Ahem.
It is obvious that the banking crises in Ireland and Spain share many similarities. However, it is also clear that the Spanish banking crisis is quite a bit smaller relative to its GDP (even if it is bigger relative to euro area GDP).
- The credit boom was not quite as strong in Spain as in Ireland. The credit/GDP ratio in Ireland rose from 104 percent in 2002 to 210 percent in 2008; the increase in Spain was from 100 percent in 2002 to 188 percent in 2008
- A recent DB report calculates that real estate loans peaked at 77 percent of GDP in Ireland but only 29 percent of GDP in Spain, while estimated non-performing loans stand at 52 percent of GDP in Ireland but only 17 percent of GDP in Spain
- Ireland’s Troika funding of 67.5 billion euro is equivalent to 43 percent of Irish GDP, the Spanish funding of 100 billion is equivalent to about 9 percent of Spanish GDP.
The proposal for a Debt Redemption Fund made by the German Council of Economic Experts seems to be gaining a bit more traction (see here). This working paper from February provides a useful overview. Given that this is the only “eurobonds” proposal with anything approaching momentum, it is worth debating its merits.
Some of the basic elements:
· Countries would be able to finance an amount of debt (as a share of GDP) equal to the difference between current levels and 60 percent of GDP through the fund. This would occur as new funding needs (deficits/redemptions) arise
· The fund would have joint and several guarantees
· Repayments would be a constant share of GDP, equal to the ERF interest rate plus one percent divided by initial GDP. The repayment schedule is designed to fully repay fund borrowings in 20 to 25 years
· Countries would have to commit to reduce their total debt to below 60 percent of GDP. Longer term, it doesn’t appear that there would be additional commitments beyond the revised Stability and Growth Pact and Fiscal Compact. However, during the “roll-in” phase, countries would have EFSF-style adjustment programmes
· Would only apply for current programme countries after they had exited their programmes.
Karl Whelan has a very useful post on options relating to reducing the burden of banking-related debt (see here). Of particular interest is his comparison of the present discounted cost of the current promissory notes/ELA arrangement and a low-interest (3 percent) long-term (30-year) financing deal with the ESM to immediately payoff the ELA. This calculation shows that that ESM alternative has a lower NPV by a wide margin.
We could perhaps quibble with some of the assumptions used in the calculation. Karl assumes the ECB’s main refinancing rate rises to 4.5 percent by 2016, which would require a strong euro zone recovery (see Table 7 here). Also, in a world where official financing remains available as an option over the longer term, the assumed discount rate of 7 percent (based on current secondary-market bond yields) could be considered high. (I am also not sure from the calculations if Karl is allowing for Irish Central Bank profits on outstanding ELA.) But Karl’s basic conclusion seems robust to reasonable relaxations of these assumptions.
Karl notes that I am “neutral” with regard to whether the long-term refinancing via the ESM would be a good deal, waiting to see the details. Based on his numbers, I am happy to agree that a 30-year deal at 3 percent is likely to result in a substantial reduction in the burden of this debt.
Spain’s banks are getting a series of loans. Hooray. The rather vague Eurogroup statement on Spain is here. It’s being reported that Spain will require up to 100 billion euro for its banks, which will be added to its national debt. The money will come in tranches, first from the EFSF, and then later from the ESM. There aren’t specific austerity measures attached to this series of loans. People in Ireland are sure to lose their minds over the fact that there won’t be specific conditionality attached to these loans, and the IMF will be ‘observers’ rather than actually part of a Troika of funders. The talk generally is likely to be something like ‘why couldn’t we get such a deal’, and apparently Minister Noonan will be bringing this up with his colleagues at a later date.
It should be noted however that Spain is already enduring a fair bit of austerity, has already signed up to the Fiscal Treaty, and so will have to produce a `programme’ of sorts under its own steam. Spain’s economy is also in pretty rough shape. I made the chart below from FRED to show household debt as a percentage of GDP (left hand axis) and unemployment in Spain (right hand axis), two variables we should be interested in. Clearly with an unemployment rate heading for 25%, a very indebted household sector, and a set of bunched bank balance sheets, the Spaniards have their work cut out for them even without a further programme of adjustment.
A few things to consider:
1. Will treating Spanish banks separately (in some sense) to the sovereign prevent its bond yields from spiking?
2. What will the effect on the EFSF and ESM balance sheets from a large scale Spanish ‘withdrawal’?
3. Will everyone now immediately target Italy (or Belgium) as the next domino to fall?
