Tag: EFSF

Bond Purchases as the Tool of Choice for Tackling the Debt Crisis?

The FT is reporting that the Christine Lagarde is the latest high-level official to offer tentative support for bond purchases by the EFSF as a central element in the reform of liquidity support measures.

Christine Lagarde, French finance minister, said France was ready to discuss allowing the eurozone’s €440bn ($588bn) bail-out fund to start buying bonds of struggling European economies amid signs of consensus that it would become the primary new tool for tackling Europe’s ongoing debt crisis.

How significant a development would this be? The first thing to note is that ECB bond purchases have failed to bring market yields to affordable levels. While probably helping to a degree, the ECB’s secondary-market purchases have lacked commitment and provide no real certainty to investors on how high yields could rise.  Secondary market purchases by the EFSF are unlikely to be much more effective unless operated at a very different scale.

In principle, however, official primary-market bond purchases could provide guaranteed funding at some maximum interest rate. This maximum rate could be set high enough to create strong incentives to rely on market funding. I would presume that the total amount of funding would be capped and the programme would have a time limit. But because they involve purchases of ordinary bonds, concern about the seniority of official creditors should be lessened. Overall, the existence of such an official buyer of last resort should give market investors reasonable confidence that governments would be able to roll over their borrowing as bonds mature over a significant time period. The proposal has the potential to provide support to a country facing difficult market conditions without crowding out longer-term private investors from the market; such crowding out appears to be a major shortcoming of current support measures.

Of course, the devil is in the detail, and there is little concrete yet about how such bond purchases would actually operate. It is also unclear whether these new facilities would be available to countries already in support programmes. But it is an interesting development.

EU-IMF Bailout Borrowing Rates

The NTMA have released a note explaining the interest rate associated with the bailout package. The average interest rate is 5.82% and the average maturity of the borrowings is 7.5 years.

The 5.82% is presented as being comprised of an average rate of 5.7% from the IMF and EFSM and 6.05% from the EFSF.

The statement leaves a few questions unanswered about the IMF and EU rates.

Regarding the IMF rate, the IMF’s statement on Sunday night said

At the current SDR interest rate, the average lending interest rate at the peak level of access under the arrangement (2,320 percent of quota) would be 3.12 percent during the first three years, and just under 4 percent after three years.

How do we get from a weighted average of 3.12% and 4% to the government’s figure of 5.7%? The answer appears to be related to the fact that the IMF lends in SDRs at a floating rate. From the NTMA statement:

The SDR comprises a basket of four currencies, Euro, Sterling, the US Dollar and Japanese Yen. The IMF’s SDR lending rate is based on the three month floating interest rates for the currencies in the basket. In the presentation of the financial support programme the interest cost on the IMF’s floating rate SDR lending is expressed as the equivalent rate when the funds are fully swapped into fixed rate Euro of 7.5 years duration.

Since both IMF and NTMA statements must be true, this suggests that the cost of swapping a floating rate SDR loan into a fixed rate Euro loan is somewhere between 170 and 258 basis points. That seems very high to me.

Regards the EFSM rate, the NTMA tell us that it “will be at a rate similar to the IMF funds, i.e. 5.7 per cent per annum.” But presumably the EFSM is lending in euros and so there was no need to undertake a very expensive swap exercise, so this deal factors in a profit margin for the EFSF that does not apply to the IMF loan.

Finally, the mystery that is the EFSF rate is revealed. 6.05%. Less than the 6.7% that was doing the rounds last week but more than the 5.7% that I had guessed a few weeks ago and still a pretty hefty rate.

I have to confess to having no idea how this 6.05% was arrived at. The EFSF FAQ states

fixed-rate loans are based upon the rates corresponding to swap rates for the relevant maturities. In addition there is a charge of 300 basis points for maturities up to three years and an extra 100 basis points per year for loans longer than three years. A one time service fee of 50 basis points is charged to cover operational costs.

