The Irish Economy

The concept of “fire sale prices” is a useful one in many contexts – some examples are the October 19th 1987 US stock market crash, the LTCM crisis of 1998, and the 2007-8 US credit-liquidity crisis. In all three of these cases, security prices crashed in a particular sub-market, policymakers stepped in providing extraordinary credit-liquidity support, and eventually (quickly in the first two cases, slowly in the last) the capital market situation normalized. Unfortunately, “fire sale prices” is a useless or even harmful analytical tool for understanding the current Irish financial predicament. A better term for current conditions in Irish asset markets is stagnation prices rather than fire sale prices. Policymakers should look to Japan circa 1991 and the following two decades, rather than the USA, for a useful historical precedent. The fire sale concept gives the wrong policy guidance in the Irish situation; it is metaphorically like trying to use a fire hose to drain a swamp.

Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny have a series of papers exploring the use of the fire sale concept in modelling financial markets. There has been a large outpouring of papers by other authors with similar or related models, but the Shleifer and Vishny model is clear and simple and their survey is particularly good. They provide a definition:

“A fire sale is essentially a forced sale of an asset at a dislocated price…. Assets sold in fire sales can trade at prices far below value in best use, causing severe losses to sellers.”

They discuss how fire sales can cause financial and macroeconomic instability via credit and liquidity channels. In a related paper they laud US policymakers for their prompt and correct response in 2007-9 in injecting massive credit and liquidity into the markets for mortgage-related and credit-related securities caught up in the fire sale environment of 2007-9.

Fire sale mitigation policies are unusual as economic policies in that, as a rule, they should result in a net profit for the policymaker. This follows from the theory of the limits to arbitrage. This certainly seems to apply in the US case – the Federal Reserve made a trading profit of $79.3 billion in 2010 and $76.9 billion in 2011. The Fed vastly outperformed the best-performing hedge fund both years, at U.S. civil service pay rates, and without actually trying to make a profit. TARP was also profitable or near profitable, after an adjustment for the expensive but necessary bail-out of the US automobile industry. This is the nature of fire sale mitigation policies – they are about buying securities slightly below fair value and holding them temporarily on government account while injecting liquidity and credit.

The bad news is that this has near-zero relevance for Ireland. Irish asset markets are not suffering from a fire sale problem but rather from a long-horizon stagnation problem. The appropriate comparison case is not from the USA but rather Japan circa 1990. Japanese policymakers and financial institutions worked endlessly to slow the pace of adjustment, leading to an almost twenty year period of stagnation, suppressing growth and business innovation, and leaving a massive overhang of government debt. Irish asset markets need to be forced to adjust quickly and reach their new (much lower) equilibrium values with un-frozen free trading and clear, public pricing. This applies to banks, collateralized pools of debt, commercial leases, and commercial and residential property. Preventing this from happening is not preventing a “fire sale” rather it is guaranteeing a long stagnation. It could even last twenty years, as in Japan.

Another question – what is it about the US environment that gives rise to fire-sale-induced financial crises of typically short duration? Part of the answer lies in the USA lead in financial innovation. New financial innovations were key to all three fire-sale market crashes mentioned in the first paragraph of this post (portfolio insurance, statistical arbitrage, and numerous CDO innovations, respectively). High-frequency trading (the most recent big innovation) will be the likely cause of the next fire-sale-related crash, if one comes in the USA.* Ireland seems to avoid these fire-sale crashes, but is plagued instead by long-lasting periods of stagnation. Let us hope the current one is not dragged out for a decade.

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*A post-script on HFT and the Tobin tax. After my last blogpost, Frank Barry asked me to give more details about Tobin’s use of the term “sand in the wheels” and its application in old-fashioned engineering. I do not know that much about the engineering use of sand in the wheels – I only heard Tobin discussing it in an interview. I now know that historically the sand in the wheels technique was used in the case of a metal (steel or iron) wheel aligned on a track and needing better grip, such as an old-fashioned railway wheel on a wet track. It is used for wheel-type mechanisms and not for gears with teeth. See Wikipedia for some details for those with an interest. I remember Tobin saying he was annoyed that many commentators mistook him as suggesting sabotage, and I remembered that key idea correctly. Sand in the wheels is a technique to improve, not hinder, performance.

In the comments on my piece on Irish Water, Paul Hunt reports back from his attempt to get the costings for water metering etc from the PWC report. This request was refused as it would be “commercially sensitive”.

