Willem Buiter writes in the FT on the odds and consequences of Greece exiting the eurozone: see here.
The piece draws on a longer article by Buiter and Rahbari from last week.
From the longer article:
[T]he positions of the main EA policymakers seem to have evolved and now suggest a greater willingness by EA creditors and the ECB to support vulnerable, but compliant EA member states under attack. In our view, EA leaders have come to the understanding that the financial, economic and political cost to the whole EA (and indeed to the EU and the global economy) of material EA break-up (that is exit of other nations than Greece) is substantially larger than the cost of extending conditional support. But EA creditor countries have also made increasingly clear that they no longer believe that the costs to the creditor countries of EA break-up or EA exit by one EA country would exceed the costs of creating a one-side fiscal union, a transfer-Europe without a commensurate quid pro quo as regards fiscal austerity and structural reform in the beneficiary countries, underpinned if necessary by far-reaching and unprecedented transfer of fiscal and wider economic sovereignty by the beneficiary countries. The EA creditor countries undoubtedly view the cost of providing unconditional and/or unlimited or open-ended fiscal and financial support to fiscally vulnerable EA countries as a price not worth paying to keep a single non-performing EA member state in the club.