So let’s plug in the numbers consistent with a seven year maturity. The seven year swap rate is 2.85%. Add 400 basis points for the profit margin and you’re at 6.85%. And this ignores the 50 basis point service fee which, if annualised over the term, would bring the rate up to 6.92%. Finally, this also ignores the following aspect of EFSF lending. From the framework agreement:

The Service Fee and the net present value of the anticipated Margin, together with such other amounts as EFSF decides to retain as an additional cash buffer, will be deducted from the cash amount remitted to Borrower in respect of each Loan (such that on the disbursement date (the “Disbursement Date”) the Borrower receives the net amount (the “Net Disbursement Amount”)) but shall not reduce the principal amount of such Loan that the Borrower is liable to repay and on which interest accrues under the relevant Loan.

This seems to mean that we are paying the service fee and margin up front. In addition, we are going to pay interest on a cash buffer, which is money kept by EFSF that we’ll never see.

So, two thoughts here. First, it seems likely that the government negotiated in the final days to get the “profit margin” aspect of the EFSF money down. Second, I wouldn’t be surprised if the true effective cost of this loan is understated by the 6.05% figure, for instance because it doesn’t include the up-front service fee or the role played by the cash buffer.

A full detailed explanation of the EFSF rate from either the Irish government or the EFSF would be very welcome.

Not All About the Banks

The government has pushed the line in recent days that the flair up in the crisis is all about the banks.  There is little doubt that the trigger was ECB concern about their large and rising exposure to the Irish banking system.   But the idea that the banks are the problem and the state is fine – happily pre-funded as it is through the middle of next year – is nonsense.   As it stands, the Irish state is not creditworthy.   All else equal, it will become even less creditworthy as it burns through its valuable cash buffer.  The vanishing credibility of the ELG guarantee along with the creditworthiness of the state is the major cause of the banks’ increasing reliance on the ECB.  The intensified banking crisis is a (very significant) symptom of a deeper problem.

Of course, hopes are pinned that we can demonstrate political capacity to stabilise the debt to GDP ratio through a credible four-year plan and budget.  This will be a massive challenge.   Funding support on good terms – part of which could be used to “overcapitalise” the two main banks – would be a significant advantage in regaining market access; indeed, probably indispensible.   The last thing we need is another incorrect diagnosis of the problem. 

A Bailout Worth Considering

Even though it’s hard to separate fact from fiction in the fast-moving bailout story, reports that the Commission and ECB are pushing for Ireland to avail of the EFSF for broader European stability reasons could change the calculation in an important way.   I still believe that Ireland’s best bet is to regain creditworthiness through a demonstration of political capacity with the budget and the four-year plan.   The alternative of being forced to seek a bailout would involve at least as much austerity as our own adjustment and would do long-term reputational damage.   

But acceding to a request to avail of the facility is potentially a different proposition.   I don’t think our European partners could simply expect us to pursue a less nationally advantageous path in the interest of broader euro zone stability.   The terms would have to be mutually advantageous relative to the next best options for both sides.   One reasonable agreement that could meet this requirement is for our European partners to support our four-year plan with a credit line from the EFSF at a reasonable rate of interest (say the 5 percent rate provided to Greece).  Access to the funds would be conditional on meeting the targets under the plan, which after all is being developed with input from the Commission and the ECB.   The intention would still be to return to markets for funding rather than the use the facility, but the backstop of a dependable credit line on reasonable terms would give us a substantially greater chance of actually being able to access market funding both for the state and the banks. 

Of course, it would be a mistake to exaggerate our bargaining power.   The increasing reliance of our banks on the ECB means we are heavily dependent on their willingness to provide extraordinary support.   But if the right deal is on offer, I worry that the government would be too inclined to resist for fear of a political backlash.  All bailouts are not created equal.   An invited bailout – on the right terms, and in line with our own chosen strategy – might well be worth accepting.

Is Ireland’s Number Up?

Constantin Gurdgiev and I offer different views on Ireland’s capacity to avoid default in today’s Irish Examiner.  Articles here.    The articles follow an introductory piece by the paper’s political reporter, Mary Regan.