To cite Paul, this is balderdash.

Irish Water will be 100% state-owned. Citizens of Ireland (of two of which I am the legal guardian) have the right to know what is going on in a company they (will) own.

Ireland is an unwilling party to the Aarhus Convention, which grants access to data except “where such confidentiality [of commercial and industrial information] is protected by law in order to protect a legitimate economic interest”. As Irish Water will be a monopoly, I do not think there is a “legitimate” economic interest in hiding data.

Unfortunately, state-owned companies have made a habit of hiding behind “commercial sensitivity” when there is none.

The Examiner has a story on the proposed LNG terminal at Tarbert in the Shannon estuary. This is a privately funded project and a welcome stimulus for North Kerry. As long as the developers play within the rules, public policy analysts should have no opinion on such matters. But as the gas market is so heavily regulated, private actors affect the public good. The LNG terminal would, for instance, improve the security of supply, which is very valuable.

Minister Rabbitte argues that Shannon LNG would increase the price of gas. This is absurd at first sight. Increased competition should reduce the price. The minister is right, though. To see why, we need to consider the gas interconnector from Scotland that lands in Gormanston in Co Meath, or rather the way in which its price is regulated: The annual cost of the pipe is distributed over the gas it carries.

The interconnector is a competitor’s wet dream. If you capture a small part of the gas market, the interconnector will increase its price — because its annual cost is distributed over a smaller volume. You can then increase your price to just below that of the interconnector and gain yet more market share. And the interconnector will raise its price again.

The solution surely is to change the regulation of the interconnector rather than to block the LNG terminal. The current regulation, which may date back to the days of Minister Woods or Fahey, is a neat example of something that makes sense in the short run only.

Note the separation of powers. Minister Rabbitte is the executive branch of government and an influential part of the legislative, he appoints and controls the budget of the regulator, and he is the trustee for the shareholders (us) of the dominant company in the market.

DubLinked is a small step, but one in the right direction.

Only two county councils so far and a distinct lack of apps, but let’s say it’s early days.

The Department of Justice has published a press release indicating that the Legal Services Regulation Bill is to be published within the next few days, having received the approval of cabinet.

Regulatory reform in respect of legal services is a key commitment in theEU/IMF Programme for Financial Support for Ireland. A blueprint for reform, indicated in the financial support programme, was provided by the Competition Authority’s 2006 report on the legal professions. The detailed indications of the content of the Bill in the press release suggest the government has rejected some aspects of the Competition Authority report. Notably the proposal that a new regulator would oversee professional self-regulation (as occurs in England and Wales through the Legal Services Board established in 2009) appears to have given way to a new regulatory body which will have direct responsibility for oversight of the professions.

In addition to the Legal Services Regulatory Authority, two further new public bodies are to be established: an Office of the Legal Costs Adjudicator (who will take on regulatory functions over costs currently administered by the Taxing Master) and a Legal Professions Disciplinary Tribunal which will take over responsibility for addressing complaints of professional misconduct, currently administered by the Bar Council and the Law Society of Ireland.

The central rationale stated for the reforms is the promotion of a more competitive environment for provision of legal services, and this is reflected in proposals to allocate tasks concerning entry to the profession and the education of lawyers to the new Legal Services Regulatory Authority so as to liberalize certain aspects of professional education and end the situation under which the profession is both provider and regulator of legal education.

The establishment of three distinct agencies may be controversial and raises the question whether the variety of functions could be undertaken by a single agency. The press release indicates that the industry will be levied to pay for the new regulatory bodies (as occurs with a number of existing regulatory bodies such as the Broadcasting Authority of Ireland). Comments in the press suggest that the professions are concerned that the power of the minister to appoint members of the Legal Services Regulatory Authority will compromise the professional independence of lawyers. It is actually not unusual to find ministers exercising such powers of appointment (appointments to the Legal Services Board in England and Wales are made by a government minister, the Lord Chancellor). Clearly board members must be appointed by someone and ministers are accountable to parliament for their actions. Even the most independent of actors within the legal system, judges, are appointed by ministers (though this is not uncontroversial).

Certain of the more controversial aspects of potential reform, such as fusing the barristers’ and solicitors’ professions and introducing multi-disciplinary partnerships have been assigned to the new Regulatory Authority for research and consideration rather than be provided for directly in the Bill, according to the press release.

