New targets for greenhouse gas emission reduction

Minister Gormley has announced new targets for greenhouse gas emission reduction: 2020 emissions are to be 10% below 1990 levels (29% below 2005 levels) , 2030 emissions 40% below 1990, and 2050 emissions 80% below 1990.

EU legislation has that Ireland should cut 2020 emissions by some 20% below 2005. The EU has committed itself to 30% if there is a meaningful global agreement on emission reduction (which is as unlikely as ever). The Environment Council has repeatedly tried to remove the conditionality of the 30%, but has been rebuffed by the European Council. The government now argues that Ireland should unilaterally adopt the 30% (well, 29%) target.

It will be hard enough to meet the EU target, as illustrated here (after Devitt et al., 2010). According to the low growth scenario, Ireland will fall short some 5.5 mln tonnes of CO2 equivalent of the EU target — and 13.5 mln tonnes of the new government target. Today’s permit price is 14 euro/tCO2. Under the EU target, Ireland would need to spend 80 million euro per year on importing permits (the model imposes a carbon tax equal to the permit price, so buying permits is cheaper than increasing domestic emission reduction). Under the new government target, this would by 190 mln euro.

The new government target is less stringent than that proposed by the Oireachtas Joint Committee on Climate Change and Energy Security.

The cost of wind (ctd)

Referring to my earlier remarks about an ESRI paper, here’s the verbatim conclusions of the paper.

Seán Diffney, John Fitz Gerald, Seán Lyons, Laura Malaguzzi Valeri, “Investment in electricity infrastructure in a small isolated market: the case of Ireland”, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Volume 25, Number 3, 2009.

The new All-Island market structure appears to have performed broadly as expected. The rules provide for a transparent and efficient operation of the market, encouraging plant availability. Investors are clearly relying on the capacity payment regime to ensure that electricity is priced at long run marginal cost in the future. Lyons et al. (2007) suggest that the calibration of the capacity payments regime is broadly appropriate. The one area which may need further consideration is the handling of wind generation within the capacity payments regime.

In this article we evaluate the costs and benefits to the Irish system of meeting the government’s target for 2020 for 40 per cent of electricity to be generated by renewables, primarily wind. We find that high wind generation is economic when fuel prices are high and that a high level of wind penetration will occur without further expensive incentives. Unless fuel prices or carbon prices are low in 2020 consumers are likely to benefit from a high level of wind generation on the system. This is consistent with the results in DCENR and DETINI (2008) and CER and NIAUR (2008). The target for a high level of wind generation in the Republic will not adversely affect consumers in Northern Ireland and may actually benefit them in the case of high energy prices. While low fuel or carbon prices could see consumers in both jurisdictions paying a higher electricity price, this premium would be likely to be small. A high level of wind generation would provide a hedge against high fuel prices.

To be sure of the net effects of wind generation it would be important to not only measure its positive externalities, but also its negative externalities. In this study we have internalised part of the negative externalities wind generation imposes on existing thermal plants by curtailing wind generation to limit thermal plant cycling. We have not however attempted to estimate the possible negative environmental externalities of wind farms.

We find that investing in a lot of wind generation is economic only if there is also parallel investment in interconnection. This allows wind to generate whenever it is available instead of being curtailed at times of low demand or imposing additional costs on thermal plants by making them ramp up and down. This implies that the total capital costs associated with an investment in high wind generation will be substantial. Therefore, in order to minimize the cost of the system to the consumer policy should concentrate on minimising the cost of this investment. One measure to achieve this is already in place, regulatory certainty: because the establishment of the new market required co-ordinated legislation in two jurisdictions it will be difficult to change. This should provide additional reassurance to investors.

Second, given the comparative youth of the SEM, avoidance of regulatory risk is at a premium. The regulators should avoid making unnecessary changes to the framework or parameters while market participants gain confidence and knowledge about how the system works.

Third, the financing of the essential network infrastructure, including interconnectors should be done on the basis that it is part of the regulated asset base of the state owned (or in the case of Northern Ireland mutual owned) company. As such it should attract a low cost of capital which will be crucial to ensure that the costs for consumers on the island of Ireland are minimised. In any event, merchant interconnectors would be unlikely to supply the socially optimal level of interconnection, given their higher cost of capital and decreasing returns to investment. It should be noted that these results are based on the assumption that interconnection operates as a perfect arbitrageur, allowing electricity to flow from the low price to the high price jurisdiction when ever there is a price difference. In practice this is unlikely to hold, so studying the specific behaviour of interconnection flow is important to assess the returns to the system. If the interconnector does not operate optimally a much larger infrastructure investment could be needed to obtain the same effect, possibly causing the high wind scenario to become too expensive. This highlights the importance of implementing an appropriate regulatory regime to cover all of the interconnectors between Ireland and Great Britain.

