Author: Gregory Connor

Just the One: Time Inconsistency and the Greek Bailout(s)

As EU decision-makers grapple with their response to an imminent Greek debt default or bailout, they need to consider not only their current decisions but also their likely future decisions. It is critically important that they not deceive themselves into thinking that they (or the Greek government) can commit to making all their future decisions now. There are strong grounds for positing time-inconsistency in EU and Greek government decision-making concerning the Greek bailout. This is a simple point, but critically important to good policy planning in this situation. Acknowledging time-inconsistency does not proscribe any particular policy choice, but it encourages policy makers to act cautiously.

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Finding Foreign Capital for Irish Domestic Banks

It is obvious that the Irish banks will need very large amounts of new equity capital in the near future, given their NAMA-related loss crystallisation, along with prospective losses on their retained loan portfolios. This confirms the year-ago forecasts of Brian Lucey, Karl Whelen and others, and contradicts the contemporaneous claims of bank and government spokespersons that there would be no need for additional equity capital. It seems clear that the amount of new equity capital needed is equivalent to majority ownership (Lucey was quoted on Frontline stating that the newly issued equity might constitute 95% of total equity after issuance).

There are three ways to inject new equity capital into the two surviving[1] banks: 1) the government directly purchases more equity shares from the banks, 2) the banks try to raise the equity from existing shareholders using a rights offering, or 3) the banks accept a big block acquisition of equity capital from a large foreign institution probably a foreign bank. The Central Bank and Department of Finance should be pushing hard on the banks to use method 3, since this method is in the best interest of the Irish taxpayer and Irish economy.

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A Behavioural Model of the Department of Finance

For faithful members of the 46-ers*, the new government budget proposal creates cognitive dissonance.  How could a government so wasteful in its bank-bailout policies produce a general government budget proposal that seems so carefully and sensibly crafted to address current fiscal and competitiveness problems? In contrast to bank-bailout policies, the new general budget seems reasonable, balanced and fair, but as stringent in difficult circumstances as could possibly be asked. Does the Department of Finance (DoF) suffer from bipolar syndrome?  How can we understand its behaviour?

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Who Blinks First? Ireland, Greece, the ECB, and the Bank Guarantee

The rules of the game have changed for Ireland.  Should Ireland respond to this new risky-game environment by selling off some or all of its domestic banks to large foreign bank holding companies?  I believe that it should.  We can keep the names on the high street bank offices, but lose the liability guarantee.

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Interaction Effects of the Bank Liability Guarantee and Asset Purchase Schemes

Both the Irish bank liability guarantee (instituted in September 2008 and likely to be renewed) and the asset purchase scheme (likely in place soon via NAMA) have been controversial, and their strengths and weaknesses have been widely debated.  Less attention has been paid to the powerful interactions between these two schemes.   If both schemes go ahead, perhaps these powerful interactions could serve to improve overall cost-efficiency and policy effectiveness.

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