(more…)

The Dept Environment is now moving to change the regulation of waste collection from “competition in the market” to “competition for the market”. The reason is simple: Economies of density. In my street, we have three bins (black, green, brown) and four companies collecting bins. Every fourth Monday, no less than 12 waste trucks drive up our road, to the delight of the children and the annoyance of drivers. Three trucks (one company) could do the same work for a little more than a quarter of the cost. Even after allowing for monopoly mark-ups, there would be cost savings for households. Market power would be limited if tendering is competitive and concessions are short (waste trucks are mobile).

A perfectly sensible move by the Department so.

In today’s Irish Times, this is spun (and again) as a way to promote incineration. This is nonsense. At the surface, “competition for the market” was a recommendation in the International Review commissioned by the previous minister, and in the Gorecki report of the ESRI.

The markets for waste collection and waste disposal are largely separated; economies of vertical integration are small. Nonetheless, Irish waste collectors have vertically integrated with waste disposal. The competition in waste collection is such that hardly any money is made. The market for waste disposal would be lucrative with the EU cap on landfill and without additional incineration, but the Poolbeg incinerator would undercut the price of any other disposal technology except landfill. If waste collection would be run as a profit center, waste would be sent for incineration.

Competition for the market will allow waste collectors to make money in their core business again.

I had an op-ed in the IT last Thursday. Discussion is not great on their site. Here’s my edit.

The government aims to create a national water utility to install water meters and charge for water use. The general thrust is commendable, but it may become an expensive failure.

Taxes will need to go up and public spending down to close the government deficit. This will hurt the economy. However, consumption taxes do less damage to growth than income taxes. The government is right to introduce water charges.

A flat water charge would be unfair. Exemptions for those unable to pay are crude and expensive to administer. A flat water charge would not induce water conservation. We produce about 450 liters of drinking water per person per day (l/p/d). The average person probably uses some 150 l/p/d. It is not fully known what happens to the remaining 300 l/p/d. Part is lost through leaky mains, part is used illicitly, and part is lost through leaks in the house or garden. Experience in other countries, and in the group water schemes in Ireland, shows that water charges would substantially reduce household water use. People would also press the water providers to reduce wastage in the distribution network. As the number of meters increases, it will be easier to locate leaks and illicit use. The government is right, too, to introduce water meters.

The government wants to install water meters in 2012 and 2013. That is ambitious: 1.4 million meters in two years, 2800 meters per day. There is also a plan to replace all household electricity meters with so-called smart meters. This has been carefully planned and trialed over the last three years. The smart meter roll-out will be done by well-established companies. In contrast, the installation of water meters is to be led by Irish Water, a company that does not yet exist. I would be surprised if there will be a water meter in every home in Ireland by Christmas 2013. Flat charges may be with us for a long time.

In fact, there is a possibility that water meters will follow the path of voting machines, as learning from past mistakes is not the strongest point of the Irish government.

Water meters will be unpopular, as they remind people of water charges. Installers would need permission to put water meters in the home. Some homeowners will withhold such permission. The idea is therefore to install water meters just outside the property boundary. This is easier but much more expensive. 1.4 million connections will need to found, and 1.4 million holes dug. The water meters would be far from the smart electricity meters and therefore need a separate communications network. This may cost up to €800 per meter (€1.1 billion in total) according to one estimate.

There is a simpler and cheaper option that has worked well in other countries. Households can install water meters themselves, or ask their plumber to. Households with a meter would pay whatever water they use. Households without a meter would pay a flat charge. If the flat charge goes up over time, more and more households will install a meter. If the costs of water meters are a concern – a good plumber could install a certified meter for less than €200 – then Irish Water could give a voucher for €200 worth of free water upon registering the water meter.

The government has repeatedly promised that there would be free water allowances. Only excessive water use would be paid for. This is nonsense. It does not promote water conservation, and it is bad social policy. Like water, food is essential, but the government does not hand out sacks of potatoes. Instead, there are benefits for those without income and tax credits for those with. Benefits in cash are better than benefits in kind, because the household can choose what potatoes to buy, or pasta. Similarly, water should be charged from the first liter onwards. The revenue from the first 100 l/p/d or so should be used to increase benefits and tax credits.

