The IMF and Institutional Reform in Ireland

The IMF report highlights two areas for institutional reform.  This is important, since institutional reform can be helpful not only in resolving the current crisis but also in preventing future crises. In particular, the IMF report advocates:

1.  A special bank resolution regime. “Such a regime would recognize the unique role played by banks in the economy and give the authorities the power to quickly transfer assets and deposits to another institution (a purchase-and-assumption transaction) or to establish a bridge bank (a new limited life bank into which the old bank is transferred to facilitate its sale).”

2. A statutory fiscal rule. “In this regard, a fiscal rule can create the basis of a public commitment to fiscal prudence. This would be valuable for navigating the ongoing politically-sensitive consolidation and maintaining long-term fiscal policy stability. In the context of the European Union’s Stability and Growth Pact, a statutory commitment to a medium-term objective of close to structural balance would be appropriate. This would need to be supported by a medium-term expenditure framework that outlines a detailed time path of expenditure reductions. Transparency and mechanisms to ensure the review of these objectives would limit the risk that they are diluted. While the authorities were supportive of such a rules-based framework, they were less sure of how quickly it could be implemented.”

Buiter on Reform of the Financial Sector

Willem Buiter has an interesting posting on the re-design of the financial sector here.

Competitiveness

Pages 9-13 of the report contain an impressive array of data showing indications of Ireland’s falling competitiveness. They also indicate that the IMF team and the Irish authorities disagreed about the extent of the competitiveness problem, with the Irish being more optimistic (due to our falling wages). We all agree, I presume, (and the IMF agrees) that to the extent that our nominal wages fall, we will become more competitive. But, it would be nice to have more data on the extent to which this is happening, in Ireland and elsewhere. As the IMF points out, you can’t just assume that wages are not falling in any of our competitors (and that is even leaving aside the issue of nominal exchange rate changes). Good comparative quantitative evidence (as opposed to anecdotes) would be nice: does anyone know of any?

IMF Report on NAMA and Nationalisation

One of the classic techniques of government spin-doctoring is to brief the press prior to a bad news announcement to the effect that the announcement is actually good news.

Today the Irish Independent reported that the soon-to-be-released IMF Article IV staff report enthusiastically praises the government’s approach to the banking crisis. The Indo reported that “the IMF says the Government is right in the action it has taken on the two key areas of banking and the public finances …  The IMF backs the setting up of the National Asset Management Agency … It says NAMA offers the chance of taking bad assets from the banks, which is a precondition for their return to health. And the IMF agrees NAMA can be self-financing”

Sounds like a strong endorsement for the govenment, huh? Well, the report has now been released.  It has lots of interesting stuff in it, which I’m sure our contributors will have more to say about later.  Naturally, however, I was drawn to page 19 of the report:

25. Staff noted that nationalization could become necessary but should be seen as complementary to NAMA. Where the size of its impaired assets renders a bank critically undercapitalized or insolvent, the only real option may be temporary nationalization. Recent Fund advice in this regard is: “Insolvent institutions (with insufficient cash flows) should be closed, merged, or temporarily placed in public ownership until private sector solutions can be developed … there have been numerous instances (for example, Japan, Sweden and the United States), where a period of public ownership has been used to cleanse balance sheets and pave the way to sales back to the private sector.” Having taken control of the bank, the shareholders would be fully diluted in the interest of protecting the taxpayer and thus  preserving the political legitimacy of the initiative. The bad assets would still be carved out, but the thorny issue of purchase price would be less important, and the period of price discovery longer, since the transactions are between two government-owned entities. The management of the full range of bad assets would proceed under the NAMA structure. Nationalization could also be used to effect needed mergers in the absence of more far reaching resolution techniques.

26. The authorities prefer that banks stay partly in private ownership to provide continued market pricing of their underlying assets. They disagreed with the staff’s view that pricing of bad assets would be any easier under nationalization. They were also concerned that nationalization may generate negative sentiment with implications for the operational integrity of the banks. Staff emphasized nationalization would need to be accompanied by a clear commitment to operate the banks in a transparent manner on a commercial basis. In particular, nationalized banks should be subject to the same capital requirements and supervisory oversight as non-nationalized banks. And, a clear exit strategy to return the banks to private operation would be needed.

What do people think? A ringing endorsement of the government’s approach?

Job Subsidy Plan “Announced”

The long-mooted job subsidy plan appears to be about to happen, though as is often the case in Ireland, the public can only learn about this through leaked details from social partnership talks, rather than through the publication for discussion of detailed government proposals.