Finally, to facilitate the continued development of competition, the ownership of the transmission system in the Republic should be transferred to EirGrid, the government-owned operator of the electricity system, and the Irish government (as shareholder) should ensure that appropriate pressure is put on operating costs in the ESB.

Prime Time on the cost of wind

The video is now online.

Eamon Ryan and Kieran O’Brien both cite an ESRI paper, but O’Brien does so accurately. UPDATE: The abstract of the paper is here.

Minister Ryan argues that the price of electricity falls as more wind power is added. This is true. The price reflects the marginal cost of power generation, which is zero for wind. However, what matters is the total cost of power generation, which may well increase as more wind is added to the system. From the household perspective, the price of electricity goes down with more wind, but the standing charge goes up.

Minister Ryan again extols the virtues of import substitution, despite much evidence to the contrary.

Windfall entitlements

There is an interesting piece in the Irish Times today.

Carbon dioxide emission permits are given away for free (grandparented) to electricity companies. This is a transfer of property from we the people to the shareholders of those companies. This has been going on for a couple of years, but no one protested too loudly.

The government has now introduced a new tax on the value of grandparented permits, and the regulator has ruled that this new tax cannot be passed on to electricity consumers. This is a good approximation to the preferred solution of auctioning permits.

Hat tip to Minister Ryan, so.

Of course, there is the law of unintended consequences. First, there was the PSO levy. Now, private companies argue that what once was a windfall profit, now is part of their regular return to capital.

The verdict will be interesting. Will the judge reason from a 2007 perspective, which has that the companies enjoyed a windfall for three years, which the government now ends? Or will the judge adopt the 2010 perspective, which has that the companies have a reasonable expectation for an income stream (based on the current position of the European Commission and the position of the government until only a few months ago) which the government capriciously removed?

Energy and Environment Review 2010

Out now

The Energy and Environment Review 2010 is the third in a series of annual reports published by the Economic and Social Research Institute, discussing trends in resource use and emissions to the environment as well as policies to change those trends. The key findings are as follows:

  • While emissions of most persistent organic pollutants are expected to fall between 2010 and 2025, emissions from households of PCBs to air and of dioxins to land and air, and particularly emissions of hexachlorocarbons to air from agriculture are projected to increase. To avoid this, additional policy interventions would be required.
  • Our estimates of the amount of methane from landfill differ from the official estimates, suggesting that international emission reduction obligations are less severe than they seem to be.
  • On average, firms spend 0.3% of their turnover on environmental protection and 0.7% of their investment is directed towards environmental care. More than three-quarters of firms spend no money at all on environmental care, but some firms spend up to 1.5% of turnover or 7% of investment.
  • It is expected that wind power will account for two-fifths of power generation by 2020, replacing coal and peat. After 2020, coal may well return to the fuel mix, with or without technically risky and expensive carbon capture and storage. Carbon dioxide emissions in 2025 would be 2.6 million tonnes higher without carbon capture and storage.
  • A large share of electricity is expected to come from renewable energy. The use of biofuels in transport can be expanded but this may face economic and environmental objections. In other sectors, the use of renewable energy seems to have stalled. It is therefore likely that Ireland will have to import renewable obligations in order to meet its targets.
  • Recent tax reforms have shifted the balance in favour of diesel cars, so that carbon dioxide emissions and tax revenue are lower than what they would have been without tax reform. In the unlikely event that the government meets the target that 10% of all cars be all-electric vehicles, carbon dioxide emissions from transport and power generation would fall by only 1% as all-electric cars primarily displace small cars driven over short distances.
  • Over the last two decades, energy efficiency has rapidly improved in Ireland and the government hopes to accelerate this trend. However, even if current policies are maintained, which seems unlikely given the current fiscal situation, a deceleration is more likely due to sectoral shifts in the economy, less efficient power generation, and export of electricity to Great Britain.
  • Ireland will probably meet its emission reduction obligations under the Kyoto Protocol because of the severe recession. However, at this point the EU target for 2020 seems to be out of Ireland’s reach. Subsidies are more likely to fall than rise, and the announced carbon tax is insufficient for the emission reductions required. Ireland will therefore have to import emission permits from other EU Member States.
  • Incineration will help Ireland to meet its landfill targets in the medium-term, but in the long-term more reform of waste policy is needed. Weight-based charging and three-bin waste collection would be needed (in urban areas) to make the planned increase in the landfill levy effective.

The Energy and Environment Review presents scenarios that consider actual and probable policies but disregard targets that are not supported by such policies.

The energy part of the review should be compared to the SEAI Energy Forecasts.