The government may also seek to transfer the responsibility for drinking and sewage water from the county councils to a new, semi-state utility called Irish Water. There is merit in this too. Water treatment plants are largely build, designed and operated by private companies, but guidance and supervision by the county councils has not always been up to scratch. A new national water company would professionalize water management. If assets would be transferred from the counties, Irish Water should be able to borrow money at a lower rate than the government.

There are dangers too. In the past, semi-state monopolies have served their employees and their political masters well – but customers and owners got a raw deal. The government should create a Commission of Water Regulation at the same time as it creates Irish Water.

Or maybe sooner. The prospect of digging 1.4 million holes in the ground is great news for the construction industry – and a number of companies are actively trying to convince the government that this is the only option. It is not. It would be better if all options would be considered, and the best one selected after an open debate.

The National Competitiveness Council has just published the Costs of Doing Business in Ireland Report 2011.

You can download it from here.

‘Competition and consumer choice’ has become a policy mantra to shake up dozy and inefficient industries and to benefit consumers.  EU and national policy-makers and regulators have expended huge effort - and continue to expend effort - to complete the internal EU markets in electricity and gas in line with this mantra.  But all that has been achieved is to move from vertically integrated national monopolists in the individual member-states to a pan-European oligopoly comprised of 12 members (responsible for 85% of EU energy supply) and some residual dominant national incumbents.  (Successive Irish government, not surprisingly, have implemented their own cunning variation on a theme.)

So how did this happen - and what can be done?  The Troika is demanding some action on electricity and gas in Ireland.  The solution outlined has relevance to sectors that, at first sight, appear unlikely candidates. (more…)

The report commission by the government on Joint Labour Committees and Registered Employment Agreements (written by Kevin Duffy, the Chairman of the Labour Court and UCD economist Frank Walsh) is available here. A press release from the government is available here.

The report of the Review Group on State Assets and Liabilities has been published here. While some of the key recommendations had been signalled over recent days in the media there is a lot of detail in the report. Apart from the recommendations on asset disposal there are lots of recommendations on the regulation and governance of state bodies. 

Common wisdom suggests the state will not be ready to co-fund the IMF-EU deal by mid 2012. Another deal will accompany a slash in payments to the social sectors including Education. Is the third level sector ready for such a crisis?

The Irish State pays a core grant to our third-level institutions for each undergraduate student, and, in an equal amount, funds the majority of research and postgraduate fees (scholarships). The latter is managed by a proliferation of various third level education bodies which we label Quangos. The sector has developed an unnaturally high dependency on the public finances. This dependence is currently anywhere between 65 to 88 per cent in most Higher Education Institutes

The funding of third-level Quangos now represent an unsustainable overhead on the sector, as this form of finance flowing from the State is on the decline. The indirect costs or the administrative structures that have mushroomed during the boom (which distributed State money) are now vestigial and are turning into a major financial headache and constraint on the sector. The HEI’s must replace these funds with international research grants and postgraduate students. The Quangos are largely ill equipped to induce and manage this change.

The Universities, while undertaking many good reforms, made the mistake of allowing indirect costs inside universities to grow to over 50 per cent. Frontline lecturers’ salaries now only account for 25 per cent of the overall cost of the sector, when we include the overheads of Quangos. Academic salaries have collapsed by 25 per cent (net) since 2008. Most academic units have also lost up to 15 per cent of their staff via retirements or voluntary quits. These savings are returned and retained by the State and not by the Universities.  The oversized non-academic and undersized academic units are finding it a challenge to refocus efforts into securing funds from outside of Ireland. Academics need to be empowered to make such change happen.

What is the solution proposed by State and its agencies to cope with the current crisis?

An imposed agreement, under the false premises of Croke Park, to increase productivity levels of declining numbers of frontline lecturing staff is their answer. Not surprisingly, these productivity increases can never pay for what are now largely indirect costs in the sector.  New income streams are needed: higher levels of international students who pay fees, more EU and Global research funding successes, and private sources.

Yet, all hiring and promotions (whether funded by the State or not), that have come under the State’s employment control, are now banned. The most recent instalment of employment control wants to redeploy academics within and across institutions. There are even conditions on the nature of research that is allowed. The focus of such is on the disciplines that will drive the smart economy (see http://des-fitzgerald.com/ecf/).

