Month: April 2010

Inflation once again?

Since the second half of 2008 this country has experienced the first sustained period of deflation in over sixty years. In 2009 the Consumer Price Index (CPI) fell by 4.5 per cent relative to 2008. Not since 1946 had the annual rate of inflation been negative. The record for deflation was in 1931, when the CPI fell by 6.4 per cent.

The accompanying Charts show the behaviour of the CPI and the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) over the past four years. (Am I only the only one to have the patience to enter Charts on this Blog?)



The CPI peaked in September 2008 at 108.4. By January 2010 it had fallen to 100.0, a cumulative fall of 7.7 per cent. The rate of deflation reached a maximum in January 2009, when a month-on-month decrease of 1.7 per cent was recorded. The HICP is less influenced by changes in interest rates, but it followed much the same pattern as the CPI, although varying within a narrower range. The month-on-month HICP deflation rate never exceeded 0.8 per cent, recorded in January and July 2009. It peaked at 110.0 in June 2008 and by January 2010 had fallen to 105.0, a cumulative fall of 4.3 per cent.

The rate of CPI deflation has tended to fall since early 2009 and the HICP since a few months later. By February and March of this year both were showing positive, if very low, rates of inflation (and seasonal patterns are in play). This reversal received little attention because most commentaries on the monthly CSO releases headline the year-on-year changes. Thus even as the monthly rate returned to positive territory in February 2010, the newspapers continued to discuss annual deflation rates in excess of 3 per cent.

In its latest Quarterly Bulletin (released last week), the Central Bank forecasts annual inflation rates for 2010 of -1.3 (CPI) and -1.1 (HICP). These are year-on-year forecasts and therefore reflect substantial carryover from the record deflation of 2009. If the CPI continued to edge up by 0.1 per cent a month from March to December 2010 – not implausible given that interest rates are on their way up, the euro is falling and oil prices rising – the annual rate of inflation for 2010 would be -1.3 per cent – exactly what the Central Bank forecasts. But by December the price level would be 1.4 per cent higher than it was in January.

This is another illustration of the tendency of Irish economy commentary tends to focus unduly on annual changes, to the neglect of significant indications from quarterly or monthly data, a phenomenon to which Rossa White drew attention in an Irish Times article last week.

More Secrets from the NAMA Temple

The EU Commission has released the full text of its decision to approve NAMA announced on February 26. Emmet Oliver discusses the statement in today’s Independent. Thanks to Jagdip Singh for the hat tip. What I find frustrating about this process is why we get a minimal “EU approves NAMA” statement in February and a slightly-censored version of the full approval six weeks later. It would be far preferable for the full text to be released at the same time as the announcement of the decision.

Thanks also to Jagdip for getting us more information on the “NAMA total consideration” mystery. As outlined in his comment, Jagdip wrote to NAMA:

Dear Sirs,

I have studied your four publications from Tuesday 30th March 2010 with respect to the transfer of the first tranche of loans to NAMA. I write to ask if you could make publicly available the overall methodology to derive the Long Term Economic Value (LEV), Current Market Value (CMV) and consideration paid with respect to the first tranche of €16bn of gross loans.

In summary the gross loans of the first tranche are estimated at €16.03bn, the LEV is shown as €10.51bn, the CMV as €9.44bn and the consideration paid is €8.51bn. Could you explain in general terms how the LEV and CMV were calculated and why the consideration paid is different to the LEV.

Also the press have widely reported the estimated haircut on the first tranche at 47%. Would it be more accurate to quantify the haircut as 34% (1 – LEV/Loan Value or 1 – 10.51/16.03)?

I have read the Act and the LEV Regulations before writing to you and I can still not resolve the figures produced for the first tranche. I propose publishing any response from NAMA to the above questions on the irisheconomy.ie blog.

Jagdip received a reply (Garbo speaks!):

Thank you for your email.

Please see below a brief guide to how NAMA obtains these calculations:

1. The €16.03bn is the nominal value of the loan balances transferring to NAMA.

2. The property CMV represents the current market value of the property as at 30 November 2009.

3. An LEV uplift factor is applied to the property CMV to arrive at the property LEV which is one of many inputs to the valuation methodology to arrive at the consideration NAMA will pay for any of the transferring loans. In addition to the LEV of the property, the loan valuation is determined by reference the discount rates per the valuation regulations taking account of enforcement costs and the legal due diligence levy, and the potential for legal haircuts regarding defects in security and title amongst other inputs which influences the consideration paid by NAMA for the loans. The average LEV uplifts per participating institution are available on our website.

4. The discount applied can therefore be calculated as: (1- (Consideration paid/Loan balances at transfer)).

Some additional information is available on our website http://www.nama.ie.

