We’re different, roysh? The decoupling of the Dublin property market

Today sees the launch of the fiftieth Daft Report, with a commentary by yours truly. To mark the occasion, and to mark five years of Ireland’s property market crash, Daft.ie and the All-Island Research Observatory at NUI Maynooth, have launched a property value heatmap tool. In a companion post to this one, I outline the tool, how it works and what it tells us about Ireland’s property market crash.

In this post, though, I’d like to highlight what’s in the report itself. The principal finding from Q2 was that conditions in the Dublin market do indeed look to have improved considerably since the start of the year. This has happened at a time when conditions elsewhere in the country are pretty much unchanged. It seems the decoupling of the Dublin property market from the rest of the country has already begun.

Get them while they’re hot (or cold): Heatmaps of property values in Ireland now available

As I note in the companion post to this one, today sees the launch of the fiftieth Daft Report, with a commentary by yours truly. To mark the occasion, and to mark five years of Ireland’s property market crash, Daft.ie and the All-Island Research Observatory at NUI Maynooth, have launched a property value heatmap tool. In this post, I’ll give an outline of what the tool is and does, and what we can learn from it.

Measuring Youth Unemployment

The problem of youth unemployment has rightly been highlighted as one of the major issues facing European countries today.  The newspapers have fastened on the shocking statistic that the unemployment rate among Spaniards and Greeks aged 15 – 25 is about 50 per cent, while the rate for the EU as a whole is about 20 per cent.  These are alarming numbers, but they are also somewhat misleading.

As Stephen Hill pointed out in a piece in the Financial Times on June 24th, the unemployment rate may not be the best measure of labour market conditions among young people who have opportunities to stay in the educational and training systems rather than entering a depressed labour market.  For this reason, an alternative measure, the unemployment ratio, has gained currency.

The conventional unemployment rate is  the numbers ‘unemployed’ as a proportion of the ‘labour force’.  The ‘labour force’ is the sum of the employed and unemployed.  The ‘unemployed’ are those actively seeking work, but not at work. (For young people it is of interest to break unemployment down into those ‘looking for first regular job’ and those who are ‘unemployed having lost or given up previous job’.)

The problem with using the  unemployment rate to measure labour market conditions among young people is that the denominator does not include those who are in the educational system or on full-time training courses.  During a recession, the higher the proportion of a youth cohort that stays on in school or college or in training, the smaller the labour force and the higher the unemployment rate. This is perverse.

By using the whole cohort as the denominator, the unemployment ratio avoids this pitfall and it may be argued that it therefore provides a clearer picture of hardship being caused by the lack of employment. (Of course this is subject to the reservation that increased educational participation may involve putting square pegs in round holes, with some young people taking courses in which they have no interest.)

The limitations of the unemployment rate as a measure of labour market conditions among the youth population is acknowledged by Eurostat, who now publish both the ratio and the rate for the population aged 15-24.  (Their recent figures for Ireland for 2011 are low and may not reflect the latest Census returns.)

The distinction between the unemployment rate and ratio certainly matters.  Data in the recently-released 2011 Census of Population volume This is Ireland Part 2 show the population classified by ‘principal economic status’. These reveal an unemployment rate of 38.7 per cent among the population aged 15-24 compared with an unemployment ratio of 14.2 per cent. While the ratio of 14.2 per cent gives no grounds for complacency, it is less alarming than the headline rate of almost 40 per cent.

It is perhaps even more important to note that the unemployment ratio has not risen as dramatically as the unemployment rate since the onset of the recession in 2008. The Figure displays the three concepts based on the 2006 and 2011 Census data.

(The Table at the end provides more details.)

Whereas the unemployment rate rose by 140% the ratio rose by 90%.  Thus, the rate tends to overstate both the level of unemployment among young people and the rate at which it has risen.

It may, however, be objected that the unemployment ratio includes all those who are not in the labour force in the denominator but excludes discouraged workers and similar forms of disguised unemployment from the numerator.  This bias would certainly be significant among older workers, who are more likely to cease looking for work and to drop out of the labour force because no jobs are available.  Its effect on the youth data, however, is smaller because labour force categories other than ‘employed’, ‘student, and ‘unemployed’ are relatively unimportant among the young.  In 2011 less than 2 per cent of population aged 15- 24 are classified as ‘looking after home/family’!

None the less, to take account of ‘dsicouraged workers’ it is worth looking at another concept that has gained some currency .  This is the NEET ratio. It refers to the proportion of the population that is Not in Employment, Education or Training.  To calculate this ratio for Ireland I have assumed that those in ‘(full-time) training’ are classified as ‘students’ in the Census.  The resulting ratio must, by definition, fall between the unemployment ratio and the unemployment rate.  From the Figure we can see that it lies closer to the unemployment ratio. Moreover, it has risen less rapidly than either the unemployment rate or ratio.   In 2011 the NEET ratio was ‘only’ 65 per cent above it 2006 level.

It is striking that the widely-used unemployment rate is so much higher, and has risen so much more, than the alternative – and arguably better – measures of the situation in the youth labour market.

