The Irish Economy

Here is a link to the new infrastructure and capital investment programme. There is a lot in there so it will take a little time to digest it.

Some quick points:

- There is a commitment to the National Children’s Hospital;

- There is funding for new schools;

- Luas BXD to go ahead (Metro North and DART Interconnector shelved, Metro West was shelved some time ago);

- the A5 project in Northern Ireland (80 km from the border to Derry) has now also been shelved (in addition to the shelving of 45 other national roads projects announced some time ago);

The Sunday Times reported on a recent paper by Niamh Callaghan and me.

The paper is on the demand for tourism in Ireland by UK visitors. This is relevant because UK tourists make up about 45% of all visitors to Ireland (and because UK tourists are not that different from other tourists).

The paper starts with descriptive statistics. Irish tourism prices have developed roughly in line with prices elsewhere, except in 2008, when Irish prices rose very sharply, and in 2009, when Irish prices fell as the rest of the world raised their prices.

Ireland roughly maintained its market share in UK tourism. The drop in visitor numbers in Ireland seems to be because people take fewer holidays during a recession, rather than because there is something wrong with Ireland as a tourist destination. Ireland does well in the market for secondary holidays (city visits, fishing trips etc) and people economize on that rather than on the main family holiday.

We then estimate the price elasticity of UK tourism demand — that is, the price elasticity across destinations — using twelve years of micro-data from the International Passengers Survey. We use that to run two simulations, abolishing the travel tax and reverting the VAT cut. The results are qualitatively the same for both scenarios. The tax changes have a small impact on the total cost of the trip. With a price elasticity smaller than one, the impact on visitor numbers is small too. Tax cuts bring additional visitors and additional revenue, but all tourists (including those that would have come anyway) pay less tax. The latter effect is larger, so that there is a net loss to the Irish economy.

Tourism tax breaks are like export subsidies. Foreigners benefit. The tourism sector benefits. The overall economy loses out.

Fairly amazing story

The general Government debt is to be written down by 2.3 per cent, or €3.6 billion, following the detection of an accounting error.

The Department of Finance said the National Treasury Management Agency (NTMA) had notified it of a double count brought about a change in its relationship with the Housing Finance Authority.

Does this mean we can cancel the €3.6 billion budgetary adjustment? (Just kidding).  Now if only we could correct the “error” of supplying the IBRC with €31 billion in promissory notes, we’d be saved.

Someone asked me today how a Greek-style haircut for private bondholders would impact on the Irish debt situation if applied here. Without any claim that this is a prediction for what could happen to Ireland, or a policy recommendation, here are the calculations.

While the figure grabbing the headlines is the 50%-60% haircut for private holders of Greek sovereign bonds, it appears that the bonds bought by the ECB will not be written down, nor will the IMF loans. FT Alphaville discuss a UBS report that calculates that a 50% haircut for private bondholders actually implies a 22% reduction in total debt.

In Ireland’s case, the latest EU Commission report estimates (page eight) that our year-end general government debt will be €172.5 billion or about 110 percent of GDP. The report also estimates that by the end of this year, we will owe €38.2 billion to the EU and IMF.  (Table 4 on page 23).

We don’t know how much Irish sovereign debt the ECB own but it’s believed to be a large amount. I do remember a report from Barclay’s claiming they owned €18 billion by June 2010. Let’s say ECB owns €22 billion of Irish debt (that’s just a guess, I really don’t know). Combine that with €38 billion from EU-IMF and you have €60 billion in debt that wouldn’t be getting a haircut. Better guesses of ECB holdings of Irish sovereign debt are welcome.

Now apply a 50% haircut to the remaining €92.5 billion of our debt and you reduce the debt by €46.25 billion, or 29 percent of GDP, getting the debt ratio down to 81 percent. (Of course, we’d still be running large deficits, so it would start increasing again.)

So that’s the answer. Perhaps worth noting, however, is that an alternative method of writing down Ireland’s debt by close to 30 percent of GDP without haircutting private bondholders at all would be to have Anglo’s ELA debt to the Central Bank of Ireland written off.

According to its interim report Anglo owed €28.1 billion in ELA at the end of 2010 but this had risen to €38.1 billion by the end of June. This is because Anglo transferred €12.2 billion in NAMA senior bonds to AIB in February to back the deposits that were being moved out of the bank.

On July 1, Anglo was merged with Irish Nationwide Building Society (INBS) to form what is now called the Irish Bank Resolution Corporation (IBRC). As of the end of 2010, INBS had €7.3 billion in loans from the ECB. However, €3.7 billion of this was backed by NAMA bonds and other assets that were transferred to Irish Life and Permanent. INBS has been in receipt of ELA since February to replace this lost funding. While this has been admitted by a Department of Finance official (see this story) the exact figure has not been released. I assume it is about €4 billion.