This is a ludicrous attempt to turn academics into public servants. The agents of the State seem to have no idea how knowledge is created and dispersed. Academics in a global market face competition from serious creators of knowledge and find every international student and grant is a hard battle won.  Publishing in the leading journals and university presses is like winning Olympic medals in terms of a lifetime dedication to the cause. Academic credentials need to be first class, a Ph.D. from a top University and ground breaking publications. Academics need the time and space to perform at these levels.  Imposing constraints on academic freedom and tenure will only give our competitors an advantage over us, deter international students and grants from coming here and could rupture our growing reputation in scholarship internationally. The idea that an academic in UCD that gets a research grant from a major donor should first see if there is someone surplus to requirements inside UCD and then search in other universities, or even State departments, before hiring a post-doc clearly indicates to me that the state has no idea how knowledge is created. Incentives are for academics to leave Ireland rather than refocus efforts.

What do we do?

Universities have to realise the State is broke. Just like the State should have understood the Irish Banks were broke, now the Universities have to drop the State like a hot potato (Taxpayers and the IMF-EU would approve).

Trinity by the nature of its charter and academic ownership of its property can break from State faster than most.

The first move would be to establish income streams from undergraduate fees, increase the number of international students and external research income.

Most Universities like Trinity already have private enterprise on campus in terms of the library shop, rented accommodation, a Foundation office and Campus Companies. These could turn a higher profit to fertilise academic scholarship.

The University of Dublin, and the National University of Ireland, could create new colleges. Let’s call the one alongside Trinity College, “Christchurch College”. Christchurch could hire and promote and pay pensions on a private basis funded by the new income streams.  All existing contracts could be honoured by Trinity College.

The nature of self governance in a third-level institution means that academics rule. They can promote academic scholarship, and while doing so they can control all non-academic units and can easily restructure the internal indirect costs over-time and reduce them to less than 30 per cent, retaining these savings to invest in Education and Research.

The top slicing of finance by education Quangos would be removed and most importantly their ability to constrain academic freedom to create knowledge for use in a global society would come to a deserved end.

Some universities have endowments and assets that could buy the limited time to achieve such academic and financial security.

Even if the State does not default the case for the third-level institutions to break away from the influence of the State and its agencies is growing with every minute.

The Irish State is a sinking ship and academics need to escape on lifeboats labelled ‘University Charters for use when Academic Scholarship is put at risk from the State, Church or private interests’.  The Founders’ bequest throughout the centuries gives academics an instrument for use when academic scholarship is threatened. Academics need to use it now.

The report of the US Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission was released last week to controversy and criticism.   The report contains a wealth of information and is interesting reading even for those whose interest is mainly in our own financial crisis.  Much of the story has been about the partisan squabbling since the report’s release, with the Commission failing to agree on the final product.   Republican commissioners issued two separate dissents to the “majority” report (see here for the dissent of Hennessy et al.).    This just underlines how politicised the narrative of the crisis has become.   Strangely enough, though, I find the duelling perspectives actually add a useful analytical edge – otherwise lacking – to the report.  (Update: See here for an interesting discussion at the NYT.)

Anger at our government is probably too raw to have a much of a productive debate until after the election.  But to draw the proper institutional and policy reform lessons, it will be useful to similarly consider the competing extremes of the “rotten institutions” and “blameless bubble” explanations for the crisis, and to explore where the truth lies.  

Some short extracts follow after the break to give a flavour of both the majority report and the dissent. (more…)

There is an interesting piece in the Irish Times today.

Carbon dioxide emission permits are given away for free (grandparented) to electricity companies. This is a transfer of property from we the people to the shareholders of those companies. This has been going on for a couple of years, but no one protested too loudly.

The government has now introduced a new tax on the value of grandparented permits, and the regulator has ruled that this new tax cannot be passed on to electricity consumers. This is a good approximation to the preferred solution of auctioning permits.

Hat tip to Minister Ryan, so.

Of course, there is the law of unintended consequences. First, there was the PSO levy. Now, private companies argue that what once was a windfall profit, now is part of their regular return to capital.

The verdict will be interesting. Will the judge reason from a 2007 perspective, which has that the companies enjoyed a windfall for three years, which the government now ends? Or will the judge adopt the 2010 perspective, which has that the companies have a reasonable expectation for an income stream (based on the current position of the European Commission and the position of the government until only a few months ago) which the government capriciously removed?

An article by Eoin O’Dell, Trinity School of Law explains how. You can read it here.

Over at VoxEU, Jeanne and Korinek discuss a time-varying macro-prudential tax on debt that would internalize and hence reduce the risk of a bust in the market for collateral.