The reason why the unemployment rate overstates both the level and rise in Irish youth unemployment is the high level of educational participation and its marked increase over the past five years. The proportion of the 15-24 year-old population in the educational system rose from 50.1 per cent in 2006 to 60.5 per cent in 2011.  While not all of the additional years of schooling will be as productive as we would wish, being in the educational system is less wasteful than being unemployed.  This aspect of the adjustment to the present crisis is concealed by the conventional youth unemployment rate.

None the less, we cannot lose sight of the collapse of employment among the youth population.  In 2006 39.5 per cent of the population aged 15-24 was in employment.  By 2011 this percentage had fallen to 22.5.  Among those aged 20-24 the rate declined from 60.0 to 39.0.  While the youth unemployment crisis may not be as severe as suggested by the headline youth unemployment rate, it is a crisis.

The possible shape of a second bailout for Ireland

..is discussed in the Irish Times today by my UL colleague Donal Donovan. From the piece:

The prospects for Ireland being able to access sufficient market funding by late 2013 do not appear favourable. The lending environment for sovereigns in much of the euro zone has worsened steadily and, barring miracles in Greece and Spain, is unlikely to improve sharply soon. Notwithstanding Ireland’s Yes vote and continued adherence to the troika programme, we can’t avoid being affected by the general market nervousness. Ireland’s budget deficit, at 8-9 per cent of gross domestic product, remains the highest among debt-distressed euro zone members.

Even under favourable assumptions, without specific debt-alleviation measures, the debt to GDP ratio will be over 100 per cent – second only to Greece – for some time.

Despite encouraging words from European Central Bank president Mario Draghi, it is hard to be confident that the estimated €40 billion needed to cover the budget deficit and repay maturing debt obligations in 2014-2015 can be obtained at affordable market terms.

The fall in GNP

Over the past week or so there have been a number of references to the fall in GNP that occurred in late 2011 as reported in the most recent set of Quarterly National Accounts released by the CSO.

Vincent Browne in particular has focused on the 7.1% fall in GNP recorded in Q4 2011 when compared to Q4 2010 as if it is indicative of some of cataclysmic collapse in the economy.  The seasonally adjusted quarterly real change was a drop of 2.2% in Q4 but even that may not be reflective of changes in the economy.

GNP is often referred to as a better indicator of the domestic economy than GDP because it “excludes the impact of the multinationals”.  That is not necessarily true.  GDP includes the net exports of the MNC sector and it is worth noting that in 2009 the top 10 MNCs accounting for one-third of Irish exports and imports (see slide 14).

GNP does not remove the trading performance of the MNCs as a measure of national income; it adds in the effect of Net Factor Income from Abroad.  This will, of course, be heavily influenced by the performance of the MNCs and the profits earned from their exports will largely exit in this fashion.

The point is that GNP can move because of a change in the export performance of the MNCs or a change in the profit repatriation decisions of the MNCs.  The decisions of the MNCs have two avenues to impact our GNP figures.  The assumption may be that one will offset the other but that is not necessarily the case.

If we look at the real seasonally adjusted changes in the components of GNP.

Component Q4 2010 Q3 2011 Q4 2011 Annual Quarterly

Consumption

20,983

20,400

20,506

-2.3%

+0.5%

Investment

4,277

3,702

4,221

-1.3%

+14.0%

Government

6,866

6,611

6,389

-6.9%

-3.4%

(C + I + G)

32,126

30,713

31,116

-3.1%

+1.3%

Exports

38,929

40,752

40,287

+3.5%

-1.1%

Imports

(31,397)

(30,639)

(30,319)

-3.4%

-1.0%

(X – M)

7,532

10,113

9,968

+32.3%

-1.4%

GDP

39,721

40,180

40,100

+1.0%

-0.2%

Net Income

(5,427)

(7,969)

(8,711)

-60.5%

-9.3%

GNP

33,925

32,225

31,523

-7.1%

-2.2%

The annual figures are poor and there is a €2.4 billion drop in quarterly GNP over the year.  Although the seasonally adjusted figures are not additive it is instructive to do so to get an indicator of where the annual 7% drop came from.

All of consumption, investment and government have fallen but their sum contributes €1.0 billion of the drop.   Net exports (driven by the MNCs) rose by €2.4 billion over the year but this was more than offset by a €3.3 billion reduction in net factor income from abroad. 

A large proportion of the change in GNP is a result of changes in exports and net factor income.  About 90% of our exports are from MNCs and you can use the Balance of Payments to track income flows (noting though that the this does not include seasonally adjusted data).  It seems that the expected drop in the outflow of investment income in the final quarter of the year was not as large as anticipated, thus becoming a seasonally adjusted increase in the outflow of investment income as reflected in the table above.

If we look at the quarterly changes we see that both consumption and investment rose in Q4 2011 (although investment was at an extremely low level to begin with).  This is not suggestive of an economy in freefall in the latter quarters of 2011.

Ireland national income statistics are hugely influenced by the presence of MNCs.  Although GNP is a useful indicator it is important to realise that changes in GNP are not necessarily reflective of changes in the domestic economy.  The CSO do provide tables on ‘Domestic Demand’ which is the bulk of the “Irish” economy (as opposed to the economy in Ireland) but that excludes the performance of indigenous exporting firms.