So my estimate is that the IBRC now owes about €42 billion in Emergency Liquidity Assistance to the Central Bank of Ireland. If the European authorities ever decide they like the idea of haircuts for Irish debt, it would be fair to ask which of a fifty percent haircut or a write-off of ELA would be more likely to damage Ireland’s reputation or cause financial market contagion.

I’d be interested to know the source of the figures cited in this article by Vincent Browne on income tax rates paid by higher earners. It certainly isn’t the last Revenue Commissioners statistical release on tax payments by income distribution, which relate to 2009. Anyway, it’s interesting to compare the figures reported in the article with the tax payments generated by plugging in the same salaries into this useful online tax calculator.

I was struck by the amount of press coverage of the Cycle to Work scheme (C2W). The Irish Bicycle Business Association (IBBA, which seems to have no website) launched a report (which cannot be found online) praising the virtues of C2W.

The report in the Irish Times is brief. 90,000 bikes have been sold since the scheme was introduced. There is no estimate of how many bikes would have been sold without C2W. The IBBA spokesperson claimed that “cycling journeys have increased by more than 50 per cent”, which may or may not be due to C2W, and may not be true as Irish data on travel and transport are sparse. The Dublin Canal Crossing counts (h/t Ossian Smyth) surely do not support a 50% increase.

RTE, BusinessWorld and the Irish Examiner add that 50 new bicycle shops have been established, and 767 new jobs created. They note the increase in the number of bike-based charitable events. And they cite the example of Temple Street Children’s University Hospital, which apparently has kept excellent records of how its employees travel to work.

SiliconRepublic has the most extensive story. It cites a LSE study that shows the commuting by bike improves your health. Such studies are plagued by endogeneity: Are cycling people fit, or do fit people cycle? McNabola et al. (2008) show, for Dublin, that cyclists (who breathe differently) are particularly exposed to PM2.5 and VOC.

The Irish Independent interviewed a bike shop owner. He notes that, since C2W, people buy more expensive bikes and that the success of his business is due to C2W.

C2W is a subsidy on the purchase of a new bicycle. You would indeed expect that people would then buy more and more expensive bikes, which is good for bike shop owners. C2W was one of the first policies introduced by then-Minister Eamon Ryan, who once owned a bike shop (see here).

C2W is unrelated to the use of the bike. Even without the C2W, bicycles beat cars on cost. I find it hard to believe that C2W has induced many to cycle to work instead, but I am aware that there no data to support this.

Feasta (The Foundation for the Economics of Sustainability) are holding an interesting conference on Thursday and Friday of this week titled National Strategies for Dealing with Ireland’s Debt Crisis: Exploring the Options. The webpage for the conference is here and the conference programme is here.

The annual report of the Comptroller and Auditor General contains lots of useful information. However, one criticism I would level at the report is its use of an accounting framework that differs from the General Government Budget that we report to Brussels.

The report states that “Overall State expenditure in 2010 was €53.8 billion, a reduction of 9.5% on the 2009 level” figures that are being widely reported in the news today. The report also lists “Total Receipts” at €35.6 billion up from €34.7 billion the year before.

However, if one looks at the more comprehensive accounts that we provide to Brussels—and which are used as the basis for reporting and compliance with our EU-IMF programme—one finds (page 49) that total expenditure by the Irish government last year was €103.2 billion while total revenues were €53.2 billion.

The €103.2 billion expenditure figure includes €30.8 billion for promissory notes, and one can understand that there are various possible accounting treatments for these notes. However, that still leaves non-promissory-note spending at €72.4 billion, almost twenty billion higher than reported by the C&AG. So despite the use of “overall” and “total”, it’s pretty clear that these are not overall totals at all.

Some of these differences are accounted for by the exclusion of capital spending and on the tax side there’s differing treatment of PRSI contributions. I could go on listing other differences but, frankly, who cares? The GGB figures provided to Brussels are the most comprehensive indicators of our fiscal position and they are being closely watched by the EU and IMF.

As I’ve written about before, these kinds of figures also mislead the public about key magnitudes, thus undermining public debate about fiscal options. For example, you will hear various expenditure items compared against a total tax revenue figure of €31.7 billion—those who’ve read the C&AG report will think total revenue was €35.6 billion. This usually ends up distorting the actual fraction of revenues devoted to these expenditures.

The government has announced that it will sell a minority share of the ESB. This is welcome news. Privatization of non-core activities is a matter of principle. The ESB has paid poor dividends. It has frequently been used to bankroll projects of dubious commercial (yet clear electoral) value. Selling a minority share is a low risk strategy for price discovery and much better than a fire sale.

So far so good. However, the government also announced that it would keep the ESB “as an integrated utility”. The ESB is a conglomerate. It generates power, it owns the transmission network, it sells electricity, and it provides consultancy services.

