Anglo Announcement: A Multiple Systems Failure

DoF are a joke.
I realise that this may sound like a cliche but the DoF has been shown up for what it is throughout this entire financial mess. From committing this country to penury on 29th Sept 2008, to this latest cockup as regards the splitting of Anglo and the cockup about what it says in FAQ document.

@Aidan C
I don’t think so. It smacks more of not liking the answers they were getting from Europe and a culture prevalent in Ireland of pulling strokes.

“I don’t think so. It smacks more of not liking the answers they were getting from Europe and a culture prevalent in Ireland of pulling strokes.”

Pulling strokes eh? Guess which party would be good at that…

The problem is that although Mrs Murphy might believe them I don’t believe the markets will and then when you see quotes like this in the WSJ

“It’s déjà vu all over again — but this is different from Greece,” said Daniel Gros of the Center for European Policy Studies in Brussels. If Ireland’s banks “can’t refinance themselves, the numbers get very big very quickly,” he said.

Mr. Gros pointed out that loans to depleted Irish banks from the European Central Bank were about 40 percent of the country’s G.D.P., a dynamic that he contended was unsustainable and would ultimately lead to Ireland seeking assistance from Europe and the I.M.F.

“I think things are going to get worse,” he continued. “And over time, the E.C.B. will have to refinance a very large part of the Irish banking system.”

you think its only a matter of time now.

The Department officials deserve to be sent for three months compulsory service at the Terry Prone School for fake sincerity. GRINS! looking at the results her school produces, I do not think they are doing a good job there to start with.

I am really glad to see others here also emphasize the underlying timeframe we are confronted with. I started to think I might expect too much…. NOT!

By any standards, let’s look to our Yankee friends, they already, whatever we might think of their efficiency, had public hearings where Loyd Blankenfein was slowly roasted. Disgracefully, public hearing were refused to the Irish people, which on its own I had hoped to be enough reason for increased Kildarestreet population on a regular basis.

Iceland has a 2.000 pages public report on the banking crimes since months.

Here we are told by the handsomely, I think he is still 4th on the global list, paid leader of this country that an in depth technical blah blah is required to find the final numbers.

Who on Earth would still believe this mambo jambo, after all the time that has passed with no results, but one PR stunt after the next?

I am certain, it is not only the credibility of the banks that is shattered to pieces on the international stage, but more important so the credibility of our political leaders.

Smacks of Sept 2008 all over again. Spooked into action by the bond markets this time.

Minister Lenihan: “the level of interest that was being charged for Irish debt on the bond markets was troubling to the Government and had prompted it to bring forward the announcement of its decision on what to do with Anglo” and his department had looked at the Anglo management’s plan for a good bank but decided “that that wasn’t a viable option in the current climate”.

What’s more he said the European Commission’s views on State aid were not a decisive factor in the final decision arrived at by the Government.

“Resolution of this, our most distressed financial institution, is essential to the promotion of confidence and stability in our financial system,”

Sounds like we may have gone off-side again to prevent another run.

Almost two years after Brian Lenihan talked about “going deep into the banks”, a year and a half since we were told that NAMA would provide clarity about losses and help us move on, over a year since new supposedly highly qualified management were put in place to preside over the bank, we’re being told that we need more time to look at the books? Give us a break.

The key here to clearing up the confusion is the intertwinement of the fortunes of Anglo with those of a very substantial part of Fianna Fáil’s money base. Therefore the extreme lengths that this bunch are going to, and the glee with which FG propose winding Anglo up.

http://solari.com/blog/?p=8815

may be of interest?

It appears to be yet another manifestation of the cute whorism political culture of the last decade and a half.

I suppose what do we expect, these are, after all, the same guys who brought us classics like bench marking, e-voting, crazy property tax breaks, the cheapest bailout in the world (The Bank Guarntee), NAMA and now the 1to2 bank wind down.

Every developed country has a financial crisis from time to time. What gets to me is how simple and predictable ours was, how slow car crash like the aftermath has been and that for such a great and capable people we allow ourselves to be led in such a half assed manner.

Thus ends rant.

I can’t disagree with Karl about the communications strategy. One possible advantage of the confusion, however, is that all the details may not have hardened. There might still be a chance to improve the proposal, so it is worth looking for a best-case scenario for how it might work.

As I see it there are three main objectiives for the resolution:
1. To retain despositors as a (low-cost?) source of off-state balance sheet funding;
2. To maximise the recovery value of the Anglo assets; and
3. To share losses with non-depositor legacy creditors post guarantee.

