Postbank and Anglo Not Comparable

There are many aspects of the government’s handling of the Anglo Irish Bank fiasco that are open to criticism. However, this doesn’t mean that every Anglo-related criticism of the government is accurate. Today’s Irish Times column by Fintan O’Toole has an appealingly simple argument that I suspect will get repeated a lot in the coming weeks:

Yesterday, Postbank, jointly owned by An Post and BNP Paribas, stopped taking new business. It will close by the end of the year. Its name would suggest that Postbank is actually a bank, but this must be an illusion.

If it were a bank, Postbank would not be allowed to fail. And Brian Lenihan’s reaction to its closure was merely to say that he is “disappointed [his favourite word] but not surprised”.Why does the closure of Postbank get a c’est la vie shrug of the shoulders while the closure of Anglo is so unthinkable that at least €30 billion of public money is being used to keep it, if not actually alive, then apparently undead?

The answer Brian Lenihan would give is that Anglo is of “systemic importance” to the Irish economy, while Postbank is not.

O’Toole then correctly points out that Postbank has lots of branches and customers.

The problem with this argument is that it is based on a confusion of the meaning of the words “close” and “fail” in the context of the banking sector. Postbank is a subsidiary of BNP Paribas Fortis and that bank is not going out of business. Every one of Postbank’s depositors will get their money back and BNP’s withdrawal from Ireland has no implications for its bondholders.

In contrast, when we discuss letting Anglo fail, we aren’t talking about shutting down its nonexistent branch network. What we mean is acknowledging that the bank is insolvent (and Fintan is correct that claims in January 2009 that Anglo was solvent were indeed ludicrous) and then having it declare bankruptcy. Normally, such a decision would lead to Anglo’s creditors not getting all their money back. However, if we did that now, we would face the problem that the Irish government has guaranteed essentially all of Anglo’s liabilities, so no money would be saved for the taxpayer.

My point here isn’t to defend the scale of the September 2008 guarantee or its extension to Anglo but merely to acknowledge that the issues related to Anglo are completely different to those related to Postbank.

Elaine Byrne’s column today also focuses on Anglo with reference to Iceland! She discusses whether, if the Iceland!ic referendum passes, we should follow suit and not pay off Anglo debts. There will be more discussion of this question in the coming months.

There are major decisions still to be taken in relation to reducing the costs to the taxpayer of resolving Anglo and other banks that appear to be only NAMA over-payment away from insolvency. We could decide to just remove the guarantee and let all the banks declare bankruptcy. But this would have, let’s say, some short- to medium-term implications for the functioning the Irish banking sector.

With the September 2008 guarantee set to expire later this year, there is the opportunity in the coming months to arrive at an orderly resolution process in which insolvency is recognised, bad property assets are cleared off the bank balance sheets, providers of risk capital lose money in a way the reduces cost for the taxpayer, and the banks are placed back on a sound footing.

These are very important decisions and the sooner our more influential journalists recognise what the real issues are, the better the public debate will be.

Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission: Testimony by Academics

A number of prominent academics testified before the US FCIC last week  – you can download the background papers here.

Minister’s Speech at Taxation Institute

Here are the slides from a talk the Minister for Finance gave at the Irish Taxation Institute on Friday. Lots of useful material in it, most of which I agree with. Slide 11 is great. It actually says Iceland! (Less fun is the repetition of the de-listing argument as a serious point.)

Commission Approves NAMA

I guess the news that the Commission has approved NAMA (statement here) will get some attention over the next few days but it’s hardly too surprising. EU guidelines allow governments to introduce an asset management agency of this type and it’s very hard to imagine that the Department of Finance had designed something that wasn’t guaranteed to get approved. However, as I’ve noted before, if you read those guidelines closely, they also suggest that the Commission isn’t in favour of packages that are overly friendly to providers of risk capital.  For instance, the guidelines state

(21) As a general principle, banks ought to bear the losses associated with impaired assets to the maximum extent …

(22) Once assets have been properly evaluated and losses are correctly identified, and if this would lead to a situation of technical insolvency without State intervention, the bank should be put either into administration or be orderly wound up, according to Community and national law. In such a situation, with a view to preserving financial stability and confidence, protection or guarantees to bondholders may be appropriate.

(23) Where putting a bank into administration or its orderly winding up appears unadvisable for reasons of financial stability, aid in the form of guarantee or asset purchase, limited to the strict minimum, could be awarded to banks so that they may continue to operate for the period necessary to allow to devise a plan for either restructuring or orderly winding-up. In such cases, shareholders should also be expected to bear losses at least until the regulatory limits of capital adequacy are reached. Nationalisation options may also be considered.

The relatively tough line suggested by these statements has been evident in the Commission’s rulings on payments to subordinated bonds and on various restructuring plans. This approach undoubtedly limits the government’s ability to overpay for the assets going into NAMA and with the assets falling in price with every passing month, the opportunity to keep the banks from actual or near insolvency via overpayment seems to be slipping away.

In my exchanges with our old friend John the Optimist, I have regularly pointed out economists shouldn’t necessarily be judged on their forecasts and I certainly have made calls here that have turned out to be incorrect. However, I will take this opportunity to point out that tomorrow is the one year anniversary of this column that I wrote for the Irish Times. Among other things which I’d still stand by, the column pointed out the following:

In addition to being unfair, it is questionable whether the bad bank proposal could achieve its goal of properly re-capitalising private sector banks. There may be limits on the price the Government can pay for impaired property loans under EU state aid rules. Banks may still have to write down their assets. It is easy to imagine a scenario where banks struggled with weak capital bases even after a bad bank scheme has been put in place.

And here we are.

Expert Group on Managing the Household Debt Crisis

The government has appointed an expert group to advise on this important issue (press release here).

What are the suggestions from the readership of this blog for this new initiative?