Category: Environment

Transparency in public energy policy

Slí Eile asserts that the culture of secrecy is alive and well in policy making in Ireland. Here’s the full essay.

The rest of this post is about a related topic, and the about an irregular commentator to this blog: Pat Swords.

Once upon a time, Pat asked the relevant authorities in Ireland for the benefit-cost analysis that underpins the public investment in wind power in Ireland. This is a perfectly reasonable request, as the public investment is substantial. There are three sources of money: tax revenue, reinvestment of profits by state-owned companies (which could have been paid in dividend to the owners aka the tax payer), and public services obligations (i.e., levies on electricity that are not quite taxes but feel the same way).

Pat’s request was refused, and so started a protracted legal battle, involving the Department of Energy, various other government bodies in Ireland, DG Environment, the European Ombudsperson, and the UN Economic Commission for Europe. There are a number of complications. Pat asked for information that probably should exist but as far as I know does not. Pat requested information under the Aarhus Convention, a UN treaty that was not ratified by Ireland. However, it was ratified by the EU, and Ireland has transposed the corresponding directive. Ireland’s renewable target is similarly derived from EU targets, the justification and even documentation of which leaves much to be desired. Europe part-funded some of the infrastructure that underpins the expansion of renewables. And there are other parts of the Acquis that may pertain to this case.

I’m no lawyer so I will not opine on the likely outcome of the case. I would have used less abrasive language than Pat is wont to. I agree with Pat that the renewables targets are expensive. I fail to understand that there are any benefits from having such a target. I am aware of the long list of wonderful things that are claimed to be benefits of renewable energy. I do not think any of them stacks up.

Most importantly, I think that a democratic government should be open and transparent, and be able to explain how and why it spends our taxes or implements costly regulation. There is often a good reason, or matters may be beyond our control.

If Pat wins this case, the ramifications could be widespread. Renewable energy is surely not the only area in which the Irish government has made dodgy and badly documented decisions. The Aarhus convention only applies, however, to policies that touch the environment.

Here’s the full story. It’s long, complicated, and occasionally intemperate.

CBA of the Home Energy Saving scheme

The SEAI has released its cost-benefit analysis of the Home Energy Saving scheme, which concludes that for every euro invested, five euros were earned. More money to the SEAI so, and the economic crisis will soon be over.

Intriguingly, the results for the HES are in sharp contrast to the evaluation of the Warmer Homes Scheme — which found that the subsidies had no statistically significant impact on behaviour — and the evaluation of the Green Homes Scheme — which found net losses.

The evaluation of the HES leaves some things to be desired. For optical reasons, it may be better to commission an independent outsider to do the evaluation. Instead, SEAI staff evaluated an SEAI programme.

The cost is assumed to equal the sum of the public and private expenditure. The HES is a price subsidy. It increases the consumer surplus, by less than the total subsidy. The net cost is the difference. Private expenditure does not enter that calculation.

The study ignores changes in producer surplus. These are probably small, if we assume that investment is displaced.

Benefits are the energy savings and the avoided carbon dioxide, . The study assumes that only 18% of the investment in energy saving would have been made without the subsidy. This is in contrast to the Greener Homes evaluation, which finds that roughly half of the investment would have been made anyway, and the Warmer Homes evaluation, which finds that almost all of the investment would have been made without the subsidy.

Energy saved and CO2 avoided are discounted at 4%. If only that were the opportunity cost of public investment.

The study accounts for the VAT paid on energy. Surprisingly, the carbon tax is omitted from the analysis. The HES subsidy is double regulation: Carbon dioxide emissions are taxed, and emission reductions are subsidized. In other sectors of the economy, there is single regulation (carbon tax, or ETS permit price). The HES subsidy thus introduces a distortion in Ireland’s CO2 abatement policy: We abate too much in home energy use and too little elsewhere. This distortion is not quantified in the study.

In sum, this CBA of the HES does not tell us much that is useful. Its conclusions are not supported.

One can assess the HES based on first principles. It is a second-best intervention: Carbon dioxide emission are regulated already. It is an inefficient intervention: It is a fixed subsidy on investment, unrelated to the emissions avoided. It may well be that the HES addresses some imperfection in the market for home improvement (e.g., constrained access to borrowing) but, if so, it is a second-best intervention in that problem too.

If the SEAI had concluded that there was a benefit of 80 cents for every euro invested, I probably would have believed them.

Dublin in the Cycle Top 10

Good news is always welcome. Dublin is the 2nd most Intelligent Community. Who cares it’s Dublin, Ohio? There is a chuckle in the capital, an opportunity to bitch, and as not too many people know about the other Dublin, its reputation adds to ours.

Dublin (Ireland) is ranked 9th (out of 80) on the list of most Bicycle-Friendly Cities in the world. The Lord Mayor rightly called this astonishing. I agree. Any town (that I’ve visited) in Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands is more friendly to cyclists, including Hamburg (ranked 13th).

The list was put together by Copenhagenize. They do not reveal their methods. Dublin got 12 bonus points for trying, without which it would not have been in the top 20. Dublin’s high ranking is explained by “a wildly successful bike share programme” (true), “visionary politicians” (since booted out of office) “who implemented bike lanes and 30 km/h zones” (although the 30 km/h zone is fiendishly hard to navigate by bike), and “a citizenry who have merely shrugged and gotten on with it” (although the few available statistics suggest that people cycle less and less).

Copenhagenize claims that “[t]he new cycle track along the [Grand] [C]anal is brilliant”. It sure looks shiny and new. It has a small ridge between the road and the cycle line, the sort that was abandoned elsewhere because if you’d hit it accidentally, you’d go head first into traffic. Right of way is confusing. I use one crossing of the new cycle lane on my way back from work. In the few months since it was opened, I’ve spend some 10 minutes there and witnessed four near misses as cars turn on bikes. Fortunately, Dublin bikes are equipped with above-average brakes.

Copenhagenize has used the old let’s-rank-something trick to generate publicity. Unfortunately, they did not add to our understanding of what makes a city friendly to cycling.

Waste collection

The proposed reform of waste collection policy was again in the news today.

The Examiner has a funny story. The proposed reform would cut costs (5,000 people less on the payroll) and increase charges at the same time. The Times is more thoughtful, although it is still curious. In our textbooks, regulators fight against market power. Here, the regulator wants to establish private monopolies and the companies that would likely obtain those are dead against.

Mr Kells issues an implicit threat of court action. Presumably, the companies would argue that they have a customary right and reasonable expectation to compete in any waste collection market.

A lot of the fuss is due to poor communication. As far as I know, the department wants to sell waste collection concessions to the highest bidder, rather than take waste collection back into the public sector (as the private waste companies seem to think).

Here is one way to get around this. Instead of auctioning concessions, they could be grandfathered.

AFAIK, there are four private waste collection companies in DLR. Counting bins on my way to work, I guess that one company has 50% of the market, two have 20%, and one has 10%. DLR should thus be carved into 10 concessions, with 5 going to company A, 2 to companies B and C, and 1 to company D. In two years time, the first concession should be auctioned, the second one two months later, and so on.

A Review of Irish Energy Policy

Continue reading “A Review of Irish Energy Policy”