As Jagdip notes, “defects in security and title” are likely to be the principal explanation for why the “total consideration paid” for the first tranche was below the “current” (i.e. November 2009) market value of the underlying assets. I think this means that the signed copy of the 46 guy letter is on its way to an anonymous NAMA official, who I’m sure will treasure it.

Between this reply and Brian O’Neill of NAMA’s letter to the Irish Times commenting on Brian Lucey’s criticisms of their ingenious linked-to-Euribor strategy (Brian’s original article here and reply to NAMA here) there is some sign of NAMA becoming a somewhat less secretive organisation. This is a welcome development though I suspect those who ask tough questions may find limits to this transparency.

The Impending EU\Greece Deal

It appears that a deal involving the EU and Greece is imminent. Greek bond yields hit their peak level in the current crisis, the ECB has altered its rules for collateral and the media are reporting that a deal is in place (here and here.)

The FT reports on the negotiations over the terms of the deal:

Officials added that Germany was sticking to its demand that the eurozone portion of the loans would have to be made at or near Greek market rates of 6 per cent or more, though this could lead to different rates being charged by other countries.

One said the agreement “reflects high rates … it is not a ‘subsidy’ and thus not a climbdown. Not even the Germans regard most recent rates as market rates”.

The FT also editorialises on this, blaming the Germans for failing to calm the bond markets sufficiently:

Berlin is also adamant liquidity support be given at market rates. This makes no sense: a rescue is needed precisely when debt markets cease to function and refuse to refinance Greece at sustainable rates. Insisting that a rescue takes place at “market rates” is to insist no rescue takes place at all. Market yields reflect this contradiction, and show that Europe has not yet put its money where its mouth is.

I have a tendency to question agreed wisdom so let me play the role of academic devil’s advocate here for a second. Ultimately, Greek fiscal stability will require a combination of lower spending and higher taxes. Yes, bond yields at current levels—if sustained—would be unlikely to be consistent with long-run fiscal stability.

However, a program that

(a) Made it clear that Greece would be able to roll over private sector debt because the EU will intervene to provide the funds

(b) Credibly lead to the adjustments in Greece’s structural deficit.

should stabilise the fiscal situation in Greece and lead to a return to lower borrowing rates for Greece. That the EU should charge a high interest rate for providing the funds for (a) and overseeing the program for (b) is, it could be argued, not unreasonable. Indeed, if the rates associated with (a) are not high enough to be painful then it may be difficult to get much traction going on (b).

Of course, the Greek government is going to look to get the interest rates on its assistant loans set as low as possible. But that doesn’t mean that a percent here or there on these loans is the key issue right now.

The other major unknown here is how any deal will affect the sovereign bond market’s attitude to Ireland.

Eddie Molloy on Finance and the Public Service

I know Philip linked yesterday to the first of his articles but I think it is worth having a thread on Eddie Molloy’s two articles on the Department of Finance and the public sector (here and here.) To my mind, most of his opinions are spot on. I can certainly relate to his opinions in relation to the misplaced belief in generalists and in the absence of management skills. But, of course, most of this material has been aired before. The question is whether the current crisis is likely to generate sufficient momentum to finally generate the kind of reforms that people have been talking about for many years.

THE MOST TURBULENT FORTY YEARS IN MONETARY HISTORY– FOUR WAVES OF ASSET PRICE BUBBLES AND FINANCIAL CRISES

Bob Aliber will give a talk on this topic in TCD next Friday April 16, 12.30-2 in Room 3051 of the TCD Arts Block  – all welcome.    Most recently, he had a prominent role in predicting the banking crisis in Iceland, which built on his long research career in the analysis of asset bubbles and crises.

Biography:

Robert Z. Aliber is Professor of International Economics and Finance at the Booth Graduate School of Business at the University of Chicago emeritus. He has written extensively about currencies, international monetary and banking relationships, and financial crises and the credit bubbles. He brought out the fifth edition of Charles P. Kindleberger’s Manias, Panics, and Crashes, (Palgrave, 2005) and is completing the sixth edition. His book the The International Money Game (Basic Books, 1972) first appeared in 1972, and the seventh edition is scheduled for publication in 2010. Other publications include The Multinational Paradigm (MIT Press, 1993) and a book on personal finance, Your Money and Your Life (Basic Books, 1984). A sequel, Your Money and Your Life All Over Again, (Stanford University Press, 2010) is scheduled for publication in 2010. He has consulted to numerous organizations including the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund. He has testified before committees of Congress, and lectured extensively in the United States and abroad. He received his Ph.D. from Yale University.