The network is a natural monopoly, and should probably not be sold. The rest of the ESB can be safely left to the market (if properly regulated).

As an integrated utility with a natural monopoly, The ESB enjoys considerably market power. The nominally independent transmission system operator, EirGrid, gets electrons from ESB, transmits them over lines owned by the ESB, and delivers them to the ESB (who then retails them). The ESB’s dominant position is the main reason why few companies have entered the Irish electricity market.

Today’s announcement suggests that the government plans to continue the current situation. It would make more sense to sell the network to EirGrid. The price of such a sale matters because the ESB is part-owned by an ESOP; and because the ESB is using the network as collateral for cheap loans.

The future ESB will therefore face three demands, compared to two now. The workers will want well-paid jobs, as they had in the past. The political masters will want their pet projects, as they had in the past. And the private owners will want dividends. The consumer will have to pay for all of this.

Former Bertie Ahern Seanad appointee, Eoghan Harris, writes in the Sunday Independent today that he is confused that I can believe public sector pay should be cut and yet also believe that his newspaper has demonised this issue. His silly comments about academics and the Irish Times aren’t worth responding to but I’m happy to clarify what my position is.

In relation to public sector pay, one can argue until the cows come home about whether public sector workers in Ireland are paid more than private sector comparators or comparable public sector workers in other countries, and about how these premia have been altered by the pay cuts of the past few years. However, that debate doesn’t change the fact that Ireland has a very large budget deficit and every major component of expenditure will need to be cut to put the public finances back on an even keel. And that must include public pay.

I’m sceptical about whether an approach that doesn’t see pay rates cut can deliver substantial savings and would also prefer pay cuts to reductions in numbers of front-line workers that will affect the delivery of key public services. So my position is that public sector pay rates need to be cut.

If that’s my position, then what’s my problem with the Sunday Independent? My problem is its focus on high rates of public sector pay as the single cause of the budget deficit. Its coverage repeatedly gives the impression that “we are borrowing to pay for the public sector”. Other areas of spending such as welfare rates receive comparatively little coverage and topics such as our narrow tax base and generous income tax exemptions receive no coverage at all.

An examination of the figures reveals that a focus on public sector pay as the source of the deficit is misplaced. This year, the government will spend €18.1 billion on pay and pensions for the public sector. The general government deficit is projected to be €15.6 billion.

You might think this means we can eliminate the deficit via an 86 percent cut (0.86=15.6/18.1) in public sector pay. But, even if you did manage to get anyone in the public sector to work for 14 percent of their current salary, this strategy still would not work because public servants pay PAYE, PRSI and a pension levy and most of these payments would have disappeared. (They also pay VAT when they spend their salaries.)

I don’t believe the government releases figures on the net cost of the public sector pay and pensions, subtracting taxes and levies, but I would be surprised if it was more than €11 billion. So you could fire every public servant in the country and still not close the deficit.

Back in the realms of reality, even substantial cuts in pay rates will still leave a yawning deficit. For example, consider a cut of 25 percent in pay rate, reducing gross pay by €4.5 billion. The marginal tax rate on public pay rates above €36,000 is 62 percent. (See tax calculator here) so the deficit would only be reduced about one-third of the amounts cut for people on salaries above this level. I suspect the net reduction in the deficit, before accounting for reduced VAT revenues, would be less than half of the gross amount, i.e. somewhere below €2.25 billion.

So, sadly, if the enormous deficit is to be closed, then other categories have to be looked at. These include spending on social payments (which will cost €26.8 billion this year and are largely exempt from income tax), on capital programmes (which will cost €6.1 billion this year) and on the narrowness of our tax base.

The idea that public sector pay is the source of the deficit has a satisfying ring for many. It means that an identifiable group of “other people” is responsible for all our problems. And it allows people to think that the pain of all the spending cuts and tax increases they are being hit with is unnecessary and is only occurring because public servants are being protected: Nothing sells newspapers quite as effectively as rage. I suspect the commenters on this blog have well above the average level of economic literacy and I can tell from repeated comments that many of them believe the deficit is solely due to high rates of public sector pay. Unfortunately, the arithmetic doesn’t support this position.

So that’s why I dislike the Sindo’s coverage of public sector pay. It leads its readers to believe that there is a simple single bullet solution to the deficit and, via that logic, to a demonisation of a particular group as the cause of our problems. Ultimately, this kind of coverage is unhelpful because it undermines public support for the additional measures that need to be taken, over and above public sector pay cuts, if the public finances are to be stabilised.

No doubt Eoghan would still diagnose my position as being down to status anxiety twitch or some other mysterious condition but I’m happy to take a few shots from the Sindo if the result is a more informed debate about the options for closing the deficit.