The challenge facing the government is that the three objectives pull in different directions. The question is how the proposed balance sheet split might improve the underlying tradeoffs.

Taking some liberties given what we know, here’s how I think it might be made to work:

First, for the funding bank, I assume it receives the deposits (liabilities) and an equal value of assets that comprise NAMA bonds and an additional bond issued by the recovery bank. This bond would be guaranteed by the government. The depositors should then feel insulated from the fortunes of the recovery bank and are willing to keep their funds in the funding bank.

Second, the zero net asset transfer from the recovery bank to the funding bank should mean that the remaining bondholders in the former do not have a legitimate legal complaint. I assume that the claim of the funding bank via the bond ranks equally with the senior debt holders in the recovery bank.

Third, now assume that the recovery bank is insolvent (or will become insolvent). It should now be relatively straightforward to impose losses in reverse order of seniority on the shareholders and bondholders. Note that the State is bearing substantial losses both as the shareholder and as the guarantor of the bonds issued to the funding bank. Effectiively, the State is taking the depositors’ share of the losses, and so the senior debt holders should have no complaint.

One possible complication is that the insolvency interferes with the ability to maximise the recovery value of the assets, but this seems surmountable. I have also left aside the issue of how the existing capital of the bank is divided between the two entities and also the issue of the interest rate paid on the bond issued by the recovery bank. These again seem surmountable.

The bottom line is that I think this structure has some potential given the difficult undelying tradeoffs , but we just do not know enough to say whether the actual plan will make matters better or worse.

Brian,

I think perceptions of the likely bond market reaction have changed. Exibit A: Ciaran O’Hagan’s post today.

John
Hmm. So, in essence, are we now saying is maybe seniors are in play? Gosh, wouldnt that be brave for someone to come out with….

The EC statement is available at the link below. Sr Almunia says “I welcome the clarification by the Irish Finance Minister on what would now be the Irish preferred option regarding Anglo-Irish. I view this new option positively as it would deal better with the distortions of competition. However, a number of important aspects still need to be clarified, and a new notification received, before the Commission is in a position to finalise its assessment and to take a decision”

In other words the restructuring plan submitted in May 2010 is rejected, an option tangentially referred to in that plan is now the new preferred option following Brian Lenihan’s meeting with Commissioner Almunia on Monday/Tuesday this week and the Irish government has now to produce a restructuring plan (Version 3.0) to submit to the EC for consideration (third time’s a charm!).

http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/10/395&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en

Brian,

Post guaranteed sseniors!

@Karl

Rather overplayed indignation and surprise, surprise, the fan club are loving it. (That opener should ensure this post has a very short life.)

The main clarification that is needed is what is meant by “depositors are completely immune from Anglo’s assets”? This statement may force John McHale’s suggestion, if it was not already the intention, that the loan to ARB will be government guaranteed, let’s wait and see.

Standing back from the communication aspects, I am surprised that there is not a welcome in this space for what is in effect a Resolution Scheme. If things get much worse, the option does now realistically open up of renegotiating the rights of ARB’s creditors, it even opens up the possibility of liquidating ARB. The difficulties of either course in the existing situation have been well discussed here and they are definitely reduced by this innovative restructuring.

What exactly will cause the champagne corks to pop round these parts? A feneral pyre of bondholders?

Detailed, honest attempts at costings even Hogan. A set of estimates that are not obviously prima facia wrong.

Yeah, it’d also be jolly nice to have a detailed plan for balancing the deficit. Bring some confidence that government spending is going to be X next year (with savings and taxes made here), Y the year after (with savings and taxes made there) and Z the year after that (with savings and taxes made there). Instead we’re waiting for the fairies to deliver world economic growth that will let us export our way to freedom. Somebody else dig for victory, will ya?

Woke up to Lenihan getting an INCREDIBLY easy ride on the (RTE) radio. Is this a democracy anymore?

@ BW II Do you read Brian Lenihan’s comments that “Some of the bond holders are guaranteed, some of the bond holders are not guaranteed. Those who are not guaranteed will have their position guaranteed in due course” as meaning that unguaranteed bondholders will be offered the chance to swap existing bonds for ELG bonds with a lesser face value? (As Hoganmew has speculated)?

