LOLR into a model with possible multiple equilibria here)

Carbon tax breaks for low-particulate fuel

We have learned a few lessons over the years. Monetary policy and market regulation are better done at arm’s length of the government. The generalists in the Dail set the broad goals, but leave the details to quasi-independent technocrats. Macro-prudence is now being added to those broad goals.

Micro is another matter. Policy-makers instinctively reach for the second-best. Sometimes that is the best feasible regulation. Sometimes that creates rents for their clients. And sometimes it is just the force of habit.

The Examiner reports that Minister Hogan suggested that smokeless fuels be given a break on the carbon tax. Really? The carbon tax regulates carbon dioxide emissions. Smokeless fuels and smoky fuels differ in their particulate emissions. A carbon tax break may reduce particulate emissions but would increase carbon dioxide emissions.

A carbon tax break would make climate policy more expensive. Emission reduction is cheapest when there is a uniform price. At the moment, there are three carbon prices: EU ETS, carbon tax, and zero. Hogan proposes there’d be four: EU ETS, carbon tax, reduced carbon tax, and zero. The reduced carbon tax would hold for coal and peat, the fuels that emit most carbon dioxide per unit of energy.

A carbon tax break would also make particulate policy more expensive. At the moment, there is a range of regulations including technical standards (e.g., in transport) and local bans (e.g., on selling smoky fuels in cities). A tax break would add yet another layer of regulation. The impact on costs is predictable: They will rise as any move away from first-best regulation does (Tinbergen 1952).

The impact on emissions is unknown. There are two substitution effects: (1) smoky -> smokeless coal and peat; and (2) oil and gas -> coal and peat. The carbon tax break would apply to all smokeless fuel, not just to smokeless fuel sold in places where smoky fuels are banned. Smokeless fuel use may increase more that smoky fuel use falls.

Recall that smokeless fuels are not particulate-less. There are no visible emissions. Invisible particulates, the ones that do real damage, are emitted nonetheless.

If Minister Hogan wants to reduce particulate emissions, he should impose a particulate tax (and abolish the ineffective sales ban) or extend the sales ban to the entire country.