Grandfathered permits

Cement companies are bound to make a lot of money from selling surplus CO2 emission permits; see Irish Times.

The atmosphere is the common property of humankind. The European Union appropriated part of that. Instead of using this to the advantage of all Europeans, it decided to give most of it to selected companies and some of it to the Member States. The government of Ireland decided to pass its share on to the same companies.

These decisions were made years ago and cannot be reversed. In fact, emission allocations have been decided until 2020. We’ve been had, again.

Budget Perspectives 2010

The conference will start in 80 mins, and is fully booked. Background material is here.

McCarthy and Varadkar on Fiscal Strategy

Colm McCarthy makes an important contribution to the fiscal debate in today’s Irish Times.   I agree with most of it: the precariousness of creditworthiness, the rebuttal of Ray Kinsella, and the reputational damage associated with an IMF/EU bailout. 

But Colm continues to provide the best analysis around of half the challenge facing the government – creditworthiness.   The other half is the collapse in domestic demand.   Colm is right that there is a tradeoff between the two.    What he doesn’t offer is suggestions on how the tradeoff can be improved, such as measures that increase the credibility of the four-year plan that would limit the necessary degree of front loading. 

Leo Varadkar’s piece in the Sunday Business Post is interesting in this regard.   On its face, it might seem that he is advocating an extreme front-loading of the adjustment.    The twist is that he advocates using the NPRF to maintain investment spending.   Thus he combines a large upfront and permanent improvement in the deficit with measures to limit the deflationary impact.   Of course, this could also be achieved by directly protecting the capital budget and imposing bigger burdens on current spending and taxation.  But that does not appear politically possible.   Deputy Varadkar’s proposal would obviously also be very difficult to pull off.   But it is worth debating. 

Unlike many others, I think the NPRF had value for its stated purpose of pre-funding future pension costs.   But that ship has sailed.   More recently, it has served as a valuable liquidity backstop against a self-fulfilling fiscal crisis.   It is worth considering now how the fund might be used to improve the creditworthiness-demand tradeoff.   

Downside risks and up

There are two pieces in today’s Irish Times on state guarantees for downside risks. The first is on toll roads: We apparently guaranteed an income stream. The second is about the power network: There is no need to budget properly and hedge your bets, as the cost can always be passed on to the customer. Other examples are the REFIT scheme, which puts a price floor under renewables, and the put-or-pay contract for the Poolbeg incinerator.

Such guarantees reduce the downside risk and hence the cost of capital for the investor. That is fine if the investment is in a public good.

However, the downside risks are transferred to the taxpayer, while the upside risks are enjoyed by the shareholders.

I would therefore introduce a special profit tax, which applies to operations that have a state guarantee against downside risks. In that way, the taxpayer shares in the good times as well as the bad. It would also make companies think twice before demanding a guarantee.

The CSO’s detailed public finance data

The CSO publishes annually, as part of the National Income and Expenditure document, detailed tables related to the public finances, which are of particular interest in the context of the current urgent focus on fiscal policy, to the extent perhaps of providing a more useful starting point for multi-year fiscal plans than the traditional exchequer and budgetary formats, which are not fit for that purpose. Some details and links to data on all this follow.