From a legal viewpoint, I am not convinced that the split avoids the much voiced concern that depositors and bondholders rank pari passu on a wind up. If bondholders and depositors do rank pari passu then the bondholders have a claim to their share of NAMA bonds on a winding up. However, the split seems to involve taking valuable assets out of the bank e.g. NAMA bonds, and this is being done for the benefit of the depositors. If you strip out valuable assets from an insolvent company in a blatant attempt to favour one class of creditor, you run the risk of legal challenge based on fraudulent preference. If the Government genuinely intended to impose pain on unguaranteed bondholders, it seems that further legislation is required: under existing law the split is open to challenge.

@gadge

But is it not relevant that an even higher value of liabilities is moving with the NAMA bonds? Of course, a new liability – the bond issued by the ARB – is being created as well. Isn’t the situation different with no net change in the value of the bank on which the bondholders have a claim.

I listened to Alan Dukes on P.Kenny.
As a Joe Public, I am still very disoriented as to what is really going on in this merry dance/workout between the 2 legally separated banking entities.

Our public interest director brought the quotient of so-called “performing loans” into the equation for the ARB.

Weren’t they originally booked to NAMA as part of providing its positive cashflow ?

Am I cynical or is this just robbing Peter to pay Paul ?
More accounting doo-doo and three card tricks?

And, in any case, we are back to what is meant by a “performing loan”.
The estimate of what were performing sounded very optimistic to a sceptical but somewhat informed member of the public.

@ John McHale

It is difficult to say until we know what exactly is going into the new bank. But for the sake of argument, lets take an oversimplified example and assume that X bn worth of deposits (liability) and x worth of NAMA bonds. At first blush, there would appear to be no net loss to the ARB in that an equal balance of assets and liabilities have been taken out. But its the selection of the creditors that is the problem: the bondholders have an equal claim to the assets of the existing company as the depositors. The effect of the scenario above is to allocate the benefit of the NAMA bonds to the sole benefit of the deposit holders. There must a legal doubt as to whether it is legal to prefer one class of supposedly equal creditors in this way.

From a purely legal perspective, I am not convinced that we are any further down the road of imposing losses on un’g debt. (It is a matter for others to argue whether to impose such losses makes sense economically, given adverse market reaction).

If things get much worse, the option does now realistically open up of renegotiating the rights of ARB’s creditors, it even opens up the possibility of liquidating ARB. The difficulties of either course in the existing situation have been well discussed here and they are definitely reduced by this innovative restructuring.

I’m with BWII on this one, I think. It does seem that restructuring the (non-depositor) creditors would be easier under the new arrangement, and that this may be part of the intention behind the reorganisation. The government is apparently still indicating that it doesn’t intend to restructure the Anglo creditors, but there are two ways to reconcile the government’s words with the idea that the reorganisation is intended to make it easier to do just that. The first is tactics: Lady Bracknell teaches us that a restructuring should come upon a bank bondholder as a surprise. The second is that the government hasn’t in fact decided on a restructuring, but it wants to have the option open as a Plan B. In fact, I think it quite likely that the civil servants and ministers are now saying to each other “aah, let’s give it another year” (or maybe another two years, or another two quarters) “to see if the global recovery takes off, or the property market firms up a bit, or something” (maybe an expanded EU bank digout?) “turns up, and if not then we’ll think about facing into a restructuring.” Of course after two quarters (or whatever) go by and nothing very good turns up they’d then be tempted to postpone the evil day by waiting and seeing for another two quarters, but so it goes. Another possibility is that they’re planning to act in the event of a Spanish bank or sovereign restructuring, at which point the EU pressure not to restructure Anglo would be largely gone and the markets will assume the worst about us anyway. A really cynical possibility is that the politicians involved are happy to shift the task of restructuring Anglo onto the backs of the next government.

Of course, doing something which (intentionally or not) eases the possibility of a restructuring has its risks. If guaranteeing Anglo and piling it full of deposits had the effect of burning the State’s bridges, then the current actions partly repair them, and you can expect the soldiers in both armies to notice.

@ BW II. Again, the devil is in the detail, but if as appears to be intended the ARB is fully capitalised at least at book values, then any complaint by the bondholders that the depositors have stolen a march on them cd be resisted on that basis. I do think, however, that you might be giving the Government too much credit in suggesting that the split is a clever answer to the absence of a proper bank resolution regime. IMO new legislation is still required.

