Today’s Irish Times reports that the government has hired Peter Bacon
to assess the possibility of creating a “bad bank” or risk insurance scheme to take so-called toxic debts off the banks’ balance sheets in a bid to free up new lending.
I know I’m at risk of sounding like a broken record on this topic but, given its importance, I’ll add my latest two cents on this. I’m not in favour of either this form of “bad bank” or a risk insurance scheme.
The “bad bank” idea (in its current meaning) involves paying higher than current market prices for impaired bank loans. This amounts to recapitalizing banks with taxpayer money without giving the taxpayer any further equity stake. If these banks survive the current era in private ownership, this will have turned out to have been a lump sum transfer from the taxpayer to the shareholders of these banks.
The insurance idea is basically a drip-drip version of the bad bank idea.
The insurance scheme probably seems more politically attractive because it delays the payouts and also because of the instant transparency of how bad the bad bank proposal is. As the IT puts it:
Under a bad bank scheme, governments would, in return for a charge on the banks, have to fund the purchase of bad debts upfront. The idea may force banks to recognise additional losses, creating higher demands for capital and leading to greater government ownership.
In other words, the bad bank idea mightn’t work because the public would need to see banks taking at least some of the losses. But this would probably require more government equity investment—and avoiding more government control of banks seems to be the political economy motivation for the scheme in the first place.
So, reading between the lines, the insurance proposal looks more attractive to politicians and also more dangerous to the taxpayer. As the IT article puts it:
An insurance scheme allows states to take losses over a longer period, mitigating the risk
which is an interesting definition of risk. Of course, the devil is usually in the details and perhaps our commenters can explain to me how this scheme can be implemented in a constructive way.
One justification for these proposals that has been put forward before in comments here is also alluded to by the IT:
without an insurance scheme or bad bank, uncertainty about future loan losses would remain, forcing banks to hoard capital and making them reluctant to lend.
In other words, some are arguing that the state can pay expected value for these assets and still improve the working of the banking system by shifting the uncertainty associated with large tail risk from the banks to the government. I suspect this is wrong on both counts. First, I don’t claim to know but I would guess that even the expected value of these losses likely equals the size of existing private capital. Second, the state guarantee effectively means that the tail risk of really bad outcomes is already implicitly being carried by the taxpayer.
Of course, if the banks end up being nationalized, these schemes will be irrelevant and it will be up to the state to fill the gap between assets and (insured) liabilities as best it can.
11 replies on “Bacon, Bad Banks and Risk Insurance”
“…if the banks end up being nationalized…the state to fill the gap between assets and (insured) liabilities as best it can.”
I don’t see the necessity of the “if the banks end up being nationalized” clause here – it looks like the state is going to have to do this anyway. As you say yourself, the question is whether it does so in the form of nationalisation or a gift to existing shareholders.
You would think that the fact that we are small would make nationalising easier.
Prof. Terrence McDonough of NUI, Galway has made the same point about bad banks over on Irish Left Review: http://www.irishleftreview.org/2009/02/20/ireland-bankrupt/
He argues for nationalisation too, but it all depends, as you say, on how it’s done.
It’s amazing how the government consistently stubbornly refuse to engage in new thinking / support new ideas until they hit the maintream, e.g. bad bank idea floated in Brussels. They are followers rather than leaders and are deeply out of their depth.
The opposition (Richard Bruton) support the good bank idea and are way ahead of the government in supporting novel ideas that will work.
Also, Nouriel Roubini makes a very clear argument for nationalisation in the US along Swedish lines…
Nationalize the Banks! We’re all Swedes Now
Im still unsure what your practical solution is here : a good bank is a nice idea in theory but in practice is not easy or swift. So whats the option set? Limited, I fear.
Brian. As I wrote in the post, these proposals are re-capitalizations without giving the investor providing the investment (the state) any equity stake. A transparent re-capitalization without any unnecessary bells and whistles complicating things is preferable to these alternatives. If that means that the state is taking full control then so be it. Perhaps this comes down to the lesser of two evils: (i) Temporary state control of the banking system and all the political and practical problems that come with that and (ii) Using taxpayer money to fully recapitalize the banks while allowing existing shareholders to profit and existing management to stay in place. If it comes down to it, I for (i) and against (ii). I’d be interested to hear your thoughts on this.
Krugman today has a nice little op-ed piece making the case for nationalization, or (as a blog he cites terms it) “preprivatization”: see
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[…] I know I’m at risk of sounding like a broken record on this topic but, given its importance, I’ll add my latest two cents on this. I’m not in favour of either this form of “bad bank” or a risk insurance scheme. Link to article […]