The Irish State Administration Database was launched last week at an event which formed part of the Innovation Dublin festival. The Database was developed by an interdisciplinary team working in the UCD Geary Institute, led by Dr Niamh Hardiman of the UCD School of Politics and International Relations, with funding from the Irish Research Council for Humanities and Social Sciences. The searchable Database records details of births, marriages and deaths of all central stage agencies (including government departments) since the foundation of the State in 1922. Avid agency watchers can study the growth in agency numbers to their peak in 2008 and subsequent modest decline. The Database shows that there are currently 350 central state agencies. However, the rich data can be mined in other ways, enabling users to look at trends by reference to such characteristics as function (eg delivery, trading, regulation, adjudication), policy domain (eg health, education, transport), and legal form (eg statutory corporation, public company, company limited by guarantee). Some further information about the Database can be found here. Users need to register here to use this free resource. There will a be hands-on demonstration of the Database on 23 November, 3-5pm, in Room G-5, Daedalus Building, UCD Belfield Campus, with an emphasis on the range of potential applications. This event is open to all but requires advance booking with mary.shayne@ucd.ie.

In Q4 2009, the Dept Environment published a Framework for the Climate Change Bill 2010 promising a Heads of Bill by Q1 2010. The Oireachtas Joint Committee on Climate Change and Energy Security decided not to wait for that and published a draft bill. This was “published” to members of the press last week, and has been made available to all this week.

There are two significant differences between the Government’s sketch and the Oireachtas’ draft. First, the Oireachtas sets a target for energy efficiency whereas the Government does not. Second, the Oireachtas puts an Taoiseach in charge whereas the Government puts the Minister of the Environment in charge.

Energy efficiency is a means to an end. Setting an energy efficiency target is therefore inappropriate. Greenhouse gas emissions are primarily from agriculture, energy and transport — that is, beyond the control of the Minister of the Environment. It is therefore appropriate to put an Taoiseach in charge.

The Oireachtas’ draft is considerably more detailed and specific than the Government’s sketch (as you would expect). It is long on creating bureaucracy but short on details how emissions would be cut.

Oireachtas and Government agree that the target for greenhouse gas emissions in 2050 is 20% of the 1990 level.

If we run Hermes/IDEM/ISus out to 2025 and extrapolate trends from there, assuming a 2% annual growth of the economy between 2025 and 2050, we find emissions of 49 million metric tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent in 2050 — 87% of 1990 levels. 60% is from fossil fuel combustion, and 36% from agriculture.

If we double the rate of decarbonisation of the economy (3.3% for energy, 2.8% for construction, 0.2% for methane, 0.9% for nitrous oxide between 1990 and 2025 in the baseline), 2050 emissions fall to 44% of their 1990 levels.

If we triple the rate, emissions go to 29%. If we quadruple the rate, emissions go to 22%.

Quadrupling the rate of technological progress (broadly defined) is very hard — particularly since Ireland’s baseline rate is rather high compared to other countries.

If we do away with agriculture, 2050 emissions would be 56% of 1990 levels. Doubling the rate of progress in energy and construction would reduce emissions to 17%.

Doubling the rate of technological progress is hard. Methane- and nitrous-free agriculture is not easy either.

It strikes me that 80% emission reduction by 2050 is on the ambitious side.

I would think that it is better to implement realistic policies than to set unrealistic targets.

UPDATE:

He_who_shall_not_be_named pointed out that the Oireachtas draft also has a target for 2020: -30%. We have repeatedly pointed out that the -20% target for that date cannot possibly be met without draconian measures such as a prolonged depression or a ban on cows. -30% is, of course, even more difficult.

(H/T to Joe & Valerie)

Covanta has written off its entire investment on the Poolbeg project in its 3Q results, citing the “political and regulatory environment” in Ireland. That’s just the sort of language we want in a SEC filing.

According to RTE, Covanta still intends to build the incinerator but does not feel bound to do so.

I’m not sure whether this is more bluff by Covanta, prudent accounting on their part, or a sign that Minister Gormley will after all waste a substantial sum of money, raise waste charges for everyone, and condemn the country’s waste to landfill for years to come.

The US Ambassador has again intervened in public in the row over the Poolbeg incinerator. Covanta flew some journalists to Copenhagen and they report enthusiastically about incineration there.