I am going to keep well away from your “NAMA II is beautiful” argument: I suspect it wont go down well in these parts 🙂

Any legal method of extracting something from senior unsecured short of default would be welcome but it will not contribute much. There is less than 5bn available to haircut. Undoubtedly some will have escaped before the split is up and running.

We are still facing a loss of 30bn plus in total offset by perhaps 2-4bn from subbies and seniors. To achieve more than that involves defaulting on state guaranteed debt (the Lucey solution) or on obligations to the ECB/CBI (the Mc Williams solution). So in essence, this proposal does not mive the situation on a whole lot.

There is still precious little debate on the option facing us with AIB. Some progres on asset sales/ NAMA transfers is needed please. In addition as Ciaran O’Hagan eloquently argues on another thread, a credible fiscal strategy needs to be re-iterated. This will involve default on other state obligations- quangos/salaries/transfers/manning levels and more taxes.

Carswell of the Times reporting that the funding bank ‘may’ provide some loans to ‘existing’ customers if it increases value to the bank.

Not entirely sure where the basis for that came from.

@tull
“There is still precious little debate on the option facing us with AIB. Some progres on asset sales/ NAMA transfers is needed please. In addition as Ciaran O’Hagan eloquently argues on another thread, a credible fiscal strategy needs to be re-iterated. This will involve default on other state obligations- quangos/salaries/transfers/manning levels and more taxes.”
Precisely. This is the sort of certainty that is required not only for the international markets, but for the domestic economy aswell. You’d have to be mad to start up a business currently (luckily most genuine entrepreneurs are), because there is no visibility on tax rates, salary levels, office rents, regulation etc. etc.

The changes don’t all need to be made now. Taking a conservative view means that some of the later dated ones might not need to be made (e.g. tax raises) or might be reversed (e.g. spending cuts) earlier. Or that money will be available for some class of stimulus spending in a couple of years.

But three years in and not even no end in sight, but no end of the beginning is a poor show.

@Hogan

agree

@ BW II

any thought on what a state sponored if not guaranteed banks would pay for deposits, what it would earn on the asset side & what the capital standards would be. What would be the incentive to stay with FBK unless you were being paid handsomely.

in turn, what implications do all of the above have for the other banks-what do they have to pay for depos, earn on the asset side and what returns on assets will htey make.

It strikes me that this is being made up as we go along. It also strikes me that the head honchos in Anglo have not bought into this. It is likely that the mgmt will be off soon, with ample severance packages. A politically asute, safe pair of hands with the ability to juggle figures will be needed to bring this home.

Ivor Callely has no future in the Senate, he fits the bill.

“The sovereign bond market is crying out for some sign that we’ve got a final credible figure for the cost of Anglo Irish Bank.” from Karls initial post.

We have credible figures on the cost of Anglo. We have them from various economists, finance experts and a ratings Agency. Its between 35-40 Billion.
These figures are based on reasonable expectations on property values that still have some way to fall.
The fact that Nama and the banks are preventing us from allowing the market to find the floor as outlined by karl deeter in his blog this week, means that any figure that comes out from Anglo themselves or the DOF will not take any future property price reductions into account and will be an underestimate.

Expect phrases in anything we get in October to be similar to the waffle that accompanied the last Budget.
My favorite phrase was when it said that there was ‘a greater possibility for downside than upside’ in their income estimates.
In other words, in an act of desperation we are going to optimistic rather than realistic and throw out the accounting concept of prudence.

How can we or the market investors expect to get a ‘credible’ number on the Anglo losses in this context?

What will happen is that they will split the difference between 24 billion (their estimate) and 35 (S and P’s estimate), so about 30 billion and work back from there in the hope enough people believe them.

@Tull

“any thought on what a state sponored if not guaranteed banks would pay for deposits, what it would earn on the asset side & what the capital standards would be. What would be the incentive to stay with FBK unless you were being paid handsomely. ”

The interest rate on deposits? Never thought of that. With NAMA bonds paying Euribor and NAMA II bonds paying (?) it is difficult to see current deposit rates being sustained. Looks like it will start life with a negative interest margin and therefore loss making.

Capital is calculated by relation to the assets, the so called Risk Weighted Asset calculation. If all the assets of FB are government guaranteed then the capital requirements should be light. Of course ARB’s capital requirements will be correspondingly heavy.

