Mortgage Arrears Update

The Central Bank have published the Q4 2011 update of the mortgage arrears series with the data for the full year also available.  The update shows that 9.2% of mortgage accounts, and more importantly 12.3% of mortgages by value, are in arrears of 90 days or more.

The total amount of owner-occupied mortgages in Ireland is now €113.5 billion, down from €118.7 billion when this series began in September 2009.  This reflects the very slow uptake of new mortgages and also the continued repayments on many mortgages which are not in arrears.

In fact, in the final three months of the year the stock of mortgages fell from €114.4 billion to €113.5 billion, for a reduction of €935 million.  Since September 2009, the amount of arrears owing on mortgages more than 3 monthly payments in arrears has increased from €354 million to €1,117 million. 

At the end of 2010 the Central Bank estimated that about 50% of the arrears were in the covered banks, 40% in the non-covered banks and 10% in other or sub-prime lenders.  It is not clear what has happened to these proportions over the last 12 months.

The rate at which mortgages are falling into arrears does not appear to be slowing.  Any slowdown would first be seen in the 90 to 180 day category but there is no sign of this. The continued entries into this category would be offset by the 6,700 who moved into the 180 day plus category (and a small number who may have exited arrears) but there was still have an increase of 1,200.

Euro Area Cross-Border Financial Flows

The February ECB Monthly Bulletin has several interesting articles. In addition to the article on cross-border financial flows, Money and credit growth after economic and financial crises – a historical global perspective and Corporate indebtedness in the euro area

External Trade Statistics

The (merchandise) trade statistics released by the CSO today showed that exports fell in December (here).  “From a November high of €8,252m, seasonally adjusted exports decreased by 9% to €7,503m in December… A substantial part of the decline in the value of exports was due to a high value product in the Chemicals and related products sector coming off patent in December”. 

This is the beginning of the “bad news (for Ireland) from big pharma” that I posted on back in December.   

Briefing Paper for Oireachtas Finance Committee

I’m appearing at the Oireachtas Finance Committee this afternoon, along with Brian Lucey and Stephen Kinsella, to discuss ELA and promissory notes. Here‘s a copy of a briefing paper I have provided to the committee and here are my opening remarks.

I’m told that the meeting can be watched live online at this link by choosing Committee 4 and also on UPC channel 801.

Cost-effective Eurozone firewalls and the buyback boondoggle

John McHale has a recent thread on the probability of a Greek default.  In this thread I want to consider a different but related question.  Only some of the promised Greek bailout funds are intended for funding Greek government expenditures; the rest of the funds are intended to pay back outstanding Greek sovereign bonds. Conditional upon a Greek default, how should the bond-payback-earmarked Greek bailout funds be spent by the Eurozone?  Let X denote the total sum of Eurozone bailout funds intended for Greece, Y the amount earmarked for Greek government expenditures, and Z the funds available to pay back Greek bondholders.  Define a disorderly Greek default as one in which a private sector involvement (PSI) agreement is not in place or is inoperative. My question is:

In the event of a disorderly Greek default, how should the EU spend Z?

There is a historical precedent for massive wastage of taxpayer funds in analogous situations. Bulow and Rogoff call it the “buyback boondoggle.” The buyback boondoggle refers to the tendency of fiscally-distressed states to demonstrate their newfound fiscal discipline by handing over large quantities of taxpayer funds to outstanding bondholders, even when there is no fiscal benefit in doing so. In reality, the payment of funds to existing bondholders by states in fiscal distress can actually lower rather than raise the future borrowing prospects of the state (see the paper above and this related paper).