Covanta is concerned about the proposed (but unspecified) levies on incineration, though. They seem to accept the levies proposed by Gorecki et al and endorsed by Forfas. These levies reflect the estimated externalities of incineration, but are lower than the estimates by Eunomia. Minister Gormley, however, has proposed that levies should be unrelated to the damage caused, but should rather be set at punitive levels for undesirable technologies.

The public consultation on this has now been closed for two weeks, but the submissions have yet to be uploaded.

Goerg, Hanley and Strobl write about FDI policy at Vox EU. Here’s the summary:

A chief concern for countries aiming to attract investment is how it will trickle down to the local economy. This column presents evidence on the effect of government grants to foreign companies investing in Ireland between 1983 and 2002. It finds that the grants had little effect on generating supply links with local firms and argues that governments should instead work towards reducing partner search costs.

I have a post on VoxEU (backed up by a paper) on the regulation of knowledge monopolies in general and the IPCC in particular.

Other countries have carefully prepared their positions for next week’s meeting in Busan. The Netherlands will call for substantial reform of the IPCC along the lines of the IAC and PBL reports. The United Kingdom will not call for Pachauri’s resignation as cordial relationships with India are deemed more important than effective leadership of the IPCC. I was met with a stunned silence when I recently asked two senior civil servants about the Busan position of Ireland, the Country That Leads The World in the Fight Against Climate Change.

We are used to thinking about market structures for goods and services, and there is a considerable body of theoretical and empirical work on how to keep market power in check. Policy advice is a service too, and relying on a single source of knowledge can have detrimental effects. The IPCC is one example, but there are examples closer to home too.

Meanwhile, Brian Lenihan wishes there was a single source of advice, and again. Cosy groupthink was one of the things that got the Irish economy into the current mess.

Two weeks ago, the Irish Times reported that MoneyPoint regularly breached its IPPC license but failed to inform the EPA. I was waiting for a follow-up article, like “Plant Closed, Chief Engineer Jailed, Company Fined”, but then I realized that I’m in Ireland still.

If a coal-fired boiler runs in steady state, it emits little more than water vapour (white smoke) and carbon dioxide (invisible). However, if it is starting up or winding down, combustion is incomplete and smoke turns black. Black smoke contains a mix of chemicals which not only twist your tongue but also cause respiratory problems, cancer, degenerative diseases, and other mayhem. Such emissions are therefore strictly regulated, and rightly so.

The report and the lack of follow-up is disconcerting for a number of reasons. First, the ESB knew but did not tell the EPA. Second, the EPA got into action after complaints by locals. This does not help against nightly emissions or invisible ones. Third, there were two more incidents after the ESB was audited (and presumably warned) by the EPA. Fourth, there is no sign of remedial or punitive action.

(There is a side issue. Power plants should not do this. The boilers are either in much worse condition than their age suggests, or the engineers in charge are not doing their job as they should.)

Regulation is only as strong as its enforcement. For a plant the size of MoneyPoint, the EPA (and the public) should be able to monitor emissions in real time. We should not rely on voluntary disclosure or complaints. The EPA should have the right to intervene in the running of the plant, and shut it down if necessary. The owners and operators of the plant do not have the right incentives.

IPPC licenses were put in place to please Brussels, but they in fact protect our health and environment.

One of the pledges in the October 2009 Revised Programme for Government is to declare Ireland a GM-free zone. The Programme promises to “declare the Republic of Ireland a GM-Free Zone, free from the cultivation of all GM plants”, and states “To optimise Ireland’s competitive advantage as a GM-Free country, we will introduce a voluntary GM-Free logo for use in all relevant product labelling and advertising, similar to a scheme recently introduced in Germany.” This followed the commitment in the 2007 Programme for Government that “the Government will seek to negotiate the establishment of an all-Ireland GMO-free [crop] zone.”

The issue has become topical because of a proposed change in EU legislation which would allow individual Member States to permit the cultivation of  GM crops or not. The idea is to combine a European Union authorisation system for GMOs, based on science, with freedom for Member States to decide whether or not they wish to cultivate GM crops on their territory. Any such prohibitions or restrictions would have to be based on grounds other than those covered by the environmental and health risk assessment under the EU authorisation system. It is expected that the new legislation will enter into force by the end of this year.

Yesterday’s Irish Times reported that the Irish Organic Farmers and Growers Association has called on the government to immediately implement the Programme for Government pledge. Would it make sense to do so? (more…)