The hiving off of good assets, namely NAMA bonds, from Anglo to the Funding Bank for the benefit of one class of creditors, namely depositors, would appear to be put the bondholders at a disadvantage. As pointed out by other commentators, however, the Asset Recovery Bank is likely to be properly funded (at least in the first instance), so the bondholders may not have legitimate grounds for complaint. This presents a paradox: the only way of exposing the un-guaranteed bondholders to losses is to leave them in an undercapitalised / insolvent entity; in order to avoid legal proceedings however the ARB will have to be properly recapitalised by the Government. How are the un’g at any real risk in such a scenario?

@ people running the numbers and chances of seniors being hit

if funding from FB to ARB is done on a secured basis (as opposed to unsecured), this would place them higher in the pecking order than senior bondolders, correct? Is this significant? I just read a BNP piece where they reckon this would see the shortfall via liquidation to senior bonds as significantly increased if this secured basis were to occur.

@ BW 11

why does FBK need to pay up for deposits, could it not just REPO NAMA I & II bonds straight to the ECB and run down the portfolio as the bad banks run off. QE Irish style.

Then deposit costs in Ireland would drift down as irrational competition abates, margins returns on AIB/BOI would drift up and the state would make a ton of money in a few years. The other banks could reduce their reliance on ECB & wholesale funding.

I am sure Mr Weber and Stark might turn a blind eye, if the quid pro quo was “no default”.

@ Tull

well its not about keeping FBK funded per se, its actually about keeping Ireland Financil System funded. If the deposits simply went back to another Irish bank, then it’d be ok to lose them, but i suppose the danger is that some of the lost deposits will go overseas.

@ All

here’s a breakdown of the relevant figs per BNP, as at 30.6.10

LIQUIDATION WATERFALL

Amount available for distribution to creditors INCLUDING the promissory note (PN) from the Irish gov’t 69,086

*
Senior Secured Creditors

Sale and repurchase agreement – central banks 26,259
Sale and repurchase agreement – banks 5,089
Covered bonds 170
Retirement benefit liabilities 9
Restructuring costs 500
Deferred taxation 4

Total senior secured 32,031

Senior secured recovery 100%

*

Amount available for distribution to senior unsecured creditors 37,055

Senior unsecured liabilities

Repayable on demand 27
Other deposits by banks with agreed maturity dates 1,926
Retail 11,656
Corporate 11,500
Derivative financial instruments 1,537
MTN program 14,639 (incl g’tee and ung’tee)
Commercial paper 1,605
Certificates of deposit 104
Liabilities to customers under investment contracts 366
Other liabilities 193
Accruals and deferred income 114

Total senior unsecured 43,667

Senior unsecured recovery 85%

*

Amount available for distribution to subordinated LT2 creditors 0

@Eoin
I doubt that the derivative liability is unsecured. I am sure some of the cash set aside as collateral will cover it. ISDA agreements mean that this is effectively held in escrow in any liquidation, so you can probably take it that it is preferred preferred…

@ DE

so you think the INBS operation was a good idea that we should replicate?

@Eoin
We would basically we replacing the government guaranteed deposits with government guaranteed government bonds. At least the bonds are a more secure form of funding than very mobile deposits.

@D_E & @Eoin
It is also cheaper – ECB repo at 1% or deposits at 3.5%… you make the call.

It makes you wonder why the NTMA bothers with all this auction nonsense…

Per Irish Times

“In a speech in Riga, Ms Merkel said that debt-laden governments must stick to their deficit- cutting programs because Germany won’t agree to have the euro fund turned into a permanent facility to provide aid.

‘The crisis mechanisms now in place are temporary,’ she said in the Latvian capital. ‘Germany won’t agree to an indefinite prolongation. Otherwise, people would say ‘we’ve got such a nice rescue package in place that this can go on forever.” ”

Might not be safe to work on the assumption that ECB will allow repo by Irish banks on a long term basis.

@Eoin
“And if we ever did decide to consider the big D, i’d prefer to be doing it on foreign private investors rather than the ECB itself.”

At this point I have given up on us defaulting on senior bonds, I just don’t think it is going to happen.

But if they were government guaranteed we wouldn’t be defaulting, would we?

Why does Quentin Fottrell must hate Ireland 😉

European Crisis Flares up in Ireland
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703453804575479252913466146.html?mod=ITP_pageone_0

FRONT page WSJ.

Great breakfast reading 😉

@Eoin
Yeah, I’ve never said I think we should default on government guaranteed bonds.

@Eoin
I probably shouldn’t have put that “?” there

But hardly makes sense to plan for something we are highly unlikely to do.

I still think this new Anglo construct makes very little sense. Has the DoF released any additional info yet

On the contrary, I think it makes perfect sense for us to now play the autistic –
ECB says “save the banks” – we pump in billions in repoable promissory notes, NAMAbananas and nigerian bank bonds.
ECB says “no depositor gets hurt” – we pay them off with ECB liquidity
ECB says “no bondholder left behind” – we pay *them* off with ECB liquidity

So the national debt becomes 400% of GDP.

And all of it is sitting at the ECB costing us 1% (it doesn’t mean we can only charge the banks that…).

Does that make us systemic? Too Big To Fail?

What ECB is going to be able to take the loss by withdrawing facilities on us?

Game on boys, game on. It’s time to go postal on this one.

@BWII
You misunderstand me. I am not being sarcastic, I am being serious.

We are at the stage of clambering over women and children to get into the boat.

@Hog

The fact that you actually believe that the INBS facility gives us the opportunity to raid the ECB vaults for 400bn proves you have got that wrong.

I told this would be a NON issue. Kenny is out today predictably criticising the Anglo split but not a whimper about Finger’s Baby having an unlimited Money Printing Machine.

@Brian Woods II
“I told this would be a NON issue. Kenny is out today predictably criticising the Anglo split but not a whimper about Finger’s Baby having an unlimited Money Printing Machine.”

What has Kenny got to do with anything?

I don’t think anyone is suggesting that INBS have unlimited ability to do this. But I see no reason why we couldn’t use it to fund Anglo.
Do you have any evidence to suggest otherwise.

@BWII
Who said anything about INBS?

@Tull
“it might allow Anglo to wind down its depo competition. This wd be good for the other banks, good for the NPRF & good for the economy”
Yes, that would be the primary advantage. The depositors costs are crystallised (retail and non-retail and from other banks). The ARB is then over-capitalised which should leave us with the position that anything the ARB can do should reduce the cost. It would also be good for the ARB as it would be paying a lower cost of capital. It would be good for operating costs since only one bank would be operating

I reckon about 29 bn in deposits of this type. Since it is being done for the depositors and we are operating a “no bondholder left behind” system, I don’t see any reason not to do that to bondholders too. So another 17-19 bn. So we’re probably talking about 50 bn between depositors and bondholders with NAMA bonds, promissory already/in future making up about 30 bn of that. Hence another 20 bn required.

50 bn is at the top end of even the most pessimistic estimates (sorry Mr. Mathews!), personally I reckon 35 bn (and have done so for some 2 years) as the LTEC (long-term economic cost) of the Anglo loan book. I have no idea what the derivatives book will cost in the wind-down process. I doubt anyone else does either! An 8% loss on the trading book would bring us up to 50bn, so we would not see anything back.

As I say, I still reckon it is possible to sell off the existing banky bits of Anglo to a foreign buyer. Might be worth a few hundred million? Selling the deposit book and the cash behind it might be worth a few hundred million on its own.

Largely, though, I see no reason to maintain a competitive funding bank at a time when, as you say, competition for deposits is fierce.

I am going to veer totally of track here and talk about the reality to an average person in relation to Anglo. I lost my job three months ago I am doing my best to keep payments up etc, but by god am I mad, im raging on many fronts, the injustice of it all, carers losing money as bondholders get paid, good friends in business going to the wall who cant get credit while bankers get paid bonus after bonus, im as stated sick of it all, and in general this site is excellent for analysis, but i got vomit inducing vile in my throat when i see some of the pr hacks on here, ye know who ye are, i will tell ye this in years to come when we are still paying for this mess, my kids, they will ask me did anybody speak out and do you know what i will say: ” yes brave people like morgan kelly, David McWilliams, Brian Lucy and Peter Mathews told us like it was and is, it gives me some solace as we go down the plughole as a people as a country and as a fighting nation… needless to say to quote eamon dunphy “the spivs” will not last long in the history that will be wrote

Fair play Sickofitall

I’ve spent twenty years in senior manufacturing and development roles, actually MAKING something and generating real revenue; these bankers are essentially parasites feeding on an otherwise decent society. Our government of self-inflated teachers, publicans and solicitors are criminally liable for what they’re doing if you ask me – damn them all and theior flagrant disregard for their citizens – are there any politicians with MORAL authority anymore, or just expedient hacks? Fv@k the bondholders – welcome to capitalism guys – you placed your money and took yer chances – my family don’t underwrite your business dealings Goddammit